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)ate: 11/15/2011 
-ime: 11 :57 AM 
'age 1 of 6 
Court - Washington County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased 
User: TRACIE 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased 
)ate 
121/2009 
122/2009 
1/16/2009 
112312009 
Code 
NCIE 
APER 
APIN 
ACAP 
JDMT 
ORDR 
STAT 
PETN 
MISC 
INVE 
NOHG 
HRSC 
CLAI 
DENO 
OBJE 
APER 
CERT 
User 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
IBARRA 
Judge 
New Case Filed - Informal Estate Gregory F Frates 
Other party: Wiggins, Lynn Appearance R Brad Gregory F Frates 
Masingill 
Filing: L 1 - Probate Matters - Application for Gregory F Frates 
Informal Probate Paid by: Masingill, R Brad 
(attorney for Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt number: 
0016150 Dated: 5/21/2009 Amount: $88.00 
(Cashiers Check) For: Wiggins, Lynn (other party) 
Application For Informal Probate Of Will And 
AppOintment Of A Personal Representative 
Gregory F Frates 
Acceptance Of Appointment of personal Gregory F Frates 
representative 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Gregory F Frates 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Brad Masingill Receipt number: 0016151 Datiad: 
5/21/2009 Amount: $2.00 (Cashiers Check) 
Order of informal probate of estate and 
appointment of personal representative 
Gregory F Frates 
Letters of administration Gregory F Frates 
STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Gregory F Frates 
Filing: J1a - Probate, petition for distribution 01' Gregory F Frates 
estate Paid by: Masingill, R Brad (attorney for 
Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt number: 0018429 
Dated: 11/16/2009 Amount: $25.00 (Cashier~; 
Check) For: Wiggins, Lynn (other party) 
Filing: J1d - Probate, intermediate or final Gregory F Frates 
accounting of personal rep Paid by: Masingill, R 
Brad (attorney for Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt 
number: 0018430 Dated: 11/16/2009 Amount: 
$9.00 (Cashiers Check) For: Wiggins, Lynn (other 
party) 
Petition for approval of final settlement and 
certificate of mailing 
Schedule of final distribution annexed to petition 
for final distribution 
Inventory 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
12/02/200911 :00 AM) 
Claim Against Estate 
Demand For Notice 
Objection to final settlement 
Other party: State Of Idaho - Human Services 
Appearance W Corey Cartwright 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Cartwright I Masingill 
000002 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
Gregory F Frates 
late: 11/15/2011 
ime: 11.57 AM 
'age 2 of 6 
Th Court - Washington County User: TRACIE 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased 
late Code User Judge 
1/30/2009 NOTC IBARRA Notice of disallowance of claim Gregory F Frates 
INVE IBARRA Inventory schedules Gregory F Frates 
2/112009 PETN IBARRA Petition for allowance of claim Gregory F Frates 
HRVC IBARRA Hearing result for Motion for Final Accounting Gregory F Frates 
held on 12/02/2009 11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
(per request from Mr. Masingill) 
MEMO IBARRA Memorandum in support of petition for allowance Gregory F Frates 
2/22/2009 NOHG IBARRA Notice Of Hearing Gregory F Frates 
HRSC IBARRA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Gregory F Frates 
01/20/201011 :00 AM) Allowance of Claim 
17/2010 NOHG IBARRA Amended Notice Of Hearing Gregory F Frates 
CONT IBARRA Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/03/2010 Gregory F Frates 
11 :00 AM) Allowance of Claim 
129/2010 MEMO IBARRA Memorandum in support of denial of lien against Gregory F Frates 
Emerson d Wiggins property 
1212010 MEMO IBARRA Responsive Memorandum in support of denia; of Gregory F Frates 
lien against Emerson d Wiggins property 
AFSV IBARRA Affidavit Of Service (of subpoena served on Gregory F Frates 
Robin Wood on 2-2-2010) 
13/2010 REPL IBARRA Reply brief Gregory F Frates 
CMIN IBARRA Court Minutes Gregory F Frates 
Hearing type: Department of Health & WelfarE!'s 
Petition for Allowance of Claim 
Hearing date: 2/3/2010 
Time: 11 :31 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: IBARRA 
Tape Number: 
Party: Lynn Wiggins, Attorney: R Masingill 
ADVS IBARRA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Gregory F Frates 
02/03/2010 11 :00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement Allowance of Claim 
110/2010 MEMO IBARRA Post hearing Memorandum Gregory F Frates 
11/2010 MEMO IBARRA Supplemental post hearing memorandum re Gregory F Frates 
legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218 
115/2010 MEMO IBARRA First supplemental pose hearing memorandum re Gregory F Frates 
Estate of George D Perry Ada County case 
CVIE0905214 
125/2010 RSPN LEE Response to March 15,2010 Memorandum Gregory F Frates 
130/2010 MEMO IBARRA Memorandum decision denying petitioners claim Gregory F Frates 
against the estate 
CERT IBARRA Certificate Of Mailing Gregory F Frates 
Masingilll Cortwright 
131/2010 REPL IBARRA Reply to departments March 18 Memorandum Gregory F Frates 
000003 
)ate: 11/15/2011 Th ct Court - Washington County User: TRACIE 
"ime: 11 :57 AM ROAReport 
'age 3 of 6 Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased 
late Code User Judge 
17/2010 MOTN IBARRA Motion for attorneys fees and costs Gregory F Frates 
AFFD IBARRA Affidavit of counsel in support of motion for Gregory F Frates 
attorneys fees and costs including the factorsn 
IRCP 54 
MEMO IBARRA Memorandum in support of the estates motion for Gregory F Frates 
attorneys fees and costs 
ORDR IBARRA Order approving petition for final settlement of Gregory F Frates 
estate and closing estate 
MOTN IBARRA Motion for stay pending appeal and stay of appeal Gregory F Frates 
BREF IBARRA Brief in support of motion to stay Gregory F Frates 
NTOA IBARRA Notice Of Appeal Gregory F Frates 
STAT IBARRA STATUS CHANGED: Reopened Renae J Hoff 
19/2010 MEMO IBARRA Memorandum in opposition to the departments Gregory F Frates 
motion to stay 
PETN IBARRA 1 st amended petition for approval of final Gregory F Frates 
settlement and certificate of mailing 
INVE IBARRA First amended Inventory schedules of property of Gregory F Frates 
Vivian M Wiggins and Emerson DWiggins 
deceased 
MISC IBARRA 1 st amended schedule of final distribution Gregory F Frates 
annexed to petition for final distribution 
NOHG IBARRA 2nd amended Notice Of Hearing Gregory F Frates 
HRSC IBARRA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Gregory F Frates 
04/21/2010 11 :00 AM) Petition for Allowance of 
Claim 
114/2010 MISC ANDERSON Estimated Cost of Transcript (emailed to Cory Gregory F Frates 
Cartwright) ($120.25 within 30 daysl 
$157.25 within 7 days) 
OBJC IBARRA Objection to first amended petition and hearin~ Gregory F Frates 
MEMO IBARRA Memorandum in support of objection Gregory F Frates 
MISC ANDERSON Request from Atty General's Office (Stacey Renae J Hoff 
Genta) for transcript of 2/3/2010 Allowance of 
Claim hearing (via phone then email) 
115/2010 NOHG IBARRA Notice Of Hearing (Motion for Stay Pending Gregory F Frates 
Appeal and Stay of Appeal) 
HRSC IBARRA Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Stay 04/21/2010 Gregory F Frates 
11 :00 AM) Motion to Stay pending Appeal and 
Stay of Appeal (AG's office) 
120/2010 MOTN IBARRA Motion to disallow attorney fees and costs Gregory F Frates 
AFFD IBARRA Affidavit of W Corey Cartwright Gregory F Frates 
MEMO IBARRA Memorandum in support of motion to disallow Gregory F Frates 
attorney fees and costs 
MEMO IBARRA Memorandum in opposition to departments Gregory F Frates 
motion for stay re attorneys fees 
late: 11/15/2011 
'ime: 11 :57 AM 
'age 4 of 6 
Th Court - Washington County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased 
User: TRACIE 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased 
late Code User 
121/2010 CMIN IBARRA 
ORDR IBARRA 
HRHD IBARRA 
HRHD IBARRA 
/22/2010 MISC ANDERSON 
MISC ANDERSON 
126/2010 OASI IBARRA 
APDC IBARRA 
129/2010 BONT ANDERSON 
130/2010 ORDR IBARRA 
CERT IBARRA 
14/2010 MISC ANDERSON 
BNDV ANDERSON 
BNDV ANDERSON 
15/2010 ORDR ANDERSON 
119/2010 MEMO IBARRA 
AFFD IBARRA 
MOTN IBARRA 
125/2010 MISC IBARRA 
128/2010 MISC IBARRA 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney Fees and 
Motion for Stay 
Hearing date: 4/21/2010 
Time: 11 :03 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: IBARRA 
Tape Number: 
Party: Lynn Wiggins, Attorney: R Masingill 
Judge 
Gregory F Frates 
Order staying distribution of estate pending Gregory F Frates 
appeal 
Hearing result for Motion to Stay held on Gregory F Frates 
04/21/201011 :00 AM: Hearing Held Motion to 
Stay pending Appeal and Stay of Appeal (AG'~; 
office) 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Gregory F Frates 
04/21/201011 :00 AM: Hearing Held Petition for 
Allowance of Claim 
Estimated Cost of Transcript (for 4/21110 hearing) Gregory F Frates 
($120.25 within 30 days/$157.25 within 7 days) 
Emailed to: Stacey Genta, Paralegal Attorney 
Gen'l Office 
Request for preparation of transcript for hearing Renae J Hoff 
held 4/21/2010 from Attorney General's Office -
Stacey Genta paralegal 
Order Of Assignment Gregory F Frates 
Appeal Filed In District Court Renae J Hoff 
Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 20600 Dated Renae J Hoff 
4/29/2010 for 157.25) 
Order re attorneys fees and costs 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Masingilll Cartwright 
Transcript of Motion Hearing held 2/3/2010 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 2327 dated Renae J Hoff 
5/4/2010 amount 85.00) (Canyon Transcription) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 2328 dated Renae J Hoff 
5/4/2010 amount 72.25) (Dept of H & W) 
Order for Preparation of Transcript and Appellate Renae J Hoff 
Scheduling (2/3/2010 hearing) Copies to: 
CartwrightlMasingili/Appeals Clerk 
Post hearing memorandum re Idaho Code 12-117 Renae J Hoff 
Second affidavit of W Corey Cartwright Renae J Hoff 
Motion to strike 
Corrected attachment to post hearing 
memorandum 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
ate: 11/15/2011 Thi Court - Washington County User: TRACI E 
ime: 11 :57 AM ROA Report 
age 5 of 6 Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased 
n The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased 
ate 
111/2010 
116/2010 
11712010 
123/2010 
12/2010 
112/2010 
113/2010 
121/2010 
117/2010 
0/1512010 
0/22/2010 
1/15/2010 
1/29/2010 
18/2011 
Code User 
BONT ANDERSON 
MOTN ANDERSON 
BREF ANDERSON 
ORDR ANDERSON 
ORDR IBARRA 
CERT IBARRA 
NOTC ANDERSON 
BNDV ANDERSON 
BNDV ANDERSON 
BNDV ANDERSON 
BNDE ANDERSON 
LODG ANDERSON 
NOTC ANDERSON 
BREF SLOAN 
MOTN TRACIE 
AFFD TRACIE 
ORDR TRACIE 
BREF TRACIE 
BREF TRACIE 
HRSC TRACIE 
DCHH TRACIE 
Judge 
Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 21118 Dated Renae J Hoff 
6/11/2010 for 157.25) 
Motion for Additional Transcript (Wasden) (of 
4/21/2010 hearing) 
Renae J Hoff 
Brief in Support of Motion for Additional Transcript Renae J Hoff 
(Wasden) 
Order for Additional Transcript Copies to: 
MasingilllCartwrightiClerk's Office 
Order on attorney fees 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Masingilll Cartwright 
Notice of Cross Appeal (Masingill) 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 2423 dated Renae J Hoff 
7/12/2010 amount 40.25) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 2424 dated Renae J Hoff 
7/12/2010 amount 117.00) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 2425 dated Renae J Hoff 
7/1312010 amount 117.00) 
Transcript Bond Exonerated (Amount 40.25) Renae J Hoff 
Lodged Transcript on Motion for Attorney's Fees Renae J Hoff 
and Motion to Stay held 4/21/2010. Copies 
mailed to: Masisngilll 
Cartwright 
Notice of Clerk's Lodged Transcript for Appeal Renae J Hoff 
Copies to: Masingill/Cartwright 
Appellant's Brief Renae J Hoff 
Motion For Extension of Time For Filing Renae J Hoff 
Respondent's Brief 
Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Motion for Renae J Hoff 
Extension of Time for Filing Respondent's Brinf 
Order for Extension of Time for Filing Renae J Hoff 
Respondent's Brief 
Respondent's Brief Renae J Hoff 
Appellant's Reply Brief Renae J Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Renae J Hoff 
02/08/2011 01 :30 PM) (Before Honorable Linda 
Copple Trout) 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held Renae J Hoff 
on 02108/2011 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Carole Bull 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: (Before Honorable Linda Copple 
Trout) 
late: 11/15/2011 
·ime: 11 :57 AM 
'age 6 of 6 
istrict Court - Washington County User: TRACIE 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2009-0001926 Current Judge: Renae J Hoff 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, etal. Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Vivian M Wiggins, Emerson Duane Wiggins Deceased 
late Code User Judge 
19/2011 CMIN TRACIE Court Minutes Renae J Hoff 
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Hearing date: 2/8/2011 
Time: 1:18 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Carole Bull 
Minutes Clerk: Tracie Jo Widener 
Tape Number: 
In the Matter of the Estates of: 
Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, 
Deceased 
/21/2011 NOTC TRACIE Notice of Augmentation and/or Supplementation Renae J Hoff 
of Respondent's Brief Pursuant to IAR 34(f( 1) 
120/2011 FJDE TRACIE Memorandum Decision on Appeal Copies to: Renae J Hoff 
Masingill,Cartwright, Frates, Appeals Clerk 
STAT TRACIE STATUS CHANGED: Closed Renae J Hoff 
/11/2011 MISC SLOAN Estimated Costs of Court Transcript - 54 Renae J Hoff 
pgs/$175.50 - Copy to: AG OfficelLisa 
116/2011 BONT SLOAN Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 2949 Dated Renae J Hoff 
8/16/2011 for 229.50) 
STAT SLOAN STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Renae J Hoff 
action 
125/2011 NOTA TRACIE NOTICE OF APPEAL (filed by Cartwright, State Renae J Hoff 
of Idaho) 
126/2011 BNDC SLOAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3107 Dated Renae J Hoff 
8/26/2011 for 175.50) 
BNVO SLOAN Bond Voided Renae J Hoff 
19/2011 MISC TRACIE Counsel must be served by October 7,2011 Renae J Hoff 
(Docket#39129-2011 
Clerk's Record & Reporter's Transcripts must be 
filed on or before November 11, 2011 
113/2011 NOTC TRACIE Notice of Cross-Appeal (Masingill) Renae J Hoff 
TRACIE Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Renae J Hoff 
Supreme Court Paid by: Masingill, R Brad 
(attorney for Wiggins, Lynn) Receipt number: 
0003304 Dated: 9/13/2011 Amount: $101.00 
(Cashiers Check) For: Wiggins, Emerson Duane 
(subject), Wiggins, Lynn (other party) and 
Wiggins, Vivian M (subject) 
116/2011 OR DR TRACIE Order Suspending Appeal Renae J Hoff 
130/2011 REQU TRACIE Request for Additional Record (Cartwright) Renae J Hoff 
0/26/2011 ORDR TRACIE Order (Memo Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Renae J Hoff 
Against the Estate is hereby Affirmed) 
0/31/2011 NOTA TRACIE AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL (Cartwright) Renae J Hoff 
1/4/2011 BNDC SLOAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3925 Dated Renae J Hoff 
11/4/2011 for 175.50) 
1/9/2011 NOTC TRACIE Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal (Masingill) Renae J Hoff 
000007 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
E-mail: bmasingill(a1hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV-:Wt09-1926 
PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF 
FINAL SETTLEMENT, AND 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Category L7 $ 9.00 I 
Category L8 $25.00 .... J , 
PETITIONER, LYNN WIGGINS, of Weiser, Idaho, represents to the Court that: 
1. Petitioner is the Personal Representative of the estme of the above named 
decedents, has collected and managed the assets of the estate, ha:, filed Petitioner's final 
inventory and schedules, paid all lawful claims against the estate, including all federal and state 
estate, inheritance and other death taxes now due, and performed all other acts required of 
Petitioner by the laws of this State pertaining to estates of the decedents:: and 
2. The time for presenting valid claims which arose prior to the death of the 
decedents has expired, or it is not expected that any valid claims will be presented, all known 
Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 1 
valid claims have been paid, or have been provided for in the final di~;tribution and there are no 
known contingent, unliquidated, or future valid claims against the estat'~; and 
3. That Vivian M. Wiggins transferred all her assets to Emerson D. Wiggins more 
than five years prior to his death and thus there are no valid Medicaid or Medicare claims; and 
Petitioner has filed concurrently herewith the following: 
a. Inventory Schedules of Property of Vivian M. \iliggins and the Inventory 
Schedules of Emerson D. Wiggins; and 
h. Schedule of Final Distribution; and 
5. Testacy Status: 
a. The decedents died intestate; and 
b. Petitioner has been appointed Personal Representative of the estate of the 
decedents; and 
c. Petitioner affirms that the statements set forth in Petitioner's Application 
for Informal Probate heretofore filed; and 
6. Based on the foregoing, and on the documents referenced above, it appears that a 
final distribution of the assets at this time is proper, subject to the right to recover against the 
distributees for proportionate payment of any claim or debt found by law to be due by the estate. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that: 
1. The Court fix a time and place for hearing on this Petition; and 
2. Notice be given as required by law. 
3. After notice and hearing, the Court enter an Order: 
Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 2 
a. Approving the Petition for Final Settlement and Distribution together with 
the schedules as filed by the Petitioner; and 
b. Authorizing and directing Petitioner to pay any outstanding 
encumbrances, pay any remaining costs or fees for administration, any attorney 
fees and costs remaining unpaid, any taxes due, any accOlmting fees necessary to 
close the estate, transfer title in the assets of the estate a: deemed necessary by the 
Personal Representative, and distribute the remainder of the assets of the estate to 
the distributees in the amount (together with any intere:;t earned thereon and less 
any fees or costs as aforementioned) in the manner se'i forth in the Schedule of 
Distribution; and 
c. After Petitioner has made such final settJ ement and distribution, 
discharging and releasing Petitioner, and closing the administration ofthis estate. 
Dated this a+IJay of November, 2009. 
Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 3 
R. Brad Ma:;ingill 
Attorney for the Personal 
Representative 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss: 
County of Washington ) 
The Petitioner, LYNN WIGGINS, being sworn, having read the foregoing, state that the 
facts set forth therein are accurate and complete to the best of the PI~titioner's knowledge and 
belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the ~ay of N O\Jerni'lr,2009. 
KAUEE EISENBARTH 
NOTARY PUBUC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 4 
'(ak ,Siwml/liblih 
Notary Puhlic for Idaho 
Residing in: We~ser 1--2015 
My Comm, Expires: 8"'2:\0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the 16.~ay of Nevwt'f'£, 2009, a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 
was mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. Second 
Weiser, Idaho 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
clo Kathy Ganett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Human Services 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D]STRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF \VASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009 .. 1926 
CLAIM AGAINST E:STATE 
(I.C. § 15-3-804) 
EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212 
f 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, by and through its 
counsel, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, Deputy Attorney General, and he:rebymakes claim against 
the above-captioned estate. This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the 
amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the Decedent VIVIAN :tvL WIGGINS, as set forth 
at Idaho Code § 56-218. The Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 1 
Y:\MRCases\Estate\Wigginsv\C&D.wpd 
Decedent, VIVIAN M. WIGGINS, in the amount of$272,134.68 as of November 17,2009. As of 
this date, $7,460.23 has been applied to this amount leaving the current amount of$264,674.45. To 
the extent that the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalf of 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS, it reserves the right to supplement its claim inlhis proceeding. 
DATED this-,--_b_dayofNovember, 2009. 
fl!~~,;~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
STACEY GENT A, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the Claimant's 
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate and know the 
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct. 
TA, Paralegal 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 15t day of November, 2009. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Commission EXPires:C':~}A. D. 2-D1 Z_ 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that the foregoing CLAIM AGAINST 
ESTATE was mailed first class, and sent via facsimile, on the I g' d.ay of November, 2009, to: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
C/O R BRAD MASINGILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
"WEISER ID 83672 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 3 
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facsimile (208) 414-0490 
~A.J. 01 Cllv1lL 
Marchell Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Human Services 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF \VASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2009-1926 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE 
(I.C. § 15-3-204) 
EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-32!2 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, (hereinafter the 
"Department") pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-204, and hereby files its Demand for Notice of orders 
or other filings pertaining to the estate of the above-named Decedent. The Department asserts that 
it has a financial or property interest in said estate based upon the amount of medical assistance 
benefits which it was required to pay on behalf of the above-named Decedent and/or Decedent's 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - 1 
Y;\MRCases\Estate\ Wigginsv\C&D. wpd 
spouse, and based upon its right to recover the amount of medical assistance benefits paid on her 
behalf as set forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. 
The Department further requests a copy of the Inventory ant l Appraisement, upon its 
preparation within three months of the personal representative's appointm(:nt, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-706. 
Notice should be given to the Department through its attorney, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, 
Deputy Attorney General, Division of Human Services, 3276 Elder, Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-0036. 
DATED this 12 day of November, 2009. 
~/~ 
W. CO~ ARTWRIGHT 
DeputfA,.ttorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE was mailed first class, and sent via facsimile, on the I ~ day of 
November, 2009, to: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
CIO R BRAD MASINGILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER ID 83672 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - 2 
Y :1J.1RCases\Estate\ Wi ggins v\C&D. wpd 
facsimile (208) 41<t-0490 
~{dwLtQ fY)o 
March Ie Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------) 
Case No. PV-2i)09-1926 
! 
I 
OBJECTION TO FINAL 
, 
SETTLEMENT 
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Department") and OBJECTS to the Petition for Approval of Final Set:lement. This objection is 
made because the Department has a valid claim against this estate pUrS"lant to Idaho Code 
§ 56-218, for Medicaid payments made on behalf of Vivian Wiggins b(~fore her death, which 
claim has not been paid and which the final settlement does not propose to pay. 
OBJECTION TO FINAL SETTLEMENT - 1 Y:\MRCases\Estate\' VigginsV\Objection to Final Settlement.wpd 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2009, 
CARTWRIGJ~~r 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, and sent via facsimile, to the following: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
C/O R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER ID 83672 
facsimile (208) 414-0490 
DATED this 11-day of November, 2009. 
ndtbW~ Qa-q " 
Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
OBJECTION TO FINAL SETTLEMENT - 2 Y:\MRCases\Estate\WigginsV\Objection to Final Settlernent.wpd 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
Email-bmasingiII@hotmaiI.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASIDNGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) Case No.: CV-2f09-1926 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
The Personal Representative of the above-entitled estate, Lynn Wiggins, pursuant to 
Idaho Code 15-3-806, hereby notifies the claimant, Department of Health and Welfare, 3276 
Elder Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho, 83720-0036 that tte entire claim is hereby 
disallowed. 
~ 
Dated this 2.Lf day of November, 2009. 
Notice - 1 
:/~V\ ;1:- . t!.~ ~) Lynn Iggins, i 'J Personal Representative 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the "1.".'-4 day of November, 2009 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Disallowance of Claim was mailed by regular United States 
mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder Suite B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 , 
LYNN WIGGINS 
1520 W. 2nd 
Weiser,ID 83672 
Notice - 2 
INVENTORY SCHEDULES OF PROPERTY OF: 
VIVIAN M. \VIGGINS and EMERSON D. WIGGINI;, Deceased 
Dated: 11-24-09 A1et1--l.~~ ........ _ 
Recapitulation 
Community Separate 
Schedule Description Propeny Property 
Schedule A Real Estate $ -0- $ - 0-
Schedule B Stock and Bonds $ -0- $ -0-
Schedule C C.D.'s, Notes and Cash $ -0- $ 78,508.59 
Schedule D Other Misc. Personal $ -0- $ -0-
Property 
Schedule E Expenditures unknown $ -0-
Total Net Value $ -0- $ 78,508.59 
Schedule A - - - Real Estate 
Community Separate 
Item Description Property, Property 
a. None 
Total $ -0- $ -0-
Item 
b. 
Total 
Item 
c. 
Total 
Schedule B - - - Stocks and Bonds 
Description 
None 
Community Separate 
Properr;y Property 
Schedule C - - - C.D.'s, Notes, and Cash 
Description 
Checking account # 422330274 
Separate property of 
Emerson D. Wiggins 
Community 
Property 
$ -0-
Separate 
Property 
$78,508.59 
$78,508.59 
Item 
d. 
Item 
e. 
f. 
TOTAL 
Schedule D - - - Miscellan(':ous 
Communi1y 
Description Propert£. 
None $ -0-
Total $ -0-
Schedule E - - - Expenditures 
Description 
Personal Representative 
Fee and care of decedents 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
Unknown at this time. 
Community 
Property 
Determined after resolution of claim 
Separate 
Propem 
$ -0-
$ -0-
Separate 
Prope!!y 
$12,250.00 
$ -0-
Nov. 30. 2009 3:09PM 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder. Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
1SB No. 3361 
{cartwriw@dhw,idaho.gov] 
No. 4493 P 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS, and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS} 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. 2009-1926 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE 
OF CLAIM 
(I.C. § 15-3-806) 
EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212 
COMES NOW, THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, through its attorney, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, Deputy Attorney General, and 
represents that: 
1. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter 
"Department")} paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent, VNlAN M. 
WIGGINS, in the amount ofS264,674.45; 
2. The Personal Representative did not give the Departme:llt notice ofthis probate as 
required by Idaho Code § 56-218(5). The Department learned of this :rrobate upon receipt of 
final distribution documents filed in this case on November 16, 2009. 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM-
Nov,30,20093:09PM No,4493 , 3 
3. Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-804 and 56·218, a written statement of the 
Department's claim in the amount of $264,674.45 was mailed to the personal representative of 
the estate and filed with the Court on November 23) 2009; 
4. On November 27,2009, the Department received a Notice of Disallowance of 
Claim without a stated reason for the disallowance; and 
5. The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be 
allowed for the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of thb,Decedent to the fullest 
extent possible. 
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS That the C)urt enter an Order 
allowing the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible. 
DATED this 3:p day of November 30,2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct cOEY 0 f L1e foregoing PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was sent via facsimile on the 30 da7ofNovember, 2009, to: 
R. Brad Masingill 
Attomey at Law 
27 West Conimercial Street 
P. O. Box 467 
Weiser) ID 83672 
Washington County Clerk 
Washington County Courthouse 
256 E. Court 
P. O. Box 670 
Weiser, ID 83672 
facsimile (208) 414-0490 
faCSimile (208) 414-3925 
~cU6hd,(1 9#mJO 
MARCELLE PltEMO, Legal Assistant 
Division of Humm Services 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 000026 
Dec. 1 2009 2:41PM 
LAWRENCE G, WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
No. 4547 P. 2 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3216 Elder, Ste. B ~ .-~ \. \ ,,~ 
POBox 83720 Fned~:~)S)h.q~ .<:'&,D 
Boise ID 83720-0036 BeTTY J. THOMAS d=J:\~e-M. 
Clerk Distrlct:ourt Telephone: (208) 332-1961 1;, 
ISB No. 3361 ~.. \o~~nJlePuty 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] J ~~_£-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASIDNGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2D09-1926 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE 
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Department") and submits the following memorandum of points and llutl10rities in support of its 
Petition for Allowance of Claim: 
I. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Decedent Vivian Wiggins ((Vivian") died January 30,2009, at the age of97. Her 
husband Emerson Wiggins ("Emerson") died less than two weeks later on February 9,2009. He 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE - 1 Y:\MRCa5es\E;;late\Wlgglos\'\MemOll!ndl,m in Suppon ofPelillo" for Allowafic".wpd 
Dec, 2009 2:41PM No 4 7 p, 3 
was 98 years old. Vivian entered the nursing home in June 2002. Emerson applied for Medicaid 
benefits to assist in paying Vivian's nursing home costs, and Medicaid wes approved effective 
September 1, 2003. After that date, the Department, through the Medicaid program, has paid for 
benefits totaling at least) $272,134.68. 
About May 22, 2009, Lynn Wiggins was appointed personal repre3entative for this estate. 
This matter was opened as a joint estate pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-· 111. The personal 
representative did not give notice of his appointment to the Departmenf as required by Idaho 
Code § 56-218(5). On November 16,2009, the Deparhnent received a copy of the Petition for 
Approval afFinal Settlement, the Notice of Hearing, and other documents from the personal 
representative. This was the first notice the Department had of this mater. On November 18, 
2009, the Department served its Claim Against Estate, and Demand for Notice upon the personal 
representative. These documents were filed with the court on Novemh~r 23,2009, The 
Department asserted a claim in the amount of $264,674.45,2 
Also on November 18,2009, the Department served its Objectillll to Final Settlement, 
which was filed with the court on November 23,2009. On November 24,2009) the personal 
representative disallowed the Department's claim without stating a rea~on. On November 30, 
2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
IMcdicaid providers have up to one year to submit claims for payment. Theref;)rc, ~hc Department reserves the 
right to supplement its Claim Against Estate if it pays more benefits on behalf of Mrs, Wlgg:ns. 
2 A voluntary payment was made on behalf of Vivian on March 27, 2008, in the amount of $7,460.23, reducing 
the amount of the Department's claim. 
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II. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S DISALLO\Y ANCE 
IS UNSUPPORTED BY LAW. 
While the personal representative's Notice of Disallowance, do;s not state a reason, the 
personal representative has suggested in other discussions that he belie'/es that because Vivian 
conveyed her property to Emerson and the property thereby became Emerson's separate property, 
the Department cannot recover. This position has no support in law. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides for the recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estates 
of deceased Medicaid recipients and their spouses: 
56-218 Recovery of Certain Medical Assistance. - (1) Except where 
exempted or waived in accordance with federal1aw medical asdstance pursuant to 
this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or 
older when the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the 
individual'S estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any. for such aid paid to either 
or both, .. , 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). This is a joint estate which assumes that all of 
Vivian's property passed to Emerson on her death. Idaho Code § 15-3·111. Idaho Code 
§ 56-218 clearly authorizes recovery from this joint estate whether the lssets are derived from 
Vivian or from Emerson. 
Whether the property had become Emerson's separate property is irrelevant. The 
DepartmenCs recovery is against any property which had been the couple's community property 
at any time after October 1, 1993; 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. - Limits on the Departmentls claim 
against the assets of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections 
56~218 and 56-21 SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a 8pouse of a 
participant is limited to the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
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time after October I, 1993. community property, or the deceased participant's 
share the separate property, and jointly owned property .... 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). In this case, the personal nlpresentative has 
suggested that Vivian conveyed all her property to Emerson in the proc ~s of qualifying for 
Medicaid benefits. Such transfers between spouses are permitted 7 and nre routine as pmt of the 
eligibility process, This allows one spouse to become eligible for Medicaid while the other is left 
with sufficient assets to live independently in the community. Howeve~, it does not affect the 
Department's ability to recover such assets through estate recovery. 
Challenges to Idaho's spousal recovery law have been made in lthe past) but the Idaho 
Supreme Comt put these challenges to rest in 1998 in the case ofIdaho Department of Health 
and Welfare v, Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998), The Jackn:llID, case was similar to 
this case in that the Medicaid recipient passed away before her surviving spouse who was 
possession of aU of the couple's assets. The personal representative ch.illenged the Department's 
claim on numerous grounds including federal pre-emption. The Idaho :Supreme Court, however, 
upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definit~.on of estate pennitted by 
federallaw3 and adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(b), validated reco'rery of property that had, 
at any time, been community property. 
The Jackman case can be difficult to read because of the way it was decided. In the 
court's first decision. the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the Depertment. Upon a 
Petition for Rehearing\ the Supreme Court modified its decision to hold that the Department's 
)42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
4The Department was given no opportunity to respond to the Petition for Rehea rin:~ either in writing or by 
argument 
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right to recover from property that had been cOll',ffiunity property was limhed to property that had 
been community property after the effective date of the federal law, "OBRA 93" that created the 
expanded definition of estate in 1993.5 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery, but in the 
Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided by a marriage settlement agreement in 
April, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law. 
The published summary of the case correctly captures this two part holding: 
... The Supreme Court, Johnson j J .• held that: (1) ifthe estate of the individual 
who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of the 
assistance received, thy Deoartment can recover the balance from the estate of the 
sU);yiving spouse, but (2) federal law! as in effect when recipient 3...'1d her husband 
entered into marital settlement agreement transmuting most ohecipient's and 
husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited the 
Department to recovering any community property recipient and hllsband may 
have accumulated after the agreement. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 213,970 P.2d at 6 (underline added). Justice Jomson's introduction also 
explains the coures holding: 
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that seeton 56-218(1) of 
the Idaho Code (I.C.), as it existed at times applicable to this ca!Je, authOlized the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) to recover from the 
available estate of a surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments received 
by an individual who was fiftv-five years old or older when recdYillg the 
payments if the individual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. We 
conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibi:ed this 
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated 
after a marriage settlement agreement transmuting their commu:1ity property into 
separate property of each. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 214, 970 P.2d at 7 (underline added). Justice Johnson explained that the 
Department was limited in the Jackman case only because the marriage settlement agreement 
5This Iimitarion is embodied in lDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 cited above, limiting spousal recovery to property that 
had been community property at any time after October I, 1993. 
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was executed before the effective date ofthe federal law expanding the; definition of estate for 
Medicaid recovery purposes: 
We conclude that this definition of "assetsll is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lione! and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendmen~s to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or l>efore the date of 
the enactment of this Act[Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § B611(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not anow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate pnperty. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Departnlent to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
g.efinition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C, § 1396p(e)(1), Hofler assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.e. § :\ 5-1-201(l5}. 
Lionel's separate property, including the conununity property tr msmuted by the 
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216~7l 970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added). 
Therefore, the Jackman caSe conclusively holds that in Idaho, the Department may 
recover from the estate of the spouse as long as the property had been (ommunity property at any 
time after October 1, 1993, 
llI. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no reasonable basis in law for the personal representative's position in this n;ase. 
Idaho law clearly pennits the Department to recover from this estate, regardless of whether it had 
become Emerson's separate property through transfers from Vivian or upon Vivian)s death or 
both. The characterization of Emerson's property as "separate" makes no difference in this case. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl., DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) Case No.: 2009-1~j26 
) 
) 
) MEMORANDUl\1 IN SUPPORT 
) OF DENIAL OF LIEN AGAINST 
) EMERSON D. '" IGGINS' PROPERTY 
) 
) 
) 
Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled estates, and files his 
Memorandum in Support of Disallowance of Claim against Emerson D ·Wiggins. In the above-
entitled matter, the following facts are undisputed: 
FACTS: 
The following are the facts upon which testimony will be adduced relative to the claim of 
lien filed by the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare. 
a. Segregation. Prior to 2002, Emerson and Vivian's estat~s were segregated, each 
holding one half as their respective sole and separate property. The tesTirrony and documentary 
evidence will show that in 2002 Emerson had an account with Zions Bank, Weiser, Idaho which 
held three accounts shown on Exhibit A. The evidence will show that M(~dicaid, Emerson, and 
Vivian determined the amount of money available to Vivian, pursuant to the segregation. The 
testimony and documentary evidence will show that Lynn Wiggins, th~ personal representative 
in this matter, helped Vivian and Emerson keep track ofthe moneys each owned as their sole and 
separate property. Those figures generally agree with the documentary evidence from Medicaid 
in which Medicaid determined all assets of Vivian had been depleted, thus making her eligible 
for Medicaid in September, 2002. 
b. lVledicaid Records and Consent. Lynn Wiggins, on behalf of his parents, 
provided Medicaid (in approximately 2002) with documentation to SGOW what assets Vivian 
owned so Medicaid could determine her eligibility for Medicaid. Lynn povided Medicaid bank 
statements and certificates of deposit. Lynn provided Medicaid all documentation they 
requested, which showed what each parent owned as his or her sole and separate property. The 
evidence will show that Medicaid determined the assets Vivian owned, calculated when she 
would be eligible, and monitored the accounts and account statements. The documents will 
show that Emerson and Vivian had provided Medicaid with all the statements and documents 
showing their respective assets, all of which show the separate nature th~reof. 
c. Medicaid Planning. The planning for Medicaid and the division of assets into 
each owning their own separate property was done in connection vvi th advice from a former 
Third District Judge, Wayne Fuller. The purpose of the planning was t) nake sure each spouse 
had sufficient funds with which to take care of themselves. 
d. Both Blind. Both Emerson and Vivian were blind. TIeir son and daughter-in-
law, LyrJl and Donna Wiggins, were in charge of taking them tc all medical and other 
appointments. 
e. Vivian's Care. In May of 2002, Vivian got ill ane was in need of medical 
and other services. The money segregated to her was used up by me:iical and care expenses. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a list of expenditures on behalf of Vivian commencing in 
November of 2002 and ending in August of 2003, compiled by Lynn. The list shows when her 
separate funds ran out. Vivian began receiving Medicaid on September 1, 2003, which 
corresponds with Lynn's calculations. The specific dates upon which services were granted to 
Vivian were as follows: 
1. Admit to Presbyterian Community Care Center on 5-9-02; and 
2. Discharged from Presbyterian Community Care Cent(~r on 6-7-02; and 
3. Admit to Weiser Rehabilitation and Care Center on 6-7-02; and 
4. Medicaid first provided to Vivian on September 1,2003. 
f. Emerson's Care. In October of2002, Emerson began renting an apartment at 
Park View Center Apartments and remained there through 2008. The ~pecific dates upon which 
services were granted to Emerson were as follows: 
1. Rented apartment at Park View Center on 10-1-02; and 
2. Moved from Park View Center on 7-5-08; and 
3. Admit to The Cottages on 7-5-08; and 
4. Medicaid paid nothing for Emerson. All expenses were out of his pocket. 
g. Agreement with Medicaid: Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Zions 
Bank statements of Emerson Wiggins, showing his segregated funds. A review of the statements 
shows the only items which were not segregated in Emerson's bank re;ords were the insurance 
premiums paid by Emerson on behalf of Vivian out of his separate property. Medicaid 
authorized those payments, and allowed Emerson to be reimbursed by~eceiving Vivian's social 
--------
security. 
h. Vivian's Death. Vivian M. Wiggins died on the 3Cth day of January, 2009 
in Weiser, Idaho, while a resident of Weiser, Washington County, Idaho; and 
i. Emerson's Death. Emerson Wiggins died on the 9th :lay of February, 2009 in 
Weiser, Idaho, while a resident of Weiser, Washington County, Idaho. 
j. Inventory Schedules of Property. The money shown in the estate (and upon 
which Medicaid seeks its lien) is Emerson's sole and separate property. See Inventory Schedules 
of Property filed in the probate estate. The Inventory Schedules of Property reflect the division 
and segregation of the decedents' property, i.e. Vivian had no assets and Emerson had only that 
which was placed into his bank account, as his sole and separate property. 
k. The Lien. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a letter o~'March 5, 2009, from the 
Department of Health and Welfare, State of Idaho. The letter clearly shows the lien is against 
the Vivian Wiggins, only. 
I. 
Legal Argument 
A. Medicaid Look Back Period: As the Court no doubt is aware, some time ago 
Idaho adopted a statute which is intended to secure reimbursement for Medicaid funds lawfully 
provided to a person (hereinafter the recipient). The Idaho statutes, di:;cussed below, are based 
entirely upon a federal statute which requires the states (which are participating in the Medicaid 
program) to attempt to obtain reimbursement for funds provided to recipients under the program. 
The initial look back period for becoming Medicaid eligible was thee (3) years when the 
segregation and transfers were made. 
B. Federal Statute: The federal statute involved in the case at bar for Medicaid 
liens, adjustments, and recoveries is 42 USC 1396p. The Medicaid reimbursement statute is part 
of the Social Security Act of 1965. The Medicaid program is funded jointly by each 
participating state and the federal government. It is administered by the states. See recently 
State Dept of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905 (Ida 10, 2008), 42 U.S.e. §§ 
1396a, and 42 U.S.e. §§ 1396k. 
The issue in this case is what reimbursement is allowed under the provisions of 42 USC 
1396p. Stated another way, the state is not entitled to recover medical assistance (correctly paid) 
under Medicaid, unless the right to recover is allowed by federal law. Thus, the right to recover 
in the Wiggins estate is limited by the terms of the federal statute. 
In Hudelson, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the State cannot fudge beyond 
that which is allowed by the specific language of the federal statute: 
"The Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the anti-lien provisic1n of the federal Medicaid 
statute, and found that it limited a state's ability to recover medical expenses it paid on a 
Medicaid recipient's behalf. Id. at 284, 126 S. Ct. at 1763, 16~ L.Ed.2d at 473-74. A 
state Medicaid plan must comply with section 1396p, which generally prohibits states 
from placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property. 7 42 US.C. § 1396a(a)(l8)." 
(emphasis added). 
As discussed in Barg, supra (hereinafter discussed at length in iIDother section) initially 
Medicaid legislation (pre-1993) provided that the States were allowed, but not required, to 
recover Medicaid benefits, and Congress specified reimbursement was cmly from the recipient's 
estate, and only after the surviving spouse died. 
In the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 42 U.~.c. 1396p(b)(l), and (4), 
the statute allowed recovery against the "individual's estate" and again only after the death of the 
SurvlVIng spouse. It also allowed the State an option to expand the definition of property to 
"any other real or personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title 
or interest at the time of death 
The Estates of Vivian and Emerson Wiggins have no funds available for the Medicaid 
lien against Vivian because (1) all transfers have been made prior to the look back period and (2) 
Emerson is the only decedent to have funds to be distributed from hi:> estate, and they ar';! not 
available to Medicaid as they are his sole and separate property. 
c. Idaho Recovery Statute: Idaho participates in the Medicaid program. Idaho 
has been amending its reimbursement statute for years. The statute in ,;{fect in Idaho at the time 
of death of both decedents is Idaho Code 56-218. However, Idaho ,Code 56-218 as presently 
constituted is entirely different than the statute in effect when the actions of the decedents were 
completed. Idaho Code 56-218, as it is presently constituted, states: 
56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance 
with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf )f an individual who was fifty-
five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistanc'~ may be recovered from the 
individual's estate, and the estate ofthe spouse, if any, for such aid paid to eit ler or bot~: 
(a) There shall be no adjustment or recovery until after the death of both the individual and the 
spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has no survivilg :hild who is under twenty-
one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disa)led as defmed in 42 U.S.CO 
1382c. 
(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate \lill be authorized pursuant to 
section 15-3-111, !dallO Code, a claim for recovery under this seeton may be established in the 
estate of the deceased spouse. 
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse m 1st be made within the time 
provided by section 15-3-801(b), IdaIlO Code, if the estate is administered and actual notice is 
given to the director as required by subsection (5) of this section. However, if there is no 
administration of the estate of the first deceased spouse, or if no ac::ual notice is given to the 
director as required by subsection (5) of this section, no claim shall be required tmtil the time 
provided for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor. 
(d) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any aid from the estate or 
surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the need for aid resulted from a crime committed 
against the recipient. 
(2) Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back dates d~:fu:ed in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by 
recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without adequate consideration are 'roidable and may be set aside 
by an action in the district court. 
(3) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of 
age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S. C. 1382c, the amount cf any 
medical assistance paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who wa!; fi:1y-five (55) years of age or 
older when the individual received such assistance is a claim against the estate in any guardianship or 
conservatorship proceedings and may be paid from the estate. 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets irtcluded within the individual's estate, as 
defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest, i:1cluding such assets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through join t tenancy, tenancy in conmon, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a debt with preference as defined in 
section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. Any distribution or transfer of the estate prior to satisfying such clainl is 
voidable and may be set aside by an action irt the district court. The personal representative of every estate 
subject to a claim under this section must, within thirty (30) days of the appointment, give notice irt writing 
to the director of his or her appointment to administer the estate. 
(6) The department may file a notice ofUen against the property of any estzte subject to a clainl under this 
section. 
(a) In order to perfect a lien against real or personal property, the jepartment shall, within ninety 
(90) days after the personal representative or successor makes a Wlitten request for prompt action 
to the director, or three (3) years from the death of the decedent, w lichever is sooner, file a notice 
oflien irt the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-21SA(3)(a), Idaho Code, in 
the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section 45-1904, Idaho C)de. Failure to file a llotice 
oflien does not affect the validity of claims made pursuant to this section. 
(b) The department may release the lien in whole or in part to pe:mit the estate property to be 
administered by a court-appointed personal representative. 
(c) The department may foreclose its lien, without probate, in any ofthe following circumstances: 
(i) Where no personal representative has been appointed aJ:er one (1) year from the date 
of death of the survivor of both the individual and spouse, if any; 
(ii) Where the property has been abandoned by the decedent's heirs or successors, if any; 
(iii) Where the real property taxes that are due and payable have remained unpaid for two 
(2) years and, after demand by the department, the heirs or successors, if any, have failed 
to seek appointment or pay the property taxes; or 
(iv) Where all parties interested in the estate consent to foreclosure of the lien. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement:hiE section including, but not 
limited to, rules establishing undue hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The estate subject to recovery is income-producing property that provides the primary source 
of support for other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery by the department will cause the heirs of the deceased individual to be eligible for 
public assistance. 
(8) The cause of action to void a transfer without adequate consideration e ;tablished in this section shall 
not be deemed to have accrued until the department discovers, or reasonab ly could have discovered, the 
facts constituting the transfer without adequate consideration. 
As mentioned in the first paragraph of the foregoing statute, the power and tenns upon 
which reimbursement can be achieved is "subject to" the extent of pcwer given by the federal 
statute. If the State seeks to obtain reimbursement beyond the tenns and conditions allowed by 
the federal statute, the action is invalid. Idaho's statute attempts to collect Medicaid from the 
separate estate of the spouse of the recipient. That effort is contrary to the federal statute, as 
constituted when the separate property was acquired, and is contra.:] to the present federal 
statute. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit E is the most recent (and most ccgent) case discussing the 
very same statute Idaho has passed. The case is out of Minnesota. It is directly on point as to the 
disallowance of a state's action which exceeds the federal mandate. The case is In re the Estate 
a/Barg, 752 W. 2nd (May 30,2008 and rehearing denied on July 21, 2008). The Barg case 
describes what the federal statute allows and does not allow. 
In Barg, the same statute as adopted by Idaho was at issue. Barg states: 
"since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicdd benefits paid from the 
estate of a recipient or the estate ofthe recipient's surviving spollse. " 
In Barg, supra, the overbroad recovery attempt i.e. from thE estate of the survIVmg 
spouse" was determined to be in excess of the federal mandate. ThE a:tempt by the State of 
Idaho, in the present case, to obtain reimbursement beyond the powers allowed by the federal 
statute is as unavailing as the attempt by the State of Minnesota in Barg. 
One of the issues before the Court is the State ofIdaho's attempt tc obtain reimbursement 
from the separate spouse's estate 0. e. Emerson Wiggins' separate propertyl. Such is simply not 
allowed by the clear wording of the federal statute. See Barg, supra and Gullberg, supra. Barg 
referred to the Gullherg decision in reiterating the Gullberg restricticn in that Minnesota was 
attempting in Gullberg to recover against "the value of all assets of th~ estate that were marital 
property or jointly owned at any time during the marriage." (emphasis added). 
Barg, supra, correctly analyzed the federal statute as follows: 
"the federal statute establishes a general prohibition against r'~covery of correctly paid 
Medicaid benefits, subject to three specified exceptions: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan may be made, except hat the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correc:iy paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following hdividuals: 
(a) And (c) are both inapplicable; and 
(b) In the case of an individual who was over 55 years 0:' age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State :;hcll seek adjustmeEt or 
recovery from the individual's estate ... " (emphasis adde,1). 
Barg, supra, holds that the express exception for recovery against the individual's estate 
is subject to the general rule against any other recovery. Further, the federal statute makes no 
reference to the surviving spouse but only from the recipient's estate. As pointed out in Barg, 
supra, exceptions to the general rule are to be construed narrowly. Comm'r v Clark, 489 U. S. 
726, lO9 S. Ct. 1455, 103 L. Ed 753 (1989). Because there is no rec(very allowed against the 
surviving spouse by the clear and unambiguous wording of the federal law, such is not permitted 
by the State of Idaho, as well as Minnesota. 
Barg, supra, also refers to two other courts which have agreed 'rvith its interpretation, i.e. 
Illinois and Wisconsin. In addition, Barg, supra, could find no contrar:r authority and found that 
the House Report on the 1993 legislation referred only to the possibi lity of recovery from the 
estate of the recipient. In the Illinois case, Hines v Department of Public Aid, 850 N .E.2d 148, 
221 Ill.2d 222 (IlL, 2006), the principle that recovery can only be had against the recipient's 
estate, was affirmed. 
Hines, supra, provides that the determination of the validity of a Medicaid lien is a 
question of law. Hines, also correctly points out: 
"States are not required to participate in the Medicaid pro gran. Once they elect to do 
so, however, they must design their own plans and set reasona1::1e standards for eligibility 
and assistance. See 42 U.S.c. § 1396(a)(17) (2000). Such :Jlans and standards must 
comport with the Medicaid Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services. See Cohen v. Quem, 608 F.Supp. 
1324, 1326 (N.D.I1l.1984); Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 175 Oth Cir.l981)." 
Hines further states: 
"Where, as here, the language of a statute is clear ani unambiguous, the court 
must enforce it as written. It may not annex new provisions 0 ~ substitute different ones, 
or read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions whi::h the legislature not 
express. People ex reI. Department of Professional Regulati m v. Manos, 202 Il12d 
563, 568, 270 Ill. Dec. 43, 782 N.E.2d 237 (2002), quoting _TJronson v. Washington 
National Insurance Co., 59 Ill.App.2d 253, 261-62, 207 N.E.2d 172 (1965). Moreover, 
as the appellate court correctly observed, it is a basic principle of statutory construction 
that "'the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of all other 
exceptions.' It 358 Ill.App.3d at 232,294 Ill. Dec. 691, 831 N.E.2d 641, quoting People 
ex reL Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Illold 264,286,271 Ill. Dec. 881 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003). 
In cases such as this, where a statute specifies exceptions to a general rule, no exceptions 
other than those designated will be recognized. In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 Ill. 273, 283, 
61 N.E.2d 24 (1945). The appellate court was therefore corr~ct to conclude that the 
Medicaid Act cannot be construed as pennitting the state to look to the estate of a spouse 
of a recipient of medical assistance for reimbursement of cmts correctly paid on the 
recipient's behalf" 
In fact, the Jackman, supra, case (discussed in a subsequent 3ection) also from Idaho 
does not allow recovery against anything but the community property of the surviving spouse. 
Jackman stands for the proposition that even if the federal statute atows (which it does not) 
recovery against the spouse's estate, it would not include the spouse's separate property. 
D. Prior Statute Governs: 
The next issue is the timing of the attempted lien. The State is attempting to impose its 
lien against the spouse's separate property based on an Idaho statute which did not become law 
until after the decedents agreed to and did segregate their respective :funds. The Medicaid 
eligibility was also determined under a statute which did not allow recovery from the surviving 
spouse's estate. Thus, for purposes of the present case, the existing statlte which claims to be 
able to get at the spouse's estate, is not the statute which governs the present issue. In Idaho 
Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998), in ruling on an issue of 
separate property (discussed infra), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"We conclude, however, that federal law applicable to (his case prohibited this 
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated after a 
marriage settlement agreement transmuting their community property into separate 
property of each." 
In Jackman, supra, it is clear the applicable version of the federal statute and thus the 
Idaho statute purportedly based thereon cannot be applied to the present ca.')e. The determination 
of the spouse's interest in the estate and the lack of assets upon which to impose the lien, is 
determined by applying the statutes in effect at the time the Wiggins developed their estate plan. 
Any other interpretation would strip the ability of any person to meaningfully plan his or her 
estate. 
E. Separate Property is Not Subject to the Medicaid Lien: 
In Barg, supra, the Minnesota Court of Appeals made the folbvving observation about 
the interest Medicaid could go after in an estate: 
"The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate of Gl 111berg, 652 N. W. 2d 709 
(Minn. App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was 
limited to Dolores's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of her death". 
Furthermore, the present law in Idaho agrees with the aforementioned statement of law, 
but goes even further. Idaho law does not allow a Medicaid lien to attach to a spouse's separate 
property. See Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) which 
held: 
"We conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibited this recovery, 
except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated after a 
marriage settlement agreement transmuting their communi!:, property into separate 
property of each." 
Although Jackman, supra, predated the present statute, it is the last decision ml the 
subject Based on Jackman, supra, even the present statute would olly apply to the Vivian's 
community property and any community property held by Emerson. Community property law 
specifically defines community property and separate property. Idaho Code 32-903. Ida..lJo law 
clearly provides that a spouse's separate property is immune from li:ms created by the other 
spouse. Idaho Code 32-912. In the present case, Emerson Wiggin's estate consists of only his 
separate property and thus the State's lien cannot attach under Idaho law, 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that this matter should be continued until the Estate has the 
time to respond to the briefing by the State, and until the factual record can be completed. For 
example, discovery is necessary by the Estate to the State to show the dates and the documents 
used to complete the Medicaid planning accomplished by the decedents. 
Dated thisctLt!1y of January, 2010. 
(lm1&J); 
. Brad M:t,singill 
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4223901507 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 ,00 10/19/2007 490 000 0000 294,27 0000002500000 
4223901507 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 10/19/2007 980 000 0000 294.27 000')422330274 
422390 15 07 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 ,00 10/20/2007 210 000 0000 .00 0000002500000 
4223901507 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 ,00 10/22/2007 490 000 0000 6,37 0000002500000 
4223901507 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 10/22/2007 900 900 0000 25,006,37 0000550369192 
- --« -'.-------- -.------.~-.... -.---. 
4229015807 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 03/23/2007 240 000 0000 56,000.00 0000000000000 
4229015807 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 ,00 12/22/2007 490 000 0000 2,139.12 0000005600000 
4229015807 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 ,00 12/23/2007 210 000 0000 .00 0000005813912 
422901!>B07 WIGGINS El.fERSON 504 .00 12/24/2007 490 000 0000 6.77 0000005813912 
4229015907 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 ,00 12/24/2007 900 900 0000 58,145.89 0000660540360 
.. " .. -----.-.. --.--~"- .. -.-.-------... -.-.----. 
4229017407 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 25,000 00 10/22/2007 240 000 0000 25,000,00 0000000000000 
< ___ < '-,_ ---"'1- r~ - ., .... - -~-.... " 
~--~~-'--- 0000002500000 01/21/2008 490 000 0000 312.35 
4229017407 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 0000 312.35 OO()O422330274 01/21/2008 980 000 
4229017407 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 308.31 0000002500000 04/21/2008 490 000 0000 
42290174 07 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 308.31 0000422330274 04/21/2008 980 000 0000 
4229017407 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 0000 30B.30 0000002500000 
.00 07/21/2008 490 000 
4229017407 IHGGINS EMERSON 504 07/21/2008 980 000 0000 308,30 0000422330274 
4229017407 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 
.00 25,000.00 0000660284755 07/22/2008 900 900 0000 
4229017407 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 
..... "",..."ftr .. n .... 1;' 
. -'---' ~.-.. -~ 
12/24/2007 240 000 0000 58,145,89 
0000000000000 
4229018397 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 58,145.89 
- -.. ~- .. ",,-~---
. ~ ~ . ~ ~ , - ----~~--.-~ 
WIGGINS EMERSON 504 59,268,93 OS/23/2008 490 000 0000 1,123.04 0000005814589 4229018397 
WIGGINS EMERSON 504 59,268,93 OS/24/2008 210 000 0000 .00 0000005926893 4229018397 
-'. --- ~- ,- -.-
02/17/2009 490 000 0000 1,218,68 
0000005926893 
4229019397 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 0000 60,487,61 0000550383162 02/17/2009 900 900 
4229019397 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 
-~.-~-.- ... ~--.----".--- ,~-.-.-,----.--- .. ~ 
,--.--~ .... 
04/08/2008 240 000 0000 7,728.29 
0000000000000 
WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 0000 75,48 0000000772929 4229019064 09/07/2008 490 000 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 .00 0000 7,803.77 00n0440139055 4229019064 
.00 09/08/2008 900 900 
4229019064 WIGGINS EMERSON 504 
< " : 4 ~ ~ "",.. "'" ~ 
EXHIBIT 
Vivian Wiggins 
Total Amount To Expenditures Expend $57,187.10 
Starting November 1, 2002 
Weiser Rehab. Physicians Burial Amount Left 
Date & Care Center Ins. Co. Medicare In. Plan Total To Despense Memo 
Nov-02 $ 57,187.10 Starting Balance 
Nov-02 $ 5,000.00 $ 5,000.00 $ 52,187.10 Thomas Funeral Plan 
Nov-02 $ 4,652.90 $ 180.68 $ 54.00 $ 4,887.58 $ 47,299.52 
Dec-02 $ 5,295.27 $ 180.68 $ 54.00 $ 5,529.95 $ 41,769.57 
Jan-OS $ 4,962.89 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 5,207.41 $ 36,562.16 
Feb-03 $ 4,492.80 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 4,737.32 $ 31,824.84 
Mar-03 $ 5,356.25 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 5,600.77 $ 26,224.07 
Apr-03 $ 5,092.59 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 5,337.11 $ 20,886.96 
May-03 $ 5,727.36 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 5,971.88 $ 14,915.08 
Jun-03 $ 5,364.18 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 5,608.70 $ 9,306.38 
JuI-03 $ 5,333.44 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 5,577.96 $ 3,728.42 
Aug-03 $ 5,362.35 $ 186.52 $ 58.00 $ 5,606.87 $ (Jl.,818.45, 
. liVERPA'Yltl1l.i!il'\nr 
'1 
r---'-
r-····· .. -._-. ..... a 
tabbies" 
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1 =i 
-
~ ... -.- .... --.. --.. - .. ~.-.-.--
-
ZIONS BAt ~;;;~I~;;"'" H ____ •.. 
P.o. Box 30709, Salt Lake City, UT Tl"is Statement: January 9,2009 
_______________________________ -=-= Last Statement: December '10, 2008 
P03037 OS-OOOO·lFN·PGOO23-OOOO3 
0003034 OJ AVO.314 "AlHO 11 0 141083672-120820 
EMERSON DWIGGINS 
KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS 
MAXINE BYRD 
Primary Account 422330274 
C1RECT INQUIRIES TO: 
24-hour Account information: 
Logan: 755-9995 
Ogden: 393-9995 
Provo: 375-9995 
Salt Lake: 974-8800 
st. George: 674-9005 
(800) 974-8800 (outside local areas) 1520 W2NO ST WEISER 10 83672-1208 
11111 ... 11 •• 11 •• 1'1.1,.1.11'111.11.11"1111111111.111111111111 
Weiser Office 
506 State Street 
Weiser, JO 83672-1963 
WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ® 
. .' 
t§IMIRJ~i@li~l..gmi: •• ti..tM~i:M;j~&~i~~:il@~il~[)[;I~Ii;~;;i!i[I:!:;Miiii:~:i!i::!il*i~i~~:~!!t:~i::;~Mi~:~§1.~i;!~t~;;::~;1ii!iM;:i~;~~ri\!~~;\i:!i!:!:!i:\W:~!l::~):;:):::l~:i:::iIilir!:~il!~;:((~;j::ji:ijii~::j:jl:~il::::ill!:~:~;':iil!::f,:i:~i!!:!:l:l~!:r::):::ii 
AccDunt Type 
Gold Interest Checking 
Previous Balance 
25,C89.96 
3 DEPOSITS{CREDITS 
Date 
01102 
01102 
01/09 
2 CHARGESJDEBITS 
Date 
01/02 
01/05 
Amount 
563.00 
307.00 
26.66 
Amount 
239.11 
280.00 
3 CHECKS PROCESSED 
CheckinglSay/ngs Outstanding 
Account Number 
422330274 
Ending Balance Balances Owed 
DepositslCredits 
896.66 
Description 
Charges/Debits 
519.11 
$25,100.05 
Checks Processed 
367,46 
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC -4OA SSREF # 1210362'~1873828 1106636519 
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC -408 SSREF# 1210362·11873829 1106636520 
INTEREST PAYMENT 0002496338 
Description 
MUTUAL OF OMAHA JAN INS ·K .... - REF # 10400001672&;49 1106709916 
PHYSICIANS MUT INS. PRE -040688REF # 104000010773677 1106839798 
Ending Balance 
25,100.05 
Number ............. .Date ........................... ,Amount Number ............ :.Date ............................ Amount Number ............. .Date ............................ Amount 
1630 12119 205.06 
• Not in check sequence 
DAILY BALANCES 
Date ... ................ ....... Balancs 
12119 24,884.00 
12122 24,874.00 
INTEREST 
Interest Earned This Interest Period 
Interest Paid Year-To-Date 2009 
Current interest rate is 1.000% 
1632* 12122 10.00 1633 12123 152.40 
Date .. .... .................... Balancs 
12123 24,722.50 
01/02 25,353.39 
$26.66 
$26.66 
Date ................... ....... Balance 
01/05 25,073.39 
01/09 25,100.05 
Numb lr Cf Oays This Interest Pericd 
Annus I Psrcentage Yield Eamed 
EXHIBIT 
"'"" 
31 
1.310~ 
;j 
ZIONS 
Interest rate changes this Interest period: Date 
12117 
New Interest Rate 
1.000% 
Please retain this statement Interest paid on your account In 2008 was 296.34. 
Jar, ~ 'rK19 
; WIGGINS 
0003034·0000002·0005843 
ZIONS tlANK. 
Page 3 of 3 
loao.." 
Processed 12/19/08 $205.06 ChI 1630 Processed 12/22/08 $I 0.0 0 ChI 1632 
Processed 12/23/08 $152.40 ChI 1633 
-- ~ .... - . ~ --.- --. - - .., --
ZIONS 
P02675 OS-OOOO-lFH-PGOO23-OOO12 
0002673 01 AVO.324 "Auro [90144383672-120820 
EMERSON DWIGGINS 
KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS 
MAXINE BYRO 
1520W2NO ST 
WEISER 1083672-1208 
11111"IIIIIIIIII'I.IIII.IIIIIIIII.nlllll.,I'III.lIIlluIIIII 
WE HAVENTFORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ® 
. . 
Statement of ACCOlli111S 
Faga 1 of3 
This Statement: February '; 1, 2009 
Last Statement: Januarj9. 2009 
Primary Account 42233027 4 
DIRECT INQUIRIES TO: 
24-hour Account Informaton: 
.ogan: 755-9995 
)gden: 393-9995 
Provo; 375-9995 
Salt Lake: 974-8800 
St. George: 674-9995 
1 (800) 974-88CO (outsid,3Iooal areas) 
Weiser Office 
606 State Street 
Weiser, 1083672-1963 
i;ii§IMMII*:;IFi:l\~INrn::.~pi!ii1li:!:!:!:i;!:'@:!~!m~;:ii:::!i!iiii::ll~i:l:::ii~i!!i::i!:i:;:!::1:1:@!:!:::i::!!;:::g:::::::::j;::i::::t~::::;@i!:§:i:i:i:iii:::::::!:;:::Hl:!::i::::::::j:l:::ljiiii:::::;tt:i::i:i:i~::::::!li:::i::i:@::::i::!!!!::::::::ti:: ii:i::::ii::iii::::::::\::!Ii:::::ij:j::::i::i~:::if 
Account Type 
Gold Interest Checking 
PreviOUS Balance 
25,100.05 
Account Number 
422330274 
Deposits/Credits 
878.95 
CheckinglSivlngs OutstandIng 
ChargesIDebits 
519.11 
Ending Billance Balan~-s Owed 
$18,"59.44 
Crecks Processed 
6.700.45 
Ending Balance 
18.759.44 
~ ~ .......................... ~ .... " .. " .... ~ ~ .... ~~~." .......... ,,~ .. ~ .......... "" ...... ,,,,",,~ ~ ~ .................... ~ .......... _ .. ,. ..................... " ....... " .... " .... "" .. ~.~ ...... ,, ~" ~ ... ~ .. ~ .. " """"~"" .""." .... ~ .. ~,.'" ..... ~ .. ". ~ ........ "''' .""' ... ,, ........... ~ ~ ... ~ ~ .. 
3 DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
Description Date 
02103 
02103 
02111 
Amount 
563.00 
307.00 
8.95 
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC -40A SSREF # 1210362 ~18S5839 1106010887 
US TREASURY 312 SOC SEC --40B SSREF # 12103624.1855840 1106010888 
INTEREST PAYMENT 0002190306 
2 CHARGESIDEBITS 
Description Date 
02102 
02105 
Amount 
239.11 
280.00 
MUTUAL OF OMAHA FEB INS '1(- REF # 104000013225513 1107636212 
PHYSICIANS MUT INS_ PRE -040688REF # 104000010157634 1105440436 
12 CHECKS PROCESSED 
Number .......... _ ... Date ............... _ ..... _ ..... Amount Number .... _ ... _ ..... Date ........................... Amount Number .. _ ........... Date ........... _ ... _ ............ Amount 
o 02109 4950 
1635* 01/16 2,900.00 
1636 01/13 41.97 
1637 01/20 123.10 
1638 02103 119.68 
1639 02104 2,900.00 
164D 02105 114.73 
1641 02104 109.16 
1642 02111 263.16 
1643 02109 42.00 
1646* 02111 25.00 
1647 0210E 12.15 
* Not in check sequence 
DAILY BALANCES 
Date ....................... _._BaJance 
01/13 25,058.08 
01/16 22,158.08 
01120 22,034.98 
. Date .....• _ .................. .BaJance 
0~03 22,546.19 
02104 19,537.03 
02105 19,142.30 
Date ...... _ ....... _ ........... Balance 
02106 19,130.15 
02lCl9 19,038.65 
021'11 18,759:44 
02102 21.795.87 
OO()2673:0000003-O005327 
2I01\TS BAl 
P.O. Box 30709, Salt Lake City, UT 841 
INTEREST 
Interest Earned This Interest Period 
Interest Paid Year-to-Date 2009 
Current interest rate is 0.350% 
Interest rate changes this Interest period: Date 
01113 
02104 
$8.95 
$35.61 
New Interest Rate 
0.400% 
0.3...."0% 
!-'ag. ")1 ~ 
Feb. ~L09 
'VIGGINS 
Number Of DriYS This Interest Period 
Annual Peroertage Yie!d'Earned 
33 
0.450% 
ZIONS BANK ACCOUNT # 0422330274 
Processed 02/09/09 $49.50 
Processed -Ol:fi:5T69-- -- - $41.97 -Chtl636 
Processed 02/03/09 $119.68 ChI 1638 
Processed 02/05/09 $114.73 ChI 1640 
Processed 02/11/09 $263.16 Chi 1642 
............. 
,...,""""", 
1IIID>WIO! .... 1IJ 
"iII .lo¥IIL(:C:pt ot~ 
... '-t • ..-.. 
..,.J"IIHIII* .. ~ .... 
-
Processed 01/16/09 
Processed _Q).120/09 
Processed 02/04IJ9 
~---------------t:HI,COOQSt.a: r, H BD 2'1 
Processed 02/04/ 09 
Processed 02/09/~9 
$29 00 .0 0 Chi 1635 
$123. 10 _Chi 1637 
-- .-~ -
$2900.00 ChI 1639 
$109.16 Chi 1641 
:: :z=s '7 t:(' $42.00 Chi 1643 

Processed 02/17/09 
Processed 02/13/09 
~----l 
~~-
.. -~-0 ___ _ 
..m., S 
$60487.61 
$30.00 Chi 1649 
Processed 02/23/09 $25.00 Chi 1651 
Processed 03/10/09 $23.08 Chi 1653 
Page 2ot2 
-~r'M'i"""'.~'." _I 
Processed 02.113/ B9 $354.03 Chi 1650 
.-
.t{rr.ktr- ...,. 
=-"~~1.,,..,,~ ___ ---..JI:i 9f'e' 
~~!f.L.""","L&:Lo"""' ___ ~ __ • .,. 
Processed 02/25/09 $49.50 Chi 1652 
0002584-0000001-0004654 

ZIONS BANK ACCOUN 1 tI l14.L.i..).)V.l.I"t 
. 1.tUtI&1!."'" I 1 .. -•• FlU.,,,,, .. t 
,,:.:117.".'''' i 
_.-
-:;;::~~:=:fJ It ~~~ ---_ .... 
-= _u..-.f" .. :/iC....... ;:;~ .. ~~~ .. ~ ~~ 
,,~ =::~~~ " .. :; .. :: cn ",lO"" p"c "u .~n ~ "'~ 
Id! l 21,llJlPIl 5"': .. Uunt.,., .. " .... ~soaOJ 
Processed 03/17/09 $50 . 00 Chi 1644 
,,<:,--:. . -.- ~, . .... : ' - ~ •• - ........ .--- -- '--" . _- - . -- .-_ .. , . - - - ..• -. - • • .-
__ ___ ___________ _______ OI1~no" So 
UV ~J.--- .. -- -.-. 
Page 2 01;C 
_Q()()2~~?::O<!OOOO1-OO054 30 


ZIONS 
30-0709 
P03273 OS-OOOO-ZFN-l'GOO23-00000 
000327001 AV 0.335 ·'AUTO T1 0 1591 83672·120820 
EMERSON DWIGGINS 
KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS 
MAXlNEBYRD 
1520W2ND ST 
WEISER ID 83672-1208 
WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ® 
Statement of Accounts 
Page 1 of2 
This Statement: July 9, 2009 
Last Statement: June 'j 0, 2009 
Primar/ Account 422330274 
For 24-hour account 
information, please cootact: 
1-800.. 78B-BANK (2265) 
Welser Office 
606 State Street 
Welser, ID 83672-1963 
~f:I"aI:ltl:II.II§N*~_.):jjjlj)jlj!jil:;:;t;ll;;jIm:;:j~;)iijIj;:;;;~;~::::i;~::;;l::::;i:Ii:i:::;':;:::::::i:;:@::!ili::[@'llft:::!l®~zlm:::l:f::t~l!~!l~I:MH:l:::I:::ll:lnri:::~::::~lm::::!i1::::::::m;ll:::::im::m:~I!i.:::i.l:~@~f,:I~I::ll:l::::::: 
CheckJngl;~'aVlngs Outstanding 
Account Type Account Number 
422330274 
Ending SaJance Balances Owed 
Gold Interest Checking 
Previous Balance 
78,708.62 
DepositslCredits 
24.95 
ChargeslDebits 
307.00 
$78,42.6.57 
Checks Processed 
0.00 
Ending Balance 
78,426.57 
......................................... ",. ........................................ ., ............. ., .................. .,.~ .............................. ~ ... ~ ................ ~ ...... ~ ...................................................................... ~ ....... 0;"' ......................... ~ ............. ;o. .. .,.~ 
1 DEPOSlTlCREDIT 
Date Amount Description 
07109 24;95 ·iNTEREST PAYMENT 0007848630 
~~~~G~:=;;;7 •• ~~ ••••••.••••••....•.•••••••••••...••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••.••.••••••••.••••.•.•...•.....••.••.••••••••••..•••••.•. 
06I1~ '"" ('"'..,.::"""~ •• 3Q7:eO ":~US . SlJRY 303 SOC SEC DOD :*I"*/":,, REF # 124000mi'3842330 1103904774 
............... ~-.~~ ........ : ......................................................................................................................... .::=~~:.: .. : ............... . 
-9~..ECKS .,.R.~E[t__.:.-' ," - .' -
There were no transactions this period . 
.............. ............ ........ ...... ............. ........................... * .................. ., .................................. ., ......... ~ ~ .. '" ......... " •• e ......... ~ " ............ ., .. ~, ...... ,. ....... ' •• ., ......... ,. .... ~ ..... - "' .......... ~ .... ~ ... ~ ............ ~ ... ~ ........... " ~ ..... . 
DAlLY BALANCES 
Date .......................... Ba/ance Date .......................... Balance 
06119 78,401.62 07109 78,426.57 
................... ~ ........................................................ ,. ................ " .. e .............. " ..................... ~ ........... ~ eG5 .......................................... ' " ...... ~ .... ~ .......... "' ....... ~'*' .... ,. ................ ~ ............. ~ .. ".~ ................... " .. 
INTEREST 
Interest Earned This Interest Period 
Interest Paid Year-To-Date 2009 
$24.95 
$159.74 
Current interest rate is 0.400% with no rate change this interest period 
Number Of Days This Interest Peried 
Annual PEifOSntage Yield Earned 
29 
0.400% 
r---
I 
.-- . 
ZIONS B 
P.o. Box 30709, Salt Lake City. lIT 84l30-0709 
\ 
F03297 O~ZfN-I'COO23-00000 
000 3 29401 AVO.335 "AUTO no 171583672-120820 
EMERSON 0 WIGGINS 
KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS 
MAXlNE8YRD 
1520 W2NOST 
WEISER 1083672-1208 
11 •• I ••• II •• II •• lm I nl.IIIIIIIII.IIIIIIIIII"II.IIIIIII" III 
WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ® 
Account Typa 
Gold Interest Checking 
;;:;; .. :Pt~,, · , ....  ;...... :; ..... . 
Previous Balance 
78,491.06 
: ... ; . ...... . -: .. . 
Accoont Number 
422330274 
DepositslCmcits 
17.53 
ChargeslDebits 
0.00 
Statement of Accounts 
Page 1 of2 
This Statement: NovemI:er 10, 2OC9 
Last Statement: October 9, 2009 
Primary Account 422330274 
For 24-hour accoont 
informalicn, please ccntact 
1-OOO-789-BANK (2265) 
Weiser Office 
606 State street 
Weiser, ID 83672-1003 
C/'.ecks Procsssed 
0.00 
Ending Balance 
78,508.59 
........................ '" .. .. ...... .. ............... .. .. .. .... ........ ..... ,. .................... of .. ...... ........ ...... ...... .... .......... .. .. ...... ................ ........ ...... . ..... .. ................. " .. a ....................... . ..... ~ ... . .. ............................. ....... ... ....... .. .. ...... . . .. ................. ... ....... ...... .. .... .. 
1 DEPOSIT/CREDIT 
Date 
11/10 
Amount 
17.53 
Description 
INTEREST PAYMENT 0007849106 
......................................................... .... ........................ ,. ........... " ......... ....... .. .... ..... .. -............. .............. ...... ... ............. ... ... .. ....... .. .. . 
o CHARGESIDEBITS 
There were no transactions this period • 
............................................................................................... ..................... " ........ , ........ ................... ... ..... .... ... ........ ... ... ...... .... .... . 
o CHECKS PROCESSED 
There were no transactions this period . 
.............................................. , ............................................. ......................................... ................ .... ... ......... .... ..... ... ...................... . 
DAILY BALANCES 
Date .......................... Balance 
11/10 78,508.59 
.......... .. .. .................... ... ........................ .................. ............ ..... ................. .... .. " ....... , .... .. ................ ... ......................... ... ...... .. .. ..... .... . 
INTEREST 
Interest Earned This Interest Period 
Interest Paid Year-To-Date 2009 
Current interest rate is 0.250% 
Interest rate changes this interest period: Date 
10/13 
$17.53 
$241.76 
New Interest Rate 
0.250% 
OOOOS3 
Numb ~ Of Days This Interest Peric,(j 
Annu.1 Percentage Yl9ld Earned 
3: 
0.260~ 
0003294-0000001-0006680 
IDA H 0 DEPARTrvl ENT OF 
HEALTH & vVELFI\..RE 
C.L "BUTCH" OTIER • GOVERNOR 
RICHARD M. ARMSTRONG· DIRECTOR 
March 5, 2009 
LYNN WIGGINS 
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE 
1520 WEST 2ND ST 
WEISER, 10 8 3672 
Re: Notice of Statutory Claim 
Estate of VJVY.aAt"l' WIGGINS; MID# 1242794 (5) 
Dear Authorized Representative: 
DIVISION OF MEDICAID 
BUREAU OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, 10 83720·0036 
PHONE 208·287·1150 
FAX 208·334·6515 
MIO#1242 7 94( S) 
The Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) wishes to extend its condolences at the loss of 
your loved one. 
The Department hereby gives you notic~ of its claim against the estate m' VIVIAN WIGGINS for 
benefits paid by Medicaid, to include all property the decedent had an interest in prior to death. The 
Department will not demand payment as long as the remaining spouse surv ;ves; however, demand for 
payment will be made against the surviving spouse's estate upon their death. 
This claim is based upon the Departmenfs statutory right to recover the amc llnt of medical assistance it 
paid on the decedent's behalf as set forth in the Idaho Code, Section 56-218. The Department's claim is 
made against the assets in the decedent's estate. You are hereby advised that a lien may be placed against 
any real property in this estate. If any of the decedent's property is improp;!rly sold or distributed, the 
Department may pursue legal action to satisfy its claim. For verification of he debt, please submit your 
request in writing within thirty (30) days. 
Enclosed is a questionnaire you are asked to complete and return within fifiee' l ( 15) working days. 
If you have any questions about this Notice of Statutory Claim, please contzct the Estate Recovery Unit 
by mail, or by telephone at 1-866-849-3843. 
Sincerely, 
Estate Recovery Officer 
Enclosure 
000064 
EXHIBIT 
D 
!n re Estaie of Sa ,752 N.W2d 52 (Minn 2008) 
752 N.W.2d 52 
In re the ESTATE OF Francis E. BARG, a/kJa Francis Edw:lrd Barg. 
No. A05-2346. 
Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
May 30, 200K 
Rehearing Denied July 21,2008. 
[752 N.W.2d 56] 
Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. 
Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, 
Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs County. 
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for 
respondent Michael Barg. 
Julian 1. Zweber, St. Paul, MN, for amici 
curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State 
Bar Association and National Senior Citizens 
Law Center. 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin 
Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney 
General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae 
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OPINION 
MEYER, Justice. 
The Mille Lacs County Family Services! 
and Welfare Department (County)£1ed ac;1aim 
~o-ainst the Estate .of·Francis E- Ilarg:(Estate), 
seeking to recover:Medicaid hendits correctly 7 
pai<£ on f>elliilf of1li&~eceased~.~~ol<i[ift 
Barg. The EstatepartiaITy aUowedthe$im, and 
disallowed the other part. i Jh:e -district .. ceomt, 
concluding that Dolores Barg's interest jn' the 
couple's property was ljIDited hecause~hehad 
conveyed it to herhusbandbeforeherdeaili, 
evaluated her interest· as a life estate, and upheld 
the partial disallowance., The County appealed, 
arguing that it was entitled to recovery from the 
full value of the property. The court of appeals 
reversed and remaIlded,partiallyallowiugtJie 
claim and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in 
the property as a jointtemmcyinterest 
t:.. fastcase 
equivalenttoone-haff th.e value of the property. 
In re Estate of Barg, 722 
[752 N.W.2d 57] 
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affinn 
in part and reverse in part. 
Factual and Procedural Background. 
The parties have stipUlated to the facts in 
this case. Uolores J. Barg was bonr ill 1926, 
mamed FranciSE. Barg in 1948,. and remained' 
married to I:iiin 1IDtil her death m 2004'.JIn 1962· 
and 1967, in two Sep2Iate transactions,1:1le Bargs 
took title as joint tenants to real property in 
Princeton, Minnesota;. 'Their home was located 
'on this property. On October 24, 2001, Dolores 
Barg entered a nUI1;mg home in Mille Lacs 
County, at:first payingfue c.0.stsherself. In 
December tZUOl, she applied for long-term 
Medicaid lienefits-.,l 
Anassetassessmem for Dolores Barg was 
completed in February 2002~ The' Bargs' marital 
·assets . inciudIDg their homestead totaled' 
$131 ,272~().3.!2 Approval for long-term Medicaid 
benefits was given retroactive to December l~ 
2('}():{ • 
On February 27, :'2002~ Francis Barg 
cexecuted.his will, nominating the couple's son 
Michael F. Bargns· personal representative, 
leaving :hi&esta1:e.-t(Jhis sumvlng ~scenqaJ;lts, 
anel W:ilrillg1l9PlCOT,isioofor biswife: Dolores 
Barg tl;ansbredher joint.tenancy interySt in the 
l:romestead:property ro Francis Barg on July 2;' 
2002,ilIrhen lrerdalrgh.teF.and .. guardian .of her. 
estate; Barl:>l;rraAnderson, executed a Guardian's 
''Deed: -~mJidY'2002, '''Barbari Anderson 
dcl:eted Dolo~J3arg's namefrolIl~~S~Qf" 
~sii-thecOuPleheld jointly at Bremer Bank. 
10 
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In re Estate of 
There is no allegation that thes~ actions were 
improper or fraudulent~ 
On January 1, 2(J04~ Dolores Barg died; 
having received $10&,413.53 in Medicaid 
benefits. At- the time of her death, -assets 
belonging to either::::Dolor~ or Francis Barg 
included three certificates of deposit; a checking 
account,· and an IRA account, aft in the name of 
Fiancis fBarg alone; one-certificate of deposit} 
payable to the funeral home~for Dolores- Barg's 
funeral; two vehicles; together worth 
approximately $9;000; the homestead titlea -iri 
F£allC:i& Bargs name; valued at $120;800; "and 
miscellaneous householrl-good&. and furniture': 
AU'of these assets: had been jointly held at some 
timeffin::ingth~couple'SS5-year marriage. 
On May 27, 2064;, Francis Barg died;'never 
having. recci~.MediC3id henefits. on"rUly 30: 
2004, the. County HIed a claim a::,oainst FJ'3l1cis· 
Bargs estate, r.:king to recover $..10&,413..53,:> 
tbe::full amountDalores Barg:. ha.dreceived in 
Medicaid benefits. 
Michael: Barg dfsaI10wed $44,533'.5Ymthe 
claim; "ands allOwed $63';88"0. 1'1re"'CoUlltyi 
petitioned for aIr allowance"'ef the' full· claim; 
arguing: that1heentire valuec"of the-m:aritaF 
property, 1Jotlrthe homestead and the eertificates 
~posi1; was subject tu-- its ehrim because 
DbioresJ~arg's. jointtenancyinterest ga'Ve'liera" 
right to use of the-entire-property. 'Ihe district 
CGm:t concluded. that -nolores-. Barg's .interest in 
the property at the ti:meofher death waS 
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~nivffi.eIrfto;;a Jjfe£~~, and~upheldthe:partiak 
~owance. 
The O:mnty~led. The~~ourt ofappea:l$ 
~lained. that', based ,-ell fIn re£state':,oj 
Qullbe:rg;-a 652 N.W.2d 709 (Minn.App. 2002), 
the-- Couniy'sabilityto reoover'agamst: FranciS' 
Bargs-:estate was limited. tQ.:Doleres'.s~stm 
marital or jointly owned.property at:thetimeoP 
herdeath.iBarg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The-'C0urt 
decided -that property: law"'principies:csfl0uldk il 
applieEl:ro-.·determine·the-namrem . .1hatinterest 
a:rui-:that under'fedet:al"law 'and' Giillberg; 
t:. fastcase 
-Dolores Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in 
the::.homestead at the time of her death. ld. at 
497. 'The court vabed that interest as an 
oodivided one-half of the property's value,'and 
remanded the case tu the district court for a 
recalculation of the amount of the claim that was 
allowable. Id. 
The County pe:itioned for review. The 
Estate opposed review but sought conditional 
Cross-review on the i~ sue of whether federal law 
permits the State to recover at all from a 
smviving spouse's est:de. We granted review, as 
well as cross-review, and asked for briefing on 
whether the Estate had adequately preserved for 
review the issue of "whether the county may 
recover Medicaid bf~nefits correctly paid on 
behalf of a predecea.::;ed spouse from the estate 
of a surviving spouse." We granted requests by 
the Minnesota Commissioner of Human 
Services to file an amicus curiae brief aligned 
with the County and to participate in oral 
argumene We alsc granted requests by the 
ERlerl.aw;:.Sectimkcithe;Minnes01:a,S~Bar 
Association and the National Senior Citizens 
Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief aligned 
with the Estate. Aftu oral argument, we asked 
the parties for sUPFlementary briefing on the 
relationship of the 2003 and 2005 amendments 
of Minn.Stat. § 25613.15, subds. 1 and lc-lk 
(2006), to the authority the County argues exists 
under Minn.Stat. § 2:56B.15, subd. la (2006) and 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how 
that relationship affects preemption analysis and 
the scope of recovery permissible under 
Minnesota law. 
Statutory Fram!Work 
eOng:ress:en1l.ct;rl Medicaidirr 1:9.65- as Title 
XIX of the Socid Security _Aw to-ensure i 
medical.care to individuals who. do not have the 
resomces to coyer essential medicaIs~:rv:i:res. 
Martin ex rel. Hojf v. City of Rochester, 642 
N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mm. 2002). ~tedicaid. was' 
intended to be the payor of lastreson. ld. The 
wcogram:isj¢iatly fund'ed-'Witii·'the states:.as . .. a: 
"cooperatfve-eridef:vor in which the -Federal 
GO-vernment provi ies financial assistance .. to' 
partic4,>a:til'lg .Statef:- to ,aid .them.- m..imnishing 
- 2 -
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health care to needy-persons. n. Harris v. lvfcRae, 
448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 
784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation 
and rules, incorporate them into state medical 
assistance plans, and suomit those plans:tothe·, 
U.S. Secretary of Health and. Human: Services 
for approvaL~~ U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & 
Supp. ill 2003). Afterthis, the states can receive 
federal payments. ~ U.S.c. § 1396 (2000). 
Each state adminiSters its own f'Cogram within 
the federal requiremenis, and the Centers fur 
Medicare and Medicaid Services f(CMSt 
::rd1TIihister 
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the program and approve state plans. Martin, 
642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the requirements 
imposed on state p~ ~that they must "complY' 
wiili the provisions- E>f[~ U.s.c. § B96pJwftlv 
respect to lieDS','3djustruentsandreoovmes of 
medical assistance correctly paid, ~fers of 
assets, and treatment of certain trusts." W2 U.S.c. 
§ 1396a(a)(l8) (2000). 
r(YTeeeiveMedieaid;'·a:'PersODN.nusL~ 
~either,n.ca:tegorically"'· or"mediGa:1ly" .. n.eectr. 
Estate of Atkinson v. M1nn. Dep't of Hwnan 
Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209,210-11 (Minn. 1997). A 
person is ~~gorically needy1' if he is eligible 
for other speQifiedfederal assistance .pro~ 
ld at 211. A person is "medically needy" ifhe 
incurs medical expenses: that reduceJrisincome . 
to roughly .the level of those who are . 
categ:oiicaI!yneedy. ld To qualify as medically 
needy a person mayhaveincome..»Qimgherfuan , 
a defined threshold.amLmay o'W:!!assets .. ofllo~ 
more: tharr a defined value. ld. Ifihe-assets of a;,;: 
Medicaid applica:rit andherspousecexceedthe 
qualifying tfrreshOld; they-must "spendjioWli' 
their assets lIDtiltlreyo are at or ~below·the 
qua:lifYirlg 1:breshold. ld. Ifa;potential Meilicaip 
recipienttransfers:. assetsPeiow faikmarket:vame 
within a certain periodortime.be:fore.~!ig:ibi1jty, 
the:recipient is deellledineligi1Jle;for~1itscfor' 
a time period mandatedby:sfutnte. ~ U.S.C. ~ 
1396p( c) (2000). This provision: prevents people 
whO' are not needy trom 15ecommg eligi51efor 
Medicaid bytransferringtherr,assetsaw~:y. 
r-. 
rastcase 
"v'hendetermini:lg the eligibility of a 
married person to receive Medicaid, states 
consider assets of both husband and wife as 
available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c) (21)00). But there are several 
provisions in place to protect the community 
spouse' from being iJ::apoverished as a result of 
.the;'Spend-down of assets needed to qualify the 
applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 
N.W.2d at 211; ~7 U.s.c. § 1396r-5 (2000). The 
value of the couple's home is not included 
among assets consicered eligible to pay for 
medical care. ld § 1396r-5(c)(5); ~2 U.S.C. § 
1382b(a)(l) (2000). Too community spouse of a 
Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an 
allowance of income and assets designated fot 
his or her needs that is not considered available 
tD pay for the recipiert spouse's medical care. ~~ 
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient 
spouse has the right 10 transfer assets, including 
an interest in the }~op1estead, to his or her 
community spouse. ~~ U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). 
Medicaid thus balmces the obligation of 
community spouses t) contribute to the payment 
of medical expenses for their recipient spouses 
against . the .accomm )dation of the community 
spouse's need to provide fur his or her own 
support 
Federal Medicc.id Recovery Provisions. 
Although it is not applicable to the facts 
before us, it is· usefufto start with: the pre-1993 
fOOerallaw on. Med~caid recovery, because it is 
relied on in the pa rties'arguments '3lldis 'ihe 
~)for tJ:re,:ratromle ~:f:seY;era1,~leyant cases. 
£rior to. amen<iments,adopted in the Omnibu§ 
BUdgetReconciliatijn Act (OB.RA) of 1993".the , 
federal Medicaid ·~stated ageneraJ 
principle that there Should be TIO recovery of 
~rrectlyp:¥dMedi ~d benefits, ·subject 
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tp several exceptions; one of wlrich is relevant: 
Ilere: 
No-. adjustment.oc recQYel)': of any medicale 
~ce correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under be State planPJaY ;be ma4e, 
iexcept-
3 
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* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who 
was 65 years of age or older when he received 
such assistance, from his estate. 
4~ U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988): Under this 
pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not 
required, to recover Medicaid benefits paid to 
recipients 65 or older; and the statute specified 
the recovery would be from the recipient's 
estate. The statute also provided that this 
recovery from the recipient's estate could only 
be made after the death of the recipient's' 
surviving spouse. Id § 1396p(b )(2) (1988). 
Despite this prohibition against recovery before 
the death of a surviving spouse, there was no 
express mention of recovery from the estate of a 
surviving spouse. 'The pre-1993 federal law 
contained no definition of "estate." 
Section I 396p(b) was amended as part of 
the OBRA amendments of 1993'. Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 
103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat 312, 627-28 
(codified as amended at ~i U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(1), (4) (2000». As amended, the 
federal law retained the general proln'bition' 
against states attempting to recover lVledicaid 
payments correctly paid on be~alf of an 
individual, with limited exceptions'. i!~ U.S.C. § 
1396p(b) (2000). J3!fIt:'~ifre';:I~J ~en.ts" 
change& section f3.96p{b): ms:everat ways. 'First, 
they lowered: 1he age:crite.r:!on for~veI"Y:from 
~t055~$eoond,.1;hey made recovery .allowecl· 
by the. exceptions mandatory rather::t:hap. 
,pemllssiye. ;:nm~they addeda..d~~ 0f 
"estate~ It. "Which . itself had both lnaIrdatory :.and 
permissive. elementS'; As-mnended, the ~enera'l 
noniecDvery ru:leandthe.relevan:t e~ceptionre~ 
as follows: 
(1) ~ adjustment or ree<wery ~of any 
medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan may be made, 
except that tIre-State sba1lse€?~ adjustment or 
recoverylSof any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of·an:fu:diviffil3:t1.mder the State 
plan in the case ofthe following individuals: 
* * * * 
t: 
fastcase 
(B) In the case 0°&'1 individual who was 55 
years of age or older when the indivjduaI 
received such medica 1 assistance, the State shall 
seek adjustment or recovery from the 
individual's estate * * *. 
Id The amenied version of section 
1396p(b)(1 )(B) retain.ed the express reference to 
recovery from;he recipient's estate. 
Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this 
recovery from the recipient's estate is only 
permitted after the death of the recipient's 
surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery 
under paragraph (1) nay be made only after the 
death of the individUf:l's surviving spouse, if any 
* * *." ~1 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis 
added). And like the pre-1993 version, the 
amended f-ederal st:ltute contains no express 
atrthorization for, or rreference to, recovery from 
a surviving spouse's estate~ 
'I'Iie f993' amen :nnentsadded a definition. 
ofttesta1!e" for purpcses of Medicaid recovery, 
with a mandatory pro.V:sion that looks. to stat~ 
probatela", "3Ild IDl optional provision that 
ooth.orizesstat.es to e::::pa:nd the definition beyond 
the scope of probate l'a.vv7 
gIhe term "e::;tat~", with respect to a' 
dece3Se<ffudi:vl{fual'~-
(A) shall mclt:de alLreal andpersonai 
properly.and.£)t:l:rerlSSets inclnded within the 
:_..3'!.-..:.3 .. _1 ............. ~.; defined lllW¥.ru.u:<U."'· e",F"',ras .' .. . :t 
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f~urposwofState pIPbareJaW; and' 
(B) tnayii:tcfnd€; at~t>ptron..of the:$tate; * 
* * ahyQthet::reaL andpersf>nal .pr()pergrand '" 
ether.assetsin. whi ili . the individual had any 
ikgal.tj:tle,.Qf kterestat the tfme'gfdeath (to the 
extent of such interest), indudingsnchassets· 
eonv.eyed to ~ surv::voT,.'hei:J;, .or.assign of the 
deceaSed 'individua r through joint tenancy, 
tenancy-ineommoIl, survivorship, life estate; 
livingtrust; or other ·arr:mgement. 
i%uB..c. ~§C. HI)6p(b)(4M emphasis added). 
Under:Ailri£~pr€)v4sit)]l, a~state has the option to 
- 4-
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adopt a defInition of "estate" for Medicaid 
recovery purposes that includes some assets 
which, under ordinary probate law, would not be 
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because 
they would pass immediately to someone else on 
the recipient's death. For example, when two 
persons hold property in joint tenancy with a 
right of survivorship and one dies, the deceased 
joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to 
tlie surviving joint tenant and is not part of the 
probate estate. Under the optional expanded 
defInition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid 
recovery purposes the interest of a deceased 
joint tenant who had received Medicaid would 
be included in his estate, ·rather than passing 
directly to the surviving joint tenant. 
'Minnesota's Medicaid Recovery Laws. 
Minnesota has long had a policy of 
requiring participants in the Medicaid program 
and their spouses to use their own assets to pay 
their share of the cost of care during or after 
enrollment. Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1 (a) 
(2006). To implement this policy, since 1987 
Minnesota law has provided for recovery of 
Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a 
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving 
spouse. Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la 
(originally enacted as Act of June 12, 1987, ch. 
403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347). 
As relevant here, subdivision la provides that, 
n on the death of the survivor of a married 
couple, either or both of whom received medical' 
assistance,' * * * the total amount paid for 
medical assistance rendered for the person and 
spouse shall be fIled as a c1aimagainst the estate 
of the {recipient] or the estate of the surviving 
, spouse." Id (emphasis added). A claim against 
the estate of a surviving' spouse --for medical 
asSistan"C"e provided to the reC,iPient SP, o~emay \ 
be made'up to "the value of the assets of the 
estate that were marital property' "Or jointly 
owned property at any time during the 
iage. " Id, subd. 2 (emphasis added). 
The broad.estate· reco:veIY authority 
contained in subdivisions la and 2 'was 
supplemented ill 2003~by-amendments to the" 
statute. ~xpanding suh~ion --1,,· and··' adding' 
h fastcase 
subdivisions 1 c-l k. f,ct of June 5, 2003, ch. ] 4, 
art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. 
Sess. 1751, 2205·17. These amendments 
implement the optiO!lal expanded defmition of 
"estate" authorized il the 1993 amendments to 
the federal law. See l,finn.8tat. § 256B.15, Bubd. 
1(a)(2) (2006); ~~ U.S.C. § 1396P(b)(4)(B). The 
2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate 
recovery law modify common law to provide for 
continuation of a redpient's life estate or joint 
tenancy interest in r121 property after his death 
for the purpose of recovering medical assistance, 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(3) (2006), and 
include that continued interest in the recipient's 
estate. Minn. Stat. § 256B.l5, subds. 19, Ih(b), 
li(a), Ij. The 2003 amendments also establish 
specifIc procedures f)r exercising claims against 
these continued life estate and joint tenan9Y 
mterests, as well as procedures and waiting 
periods that differ according to whether' the 
recipienfs spouse, d ~endent children, or other 
.;relatives 
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living-in the homeftead survive the recipient. 
Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49, 
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751,2213-17 
(codifIed as amended at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, 
subds. Ii and Ij). b:i~ease, the-County filed 
·its clai:t:n undersubdivisions fa and 2 and did not 
rely on _ provisions added in the 2003 
amendments: 
The issues pre rented in this case involve 
several questions ah)ut the relationship between 
the recovery previsions of federal and 
Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals 
held that a partial disallowance of the County's 
claim was proper, mlyng on its earlier decision 
in Gullberg that lhe broad authorization in 
subdivision 2 for rel~oyery up to the value of all 
assets of the estate t hat were marital property or 
jointly owned at my rime during the marriage 
was partially preempted by the 1993 
amendments to the federal law that limit the 
expanded estate to ass:ets in which the recipient 
spouse 1:J.ad a legalmterest at the time oj her 
death Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing 
Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714). 
5-
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The County: and its supporting amicus 
curiae the Commissioner of the Department of 
Human Services, argue that the court of appeals 
was wrong, both here and in Gullberg, in finding 
any preemption of the broad estate recovery 
authorized in subdivisions la and 2. They 
contend that there was nothing in the federal 
statute prior to the 1993 amendments that 
limited the states' authority to pursue estate 
recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the 
1991 amendments were intended by Congress to 
expand state options, not limit them. 
l Alternatively; the County argues that even ifl recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had an interest in the property 
notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, 
and. the court of appeals erred in valuing that 
"interest~as ouly one-half the va1ue of the 
homestead. 
The Estate and its supporting amici curiae 
counter mat fed~rallaw authorizes recovery only 
from a recipient's estate, and Minnesota law thai 
allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate 
is therefore preempted.6 The Estate argues that 
recovery is also barred because, to the extent 
recovery is allowed from the estate of a 
surviving spouse, federal law limits that 
recovery to the value of assets in which the 
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her 
<ieath, and subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is 
preempted to the extent it allows broader 
recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that there 
should re no recovery here because Dolores 
Barghad no legal interest 
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in the homestead or the certifIcates of deposit at 
the time of her death, having conveyed her 
interest to her husband during her lifetime. 
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. 
FiTst; does federal law preemptthe mIthorization 
irr'Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, forrecbverj 
ofMedicaid benentspaid for a Tecipientspouse" 
from the estate of the smviving ~ouse? Second, 
iFsuch recovery from a surviving spouse's estate 
is; not preempted, doesfederal1aw ·limit .the 
r-. fastcase 
recovery to-.assets in which the recipient had an 
futeresf:if fue time of her death, preempting the 
broader recovery 2.l10wed in Minn.Stat § 
256B.I5, subd. 2, as to assets owned as m:.rrital 
property or in joint t,~nancy at any time during 
the marriage? Third, if recovery is limited to '" 
assets in which the recipient had an interest at 
the time of her deatl:. what, if any, interest did 
Dolores Barg have in the homestead or the 
certificates of deposit at the time of her death, 
and specifically, was the court of appeals correct 
in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy 
interest for purpose:;; of estate recovery even 
though she transferred that interest to her 
husband during her lifetime? We address these 
issues in tum, after first reviewing basic 
preemption pnnciplef:. 
L 
Whether federaIT law preempts state law is 
primarily an issue)f statutory interpretation, 
which we review de novo. Martin, 642 N.W.2d 
at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is 
a question of law, which we also review de 
novo. Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm'r a/Revenue, 
488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn.1992). 
Congressional purpose is "'the ultimate 
touchstone'" of the preemption inquiry. Malone 
V. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 
S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting 
Retail Clerks IntI' Ass'n, Local 1625 v. 
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct 219, 
11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Our primary focus in 
the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of 
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 
L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The United States Supreme 
Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of 
issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 
'start[s] with the assl!lllption that the historic 
police powers of lhe States [are] not to be 
superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the 
clear and manifeEt purpose of Congress.1II 
Cipollone v. Liggetr Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 
516, 112 S.Ct 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally 
·6· 
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disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct. 
2608). 
Congress may preempt state law in several 
ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 
280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, it may do so with 
express language preempting state law. Id. 
Second, it may do so by fully occupying the 
field, that is, "congressional intent to pre-empt 
state law in a particular area may be inferred 
where the scheme of federal regulation is 
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress 'left no room' for 
supplementary state regulation." Id. at 280-81, 
107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 
S.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress 
neither expressly preempted state law nor so 
completely occupied the field as to leave no 
room for state action, because the Medicaid 
program specifically permits and even requires 
action by participating states. Martin, 642 
N.W.2d at 11. 
The third kind of preemption is at issue in 
this case. Even when Congress 
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has not chosen to displace state-Iaw expressly or 
by:fully occupying the field, "reaeral law may 
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent it 
actually conflicts with :federaf law." Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 
683. Conflict preemption. occurs when 
compliance with both state and federal laws is 
imposSIole, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 
L.Ed.2d 248 (1963),-'Or when the state law is "an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 
399,85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
n. 
We now turn to the question of whether 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a, which requires 
Medicaid recovery against the estate of a 
Surviving spouse,"is preempted by federal law, 
particularly U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). 
h fastcase 
Because only con'lict preemption may be 
applicable, we set k to determine whether 
compliance with boo h statutes is impossible or 
whether the state la 101 stands as an obstacle to 
accomplishment of The purposes of the federal 
law. 
The County s.~eks recovery here under 
subdivision la of section 256B.15, which 
authorizes-indeed requires-recovery of 
Medicaid benefits nom the estate of the 
surviving spouse 0 f a recipient. The Estate 
argues that this state law authorization to recover 
from the estate of the surviving < spouse is 
preempted because i< conflicts with 4:2 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b )(1), whie!. prohibits recovery of 
correctly paid Medic lid benefits except from the 
estate of the recipien: of the benefits. 
The federal statute- establishes a general, 
pmhibition~oainst teC€}very ef correctly paid 
Medicaid benefitS; subject to three speemed 
exceptions: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any 
medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under rhe State plan may be lnade, 
except that the Stat~-sha:ll seek adjustment or 
~recovery of any medical assistance cor:.ectly 
paid on behalf of ru: irdividual under the State 
plan inthe<(!;(,[Se €)fth?followingindivid1l£iJ.,s: 
U.S.C. § 1396J:(b)(1) (emphasis acded). 
0:n:ly-oneexceptienporentiaUy ~pplies t,5) the-
eircumstanceofthis ·~ase: 
(B) In the case of an individual who vvas 55 
years of age or ddet when the individual 
received such medicli assistance, the-State shall-
,seek adjustment or-recovery from the 
.iNdividual's estate· * .~ *. 
Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
Because this express exception to the general 
rule against recov!~ry of Medicaid benefits 
directs that recovery come from the recipient's 
estate and makes n D reference to a surviving 
spouse's estate, the Estate argues that recovery 
from the surviving s:)ouse's estate is not allowed 
under federal law. llee:ause- -exceJ!)tions tea 
gerreral statement or policy are to be construed.-
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narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 
109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it 
appears on its face that recovery from the 
surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by 
federal law. 
Two courts have agreed with this analysis 
and concluded that section 1396p(b)(1 XB) 
authoriZes recovery only from the recipient's 
estate and does not allow recovery from the 
estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't of 
Pub. Aid, 221 Ill.2d 222, 302 IlLDec. 711, 850 
N.E.2d 148, 152~53 (2006); In re Estate of 
Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245, 246 
(1995), rev. denied 546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 
1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
'explained that the federal statute never 
"counter[ ed] the initial blanket prohibition" 
[752 N.W.2d 65] 
on recovery by authorizing recovery from the 
surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d 
at 246. The TIlinois Supreme Court noted thaf 
under federal and nlinois law, the state had 
authority to seek reimbursement from the 
recipient's estate after the death of bis surviving 
spouse. Hines, 302 TIl.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at 
153. But instead, as here, the state sought 
recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. 
Id. The court explained that federal law allows 
only three exceptions under· which a state may 
seek reimbursement and '''[a]ll are specifically 
directed .to the estate of the recipient. ~:o 
provision-is made for collection from-the-"e:state 
of the. recipient's spouse." Id The court declined 
to add to the unambiguous language of the 
federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond 
those specified in ffie federallaw. Id 
The Commissioner argues that Hines and 
Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting 
the federal statute, particularly in light of the 
presumption against preemption. The County 
contends that this statutory exception to the 
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally 
against individuals who received benefits after 
age 55, and does not narrowly limit the sources 
of recovery. The County asserts that the 
reference to the individual's estate is merely a 
h fastcase 
designation of the timbg for recovery mther 
than a limit on the s ;ope of recovery, because 
the language does n·)t say that the state may 
recover "only" from the individual's estate. The 
County argues that, a'Jsent such express limiting 
language, and applying me presumption against 
preemption, section 1396p(b)(1)(B) merely 
specifies one potentill source of recovery, the 
recipient's estate, ane does not preclude others, 
such as a spouse's estate. 
In our view, the p~ain language of section 
1396p(b)(1 )(B) comI= orts far more closely with 
the interpretation of the lllinois Supreme Court 
in Hines than with t1: e County's expansive view 
of the anthority ill parted by that provision. 
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted 
~ounty's broad v:ew' of that language alon~ 
Indeed, in expla~: the then-exisring law in a' 
report on proposed CBPA amendments::in1993, 
a"lt'duse Report referred only ro--tbe possibility 
of recovery from the estate- of the- recipient; even" 
when-describing recovery after the death of a 
surviving spouse: 
Under current bLw, a State nag-the option of 
seeicIDg recovery of amounts correctly paid oI1' 
behatFoftm fudi-vfaual under its Medicaid 
program from the indiVidual's estate if the 
individual was 65 ye:rrs or older at the time he or 
she received Medicaid benefits. The State may 
not seek recov:e:ry from the beneficiary's estate 
pntiLthe death of the surviving spouS~, if any, 
and only if the indiv'dual has no surviving minot 
or disabled child. ~.,.. ~ -.~; , ... 
;ffiR.Rep. No. lO':;,~Xg, at 208 (1993), as. 
reprinted frr 1993" ·mi~qC.A.N. 3:1&, 535 
(emphasis added). In contrast, describir:.g the 
proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid 
recovery law passed by the House, t:bfLsame, 
Hwre Rep&rt--statecr mat newly-required state 
estate recovery programs would have to 
"provide for the collection of the amounts 
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the 
individual for long· term care services from the 
estate of the individual:. o'rlhe-S1ifRJiringYJX!llS€." 
Id. 1'1ilis;"wnen. .the:llouse--wanted: to dL'Scribe 
-;:;: ,., • • 'j .. 
recovery from the'- SW::VWlllg spO.1,!Se s estate, . It' 
C::said.so,clearly. 
·8 
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain 
ianguage providing only for recovery from the 
recipient's estate, we acknowledge that several 
courts have interpreted tf1e federal recovery 
provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a 
surv1Vmg 
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spouse. TIle courts reaching this conclusion have 
for tf1e most part relied on the 1993 amendments 
to the federal law that allow the states to adopt 
an expanded definition of estate for purposes of 
Medicaid recovery. For example, the New York 
Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that 
although federal law did not expressly provide 
for recovery of Medicaid payments from the 
"secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 
amendments gave the states power to recover 
against the spouse's estate for certain categories. 
of assets. In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 
604 NY.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 
(1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court 
agreed with the Craig interpretation that the 
1993 expanded estate provision gave the states 
the option to recover against a surviving 
spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint 
tenancy or right of survivorship. In re Estate of 
Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 1998). 
Indeed, the court in Thompson rejected the 
ruling in Budney that recovery against a 
surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under 
federal law on the basis that the Budney court 
had not considered the optional expanded 
definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 
850. The North Dakota court jIDncluded that 
"consideration of all the relevant statutory 
provisions, in light of the Congressional purpose 
to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a 
legislative intention to allow states to trace the 
assets of recipients of medical assistance and 
Iecover the benefits paid when the recipienfs 
surviving spouse di~s. n Id. at 851. The court 
explained that, under the circumstances, it made 
no difference whether recovery was from one 
, estate orthe other. . 
Because the expansive federal definition of 
"estate" in U.S.C_ § 1396p(b)(4) extends only; 
to assets in whichthe medical assista.nre:henefits 
c. fastcase 
recipient "had any legal title or h"1terest in cJ the 
time of death," it is a matter of little moment 
whether the department seeks to recover the 
benefits paid by filing a claim in the estate <-1 the 
recipient after the death of the recipient's 
survtving spouse or by filing a t;}aim in the 
surviving spouse's esrate. 
Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in IdahQ 
Department of Healt~ ~71d Welfare v.Jackman, 
132 Idaho 213, 970 P2d 6, 9-10 (1998), the 
Supreme Court of Ua110 also ruled that some 
recovery of Medicaid benefits could be made 
from the estate of a Slli-vlving spouse, but held 
that such recovery was preempted by federal law 
except to the extent c f assets that had been in the 
recipient's estate as defined by state probate law. 
TIie8'e courts provi~ little explanation: for 
their _~c::o!1ciusions tl:at the statutory language' 
expressly mentioning recovery only from the 
recipient's estate also allows recovery from the 
surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the 
courts viewed the authority to recover from 
assets that were part of the recipient's estate after 
the death of the survivng spouse to fairly imply 
authority to recover those assets from the 
surviving spouse's estate to which they had 
passed on the deatl. of the recipient. 1» other,' 
wordS, to the exteJt assets in the _ surviving 
sponse's-estate aretb ere because they had pass~, 
ill the surviving spouse from the estate of the 
recipient, recovery from those assets in the 
.surviving spouse's e:ltate is, in essence, recovery 
from the recipient's (:st:.te. 
TIi6-Nlnth eiro lit C~of, Appeals appea+s 
trrhavemade .a si:nnnrnnspoken inference in: 
assessing,_preemptIoR -of €:dif~Medi~ 
reco:v:~@~i!;t~o,cases. Bucholtz v. Belshe, 
114 F.3d 923 (9th Cir.1997); Citizens Action 
League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1989), 
cert. denied, 494 US 056, 110 S.Ct. 1524, 108 
L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In both cases, the 
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N"'m.th=,;Circmt addressed whefuerCa:li£)fnia!s 
Medicaid .recovery law was preempted bYPI;e-
1993.amendment federal law. Tae California 
;tawaHowedihestate to seek recovery nf>t only 
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from the estate of the deceased Medicaid 
recipient, but II' against any recipient of the 
property of that decedent by distribution or 
survival.'" Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 (quoting CaL 
Welf. & Inst.Code § 14009.5 (West 
Supp.1989». Thus, California law allowed the 
state to trace assets of the deceased Medicaid 
recipient and seek reimbursement from the 
recipients of those assets. 
In Kizer the plaintiffs were individuals who 
had owned property in joint tenancy with·"3. 
Medicaid recipient and had succeeded to 
ownership by right of survivorship upon the 
death of the Medicaid recipient. Id. at 1005. To 
determine whether California's claimed right of 
recovery from these surviving joint tenants was 
inconsistent with federal law, the court looked to 
section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed 
above, provided the general prohibition against 
recovery with the exception for individuals who 
were 65 years old when they received assistance. 
Id. at 1006. The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
federal statute proVlaed only for recovery from 
the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a 
federal statutory definition of estate, looked to 
common law for the meaning of the tenn. Id. at 
1006. The court held that an "estate" under 
common law did not include properi¥ heldm 
joint tenancy at death, and therefore the 
California law that allowed recovery agairist 
such property went beyond the recipient's estate 
and was too broad. Id. at 1008. The court in 
Kizer did not expressly address the issue of 
whetfier assets within the definition of "estate" 
couId only be reached bya claim against the 
recipient's estate, or. whether federal law would 
permit the state to follow those assets and make 
the. claim against a surviving joint tenant-or, as 
here, a surviving spouse. 
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 
federal law, the N'mth Circuit 3.oaain addressed a 
preemption challenge to the same broad 
California Medicaid recovery provision. 
Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz 
was application of the state recovery law to 
assets of Medicaid recipients that ,had 'beel} 
subject to three forms of joint interests: iOier 
vivos trusts, tenancy in common, ~~ 
h fastcase 
COIlli"1lunity property. Id. at 924. 'The court 
applied the Kizer prir ciple that "'use of the word 
"estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision 
limits a state's rec )very to property which 
descends to the recipient's heir or the 
beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'" 
id at 925 (quoting lI1zer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to 
each of the forms of;hared interest at issue, The 
court concluded that, tke the joint tenancy in 
KiZer, property heldn an inter vivos trust is not 
part of the deceden~s estate under California 
connnon law, and therefore was not part of the 
estate subject to reccvery under the federal law. 
Id. at 926. In contnst, the court explained, a 
decedent's interest in property held irr tenancy in 
connnon or commurrity property is ,subject to 
disposition and administration as part of the < 
decedent's estatenndet' C3li:forma law. Id at 
926-27. The Ninth Cir:;w conclnded not only 
that the decedent's iateresf mpr-operty held in 
tliore- f()Bl1S.:was,smtlect 'ilJ. recovery- under,the 
federal law; .aut ~tl.so held; albe:iLwithout 
~lanation; tiJ::J.'t;teC1:lVe1Y could be sought from" 
the fieirs or-beneficiaries; whoreceiv.ed that 
,:property:< "[California] may,ftowever; pursue' 
penplewho recefipd propertY' held by the 
decedent in the forni·of tenancy in common or 
Qffimnunitypropert:'." Id. at 928 (emphasis 
added). ,Like other courts, the. Ninth Circuit 
seems to nave i:nIerrea 1hat the federal laws 
¢er:enceto recovery from the Medicaid 
~ient's "estate" conferred 
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authority to follow the assets' from that estate 
and recoverthem from the-people who received 
,the property. 
~;::fu:e comts'that ha.veconSlaeredtbet' 
issne.'~ split on tle question of wheth,er the 
narrow reference In section 1396p(b)(1) to 
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid 
recipient allows rec overy only through a direct 
claim against that e:;tate, or whether recovery is 
also allowed from those who received covered 
assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate, 
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were,," 
this ,an tmii:nar)' t}Uestien ,of st2ttutory' 
inrerpreta1io~ we- woold conclude that the plain ' 
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language of the federal statute provides only for 
recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, 
as the Illinois court persuasively reasoned in 
Hines. But we are influenced by the principle 
that preemption of state laws is disfavored, 
combined with the fact that allowing recovery 
against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent 
with both the federal provision precluding 
recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate 
until after the death of a surviving spouse as well 
as with the purposes of the federal legislation.7 
These additional considerations lead us to 
conclude that the split in authority, in these 
particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient 
ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate 
recovery language that we cannot say that 
Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15, subd. la, to seek reimbursement from 
the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with 
federal law such that it is preempted. 
Accordingly, we hold that federal law does 
not preclude all recovery from the estate of a 
surviving spouse, and the authorization in 
subdivision la to make a claim against the estate 
of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. 
The question remains whether federal law limits 
the scope of recovery against the estate of a 
surviving spouse and, in particular, whether that 
recovery may reach all property previously held 
by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as 
marital property or jointly with the surviving 
spouse during the marriage, as allowed by 
Minn.8tat. § 256B.15, subd. 2. 
m. 
We tum to a determinationDf whether the 
scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's 
estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent 
with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15 allows the state to recover from a 
survivingspouse's-estafe "t:Ire value of the· assets 
of the estate that were marital property'orjointly 
owned: property at any timedztring tlie 
marriage. " (Emphasis added.) The County 
argues that this broad estate recovery authority 
does not conflict with federal law because the 
pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be 
construed broadly and the 1993 amendments 
" fastcase 
were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate 
recovery authority. In asserting this 
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argument for broad e!ltate recovery authority, the 
County emphasizes that it is consistent with the 
dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid 
expenses to make REsistance available to more 
qualifYing reclpleats, while protecting 
community spouses from pauperization during 
their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because 
section 1396p(b)(1) 21l0WS recovery only from a 
recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows 
expansion of the est2:te only to include assets in 
which the recipient had an interest at the time of 
death, the "any tim.e during the marriage" 
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too 
far down the path of favoring the purpose of the 
<law at the expense of the plain meaning of-its 
-language. SignificaU'Jy, no court has embraced 
the County's argume:at that the pre-1993 federal 
law authorized recovery from a surviving 
spouse's estate of as~ets that were jointly owned 
dnring the marriag ~ but transferred by the 
recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of 
tliecourts that have interpreted federal law tD 
allow direct claiI:m against the estate of a 
surviving spouse, only one has construed that 
authority to exter.d to assets that were 
fransferredbefore tie death of the Medicaid 
recipient, and that CCl'lTtrelied on language from 
the-1993 amendrnen::s to support that extension, 
See In re Estate of Wirzz, 607 N.W.2d882, 885-
86 (N.D.2000). 
Olheret:>urts-tflIlthaverecognized authority 
t&TeCOVertrom :a SOl lI'Ceotherthanthe Medicaid~ 
recipient's eStatehavecons1:rned that authority to 
~chj)nly assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient had an inte rest at the .time of heL death, 
fu.at is, assets which were p~ of the recipient's. 
e$teas definedby traditional state probate law 
0I7)inclllded, in' the estate under an expanded 
defuritionallowed by the 1993 amendments to 
federnFlaw. ) See 13t.:choltz, '114 F.3d at 925-27 
(.lim:i1:l:Q:gr-eeovery~:o assets :th1ltyv;ere .part of 
recipient's:estafe a;; defined by state probate 
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law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 
970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from 
surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho 
Medicaid recovery statute is limited by federal 
law to assets that were part of the Medicaid 
recipient's estate as defined under state probate 
law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3 
(recognizing that "expansive defmition of 
'estate' in [section] 1396p(b)(4) extends only to 
assets in which the medical assistance benefits 
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the 
time of death"'); see also In re Estate of Smith, 
No. M2005-0141O-COA-RJ-CV, 2006 WL 
3114250 at *4 (Tenn.CLApp. Nov.l, 2006) 
(explaining that courts that have allowed 
recovery against estates of surviving spouses 
have required that recipient had interest in assets 
at time of death). 
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 
amendments as authority for recovery from a 
surviving spouse's estate, our court of appeals 
acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit 
the assets subject to recovery to those in which 
the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the 
time of her death. See Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 
714 (holding that Minn.StaL § 256B.15, subd. 2, 
authorization to reach assets that were marital 
property or owned jointly at any time during the 
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law 
limitation to assets in which recipient had 
interest at time or death). And the court of 
appeals acknowledged that limitation again in 
this case. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After 
Gullberg, the state's ability to recover was 
limited to the recipient's interest in marital er 
jointly owned property at the time of the 
recipient's death."). 
As noted above, the only decision to 
deviate from this limiting principle requiring 
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an interest at the time of death is Wirtz:. 
Although the North Dakota court had 
acknowledged in its earlier Thompson decision 
that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is 
limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient 
had an interest at the time of death (indeed that 
t:. fastcase 
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was the basis on which the court rationalized 
allowing recovery fr.;)m the surviving spouse's 
estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in 
Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid 
recipient to his spouse before his death were 
subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's 
estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court stated that 
limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to 
"assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the 
Medicaid recipient had legal title to and 
conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-
common, survivorship, life estate, or living 
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and 
"other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 
607 N.W.2d at 885. Concluding that the words 
"interest" and "other arrangement" are 
ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional 
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide 
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries. " 
Id. at 885-86. The court did not explain why the 
same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was 
consistent with the limitation to recovery from 
assets in which the recipient had an interest at 
the time of death, y.;:t also justified abandoning 
that limitation in Wil'lz. 
We cannot agree that the "other 
arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment 
is ambiguous in the .sense implied in Wirtz. The 
plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in 
the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is 
arrangements other than those expressly listed 
that also convey assets at the time of the 
Medicaid recipient's death. 
We return agnin to the language of the 
federal statute. The l'ederal optional defmition ef 
"estate" allows inclnsionof 
any other remand personal property and 
other assets in which the individuaf had any 
iegal title or interest at the time of death' (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
~<~ U.S£. § 1396p(b)(4)(It) (emphasis 
added). The "including" clause further describes 
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the assets that a state may include in this 
expanded estate. The clause describes those 
assets in two ways-first by the limiting 
adjective "such," and second by the language 
describing how and to whom "such assets" are 
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers 
back to the immediately preceding clause 
describing the assets as those "in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of death." The including clause then 
describes to whom "such" assets may have been 
conveyed-a "survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual." fd (emphasis added). And 
fmally, the clause describes several methods by 
which the conveyance of "such" assets might 
take place - "through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or 
other arrangement." fd 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such 
assets" is predicated on the recipient having it 
legal interest at the time of death. When we 
construe a federal statute we must, if at all 
posswle, give effect "to every word Congress 
used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 
339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). TO' 
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime 
transfer would be to read the words "at the time 
of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that 
"other arrangement" cannot 
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include lifetime transfers is further supported by 
the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement~t 
~ ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of 
the deceased individual, " leaves no doubt that 
the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must 
have died for the conveyance to occur. A 
recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during 
his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign 
of the deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. 
In light of the plain statntory language and its 
context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that 
"other arrangementff is sufficiently ambiguous tD 
include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
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We conclude that there is no principled 
basis on which to interpret the federal law to 
allow recovery of as:;ets in which the Medicaid 
recipient did not have an interest at the time of 
her death. As explained above, the rationale for 
finding authority to recover from a surviving 
spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority 
granted in the federal law to recover from the 
"estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property 
transferred prior to death would not be part of 
tberecipient's estate. Further, as recognized by 
every decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 
1993 amendments nllow states to expand the 
definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery 
purposes, the langua!~e of the federal law clearly 
limits that expansion to assets in which the 
recipient had an inter est at the time of her death. 
Accordingly, we hold that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, 
subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that 
it authorizes recovery from the surviving 
spouse's estate of assets that the recipient owned 
as marital property or as jointly-owned property 
at any time during the marriage. To be 
recoverable, the assets must have been subject to 
an interest of the M;ldicaid recipient at the time 
~f her death. 
IV. 
This brings us to the .,question of whether 
Dolores Barg had allY interest in property at the 
time of her deafb:that would allow the County to 
make a claim' against the estate uf her 'SUrViving 
spouse, despite her t:rnnsfer of her joint interest 
in the property prier to her death. As we have 
noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the 
interest-at..:time-of-d:>ath .,limitation cOn :spousai 
estaterecovery,but nevertheless found that for 
these purposes Doleres retained a joint tenancy 
i,nterest at the time of her death that made the 
value of that interest recoverable from Francis's 
estate. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. 
Eschewing reference to either marital property 
law or probate law to determine the nature of 
any interest at the time of death, the court of 
appeals looked to st mdard real property law and 
Gullberg in decidilg that Dolores retained a 
joint tenancy intere:;t. fd. at 496-97. We do not 
agree. 
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The court of appeals determined that 
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the 
property based on its understanding that the 
court in Gullberg had recognized a continuing 
joint tenancy interest because the lifetime 
transfer was an It other arrangement," and 
because the court apparently understood section 
1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allowD a state to 
broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the 
meaning used in probate law and to include 
joint-tenancy interests that have been previously 
conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section 
1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to include 
lifetime transfers of property in the phrase "other 
arrangement" because the plain language and the 
context require that phrase to be limited to 
conveyances occurring upon the death of the 
recipient. For that reason, we cannot 
[752 N.W.2d 72] 
agree with the court of appeals' characterizati0TI 
of section 1 396p(b )( 4) as allowing the expanded 
definition of estate to include "previously 
conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language 
of section 1396p(b)( 4) requires that any interest 
included in the expanded estate must be one in 
which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at 
the time of her death, not one that was 
previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores 
did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the 
property at the time of her death, because that 
interest was effectively and legally transferred 
before her death. 
The question remains whether Dolores had 
any other interest in the property at the time of 
her death that may be considered part of an 
expanded estate for recovery purposes under 
Minnesota law. We agree with the court of 
appeals that courts should not look to marital 
property law to find such an interest, because the 
statute in which marital property is defined 
limits the definition to the purposes of that 
chapter. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b 
(2006);8 see Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, 
we agree that the recognizable interests at the 
time of death cannot be limited to those defined 
by probate law, because the purpose of section 
1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the 
~ fastcase 
defmition of estate beyond probate law. See 
Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree 
that real property law principles, informed by 
principles of probate law, should be the basis for 
ascertaining any interests at the time of death. 
Any interest recognized must be consistent with 
the underlying fOlmdational rationale that 
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is 
allowed only because of its relationship to the 
recipient's estate, iTem which federal law 
expressly allows recovery. With those principles 
in mind, we caution that for an interest 10 be 
traceable to and reeoverable from a surviving 
,spouse's estate, the: interest must be (1) an 
,interest recognized by law, (2) which the 
MediCaid recipient held at the time of death, and 
(3) that resulted in a eonveyance of an interest of 
some value to the surviving spouse that occurred 
as a result of the recipient's death. Further, to the 
extent the interest is not part of the standard 
probate estate, Minnesota law must have 
expanded the definition of estate to include the 
interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b )(i:~). 
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead 
and certificates of deposit no longer existed~ 
the: time of her death. No other recognizable 
intere&t has been identified. 
The County argues that the reference to 
marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the 
Minnesota legislature'S intent to make all marital 
property subject to spousal estate recovery. But 
subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest 
at ihe time of death or 10 re-defining the probate 
estate to include all marital propertY, even 
l'roperty transferred prior to death. This is not 
surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted 
,long before the optional estate definition 
auihority was added to federal law. 
The district court indicated that because 
Dolores was married to Francis even after the 
transfer of her intf:rest in the homestead, she 
retained some intfrest in the property. But 
whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's 
death, rather than resulting in transfer of an 
interest of value'to francis,. 
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We conclude that Dolores had no interest in 
assets at the time of her death that were part of a 
probate estate or an expanded estate defmition 
pennissible under federal law, and therefore 
there is no 
[752 N.W.2d 73] 
basis for the County's claim against the estate. 
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota 
legislature amended section 256B.15 by 
extending the definition of estate for Medicaid 
recovery purposes to include assets owned by a 
recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at 
the time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 
14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. 
Sess. 1751, 2205-2217 (codified as amended at 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The 
amendments do not mention the other forms of 
conveyance at death listed in the federal 
definition of "estate," except that the "right of 
survivorship" is mentioned with respect to joint 
tenancies.ld subds. 1(a)(6), 19, Ih(b). Thus, the 
legislature chose only to include two fonns of 
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. 
Also, as provided in the federal law, the 
inclusion of joint tenancy and life estate interests 
in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to 
interests the recipient owned at the time of 
death. Minn.Stat § 256B.l5, subds. Ih(b)(2), 
li(a). The amendments further limit the scope of 
recovery by exempting from the reach of 
subdivisions Ic through lka "homestead owned 
of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the 
,recipient and the recipient's spouse as joint 
tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat. 
§ 256B.15, subd. l(a)(6). In 2005, the legislature 
.retroactively made the provisions continuing life 
estates and joint tenancies effective only for life 
estate and joint tenancy interests created on6r 
after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st 
Spec. Sess., eh. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn. Laws 2454, 
2649 (codified at Minn.Stat § 256B.15, subd. 
l(c)). 
It is difficult to discern the intended reach 
of the 2003 amendments.9 IFthec;pr~{)03, ·law 
allowed ·recovery againsttlJe ~ving spouse's 
estate as argued by the Comity,·· there was lirtle 
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need to enact the 2003 amendments to reach 
those assets in the caSt! of a recipient who leaves 
a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree 
that the 2003 amendments do not apply to or 
influence this case, fer reasons that are not clear 
to us. 
It suffices to S;2;y that even if the 2003 
amendments were applicable, they would 
provide no basis for the County's claim. The 
new subdivision l:i specifically applies to 
circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient 
against whom a recovery claim could otherwise 
be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision provides 
procedures for filing a claim without making a 
recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. 
Id., subd. 1 (f). If this subdivision were to be 
applied to this case:. several limitations would 
preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient, 
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at 
the time of her death. If she had owned a joint 
tenancy at the time of her death, it would have 
been a homestead owned of record by her and 
her spouse as joint tenants with a right of 
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach 
of subdivision Ii. ld, subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that 
joint tenancy was established in the 1960s, well 
before August 1,2003. 
In summary, we bold that federal law does 
Hot preempt all Medicaid recovery from sJPousal 
estates, and Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a, is 
therefore not preempted to the extent it allows 
claims against the e::;tate of a surviving spouse of 
a Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable 
scope~ of spousal estate recovery is limited. 
Subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is preempted 
to tlJe extent that it allows recovery from assetS 
in which the deceas'~d Medicaid recipient did not 
have a legal interest at the time of death, and to 
[752 N.W.2d 74] 
the extent that it J )ermits recovery beyond the 
extent of the recipitmt'sinterest. Finally, we hold 
that Dolores Barg lIad no interest in property at .. 
tlIe tirrre of her de.; th that can form the basis for i 
recovery againsttheestate.ofFrancis.Bar~, 
v. 
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We have concluded that the County's claim 
for full recovery against all the assets in Francis 
Bargs estate was preempted by federal law 
because recovery is limited to assets in which 
Dolores had an interest at the time of her death, 
but the question of the appropriate remedy 
remains, because the County argues that the 
Estate waived the right to deny the claim in its 
entirety. Although we have decided as a matter 
of law in our preemption analysis that the state is 
preempted from requiring reimbursement from 
assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient 
spouse had no interest at the time of her death, 
that does not resolve the remedy issue here. 
Although a state may not compel payment from 
a spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by 
federal law, feneraI preemption does not 
preclude an estate from voluntarily paying all or 
part of a claim that could not be compelled. 
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed' 
the County's claim; thus -allowing the remainder 
of the claim. Minnesota Statutes § 524.3-806(a) 
(2006) provides that, on petition of the personal 
representative after notice to the claimant, the 
court may "for cause shown permit the personal 
representative to disallow" a previously-allowed 
claim. But the personal representative made no 
such request here. When questioned at the 
hearing in district court whether the personal 
represent.ative was challenging the entire claim 
of the County, the representative affirmed that 
he was challenging only the part already 
disallowed. When the district court affirmed that 
partial disallowance and the County appealed, 
the Estate did not file a notice of review in the 
court of appeals to challenge the implicit award 
to the County of the allowed part of its claim. A 
respondent who does not file a notice of review 
to challenge an adverse ruling of the district 
court waives that issue in the court of appeals. 
See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, 
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. RR Co., 294 
N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially 
allowed the County's claim and having then 
failed to properly seek a reversal of that 
allowance in both the district court and court of 
appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek 
that relief for the first time in this court. 
I': fastcase 
Accordingly, th,~ decision of the court of 
appeals is affmned in part and reversed in part. 
The court's denial of the County's claim for full 
recovery is affirmed., The court's remand for an 
award to the County based on the existence of a 
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is 
remanded to the d.istrict court for entry of 
judgment based on the partial allowance made, 
but not subsequently ,~hallenged, by the Estate. 
Affmned in par; and reversed in part. 
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in 
the consideration or decision of this case. 
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of 
this court at the time of the argument and 
submission, took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
Notes: 
1. "Medicaid" is the popular nam~ for this 
cooperative federal-state program. See ~~ U.S.c. § 
1396-1396v (2000). In Minnesota it is referred to as 
"medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 256B.02, subd. 8 
(2006). 
2. For purposes of detennining eligioility of one 
spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home}§ 
excluded. ~ U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); ;1!2 
U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1)(:!oOO). In the asset assessment 
for Dolores Barg, $104,875 was excluded. This 
amount corresponds to the value of the home, one 
jointly-owned vehicle, and a burial lot. When 
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the 
couple's resources is reserved for~.the needs of the 
spouse not applying fer Medicaid. ~2 U.S.c. § 1396r-
5(c)(2), (f)(2XA) (2000). Protected assets for the 
nourecipient spouse, Francis Barg, were calculated to 
be $24,607. 
3. The Commissioner'S motion to supplement the 
record on review is granted as to the following 
documents: North Dakota Medicaid State Pl~ 
Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Pl~ 
Transmittal No. 05-012; Idaho Medicaid State Plan, 
Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid 
State PI~ Transmitill No. 06-10. The motion is 
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated 
November 4, 1999. 
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4, Formerly the Health Care Financing 
Adminiswdtion (RCF A). See Wis. Dep't of Health & 
Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122 
S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002). 
5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses 
is premised on circumstances similar to those of the 
Bargs. One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient 
spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. 
The other, who we refer to as the community or 
surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and 
survives the recipient spouse. 
6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of 
"whether the cOlmty may recover Medicaid benefits 
correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse 
fi-om the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested 
briefing on whether that issue had been adequately 
preserved for review. The County argues that the 
Estate fulled to preserve the issue because it only 
partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed 
before the district court that only the disallowed 
portion of the claim was contested, and it asked the 
court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision. 
The County's arguments go to the scope of the 
remedy available in this case, an issue that we 
address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect 
independent of the specific scope of recovery 
available in this case. That legal component is 
necessary to a thorough analysis of the preemption 
issues presented here, and we will therefore address 
the issue in that context. No new or controverted 
facts are needed in order to address this purely legal 
question, and no prejudice will result from our 
consideration of the issue becanse the parties 
addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, 
the court of appeals, and this court. See Watson v. 
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 
(Minn. 1997). 
7. The United States Supreme Court has described 
Congress's passage of the anti"-impe-veriSfimem;: 
provisions' as an effort to "protect community spouse$ 
trom 'pauperization' while preventing financially 
secnrecouples from obtaining Medicaidassistanee. " 
Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 
U.S. 473, 480, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate 
does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, 
because the spouse must be dead for the recovery to 
occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid 
benefits to other impoverished individuals; indeed, :it 
can be expected to do quite.the- opposite. See West 
Virginia v. u.s. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 289 
F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that Congress 
c: fastcase 
expected the estate reC(NelY provISlOns to allow 
government to realize savings of $300 million over 
five years, and that the savings have been even 
greater). 
8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § JIS.54, subds. 1,5 (2004). 
9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on 
this question. 
17 
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) 
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) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF DENIAL OF :LIEN AGAINST 
) EMERSON D. \VIGGINS' PROPERTY 
) 
) 
) 
Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitk~d estates, and files his 
Responsive Memorandum in Support of Disallowance of Claim against the Estate of Emerson 
D. Wiggins. 
FACTS: 
The testimony at the hearing will include the testimony of the personal representative and 
Robin Wood, the Director of the Weiser Care Center, that the property remaining in the Estate of 
Emerson Wiggins is the separate property of Emerson Wiggins, through transmutation of his and 
Vivian's assets by Vivian and Emerson, themselves. 
LAW 
The Department filed a brief yesterday alleging that the first Jackman case, found at 132 
Idaho 213(1998), hereinafter referred to as Jackman I, changes the issue presented by the 
personal representative in the instant case. However, a close reading of Jackman I does not 
have the meaning portrayed by the Department. 
Jackman I determined, as did the Barg decision, that the definition of "assets" by federal 
law is the same. Jackman I states: 
"The federal definition is significant. Federal law includes witlnin the recipient's estate 
"all real and personal property and other assets included ~rvithin the individual's 
estate ... " ... and "any other real or personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time I]J death ... " 42 U.S.c. 
J39p(b)(4). " 
The foregoing is correct, and applied to the instant case refers only to Vivian's estate. 
Vivian had no estate and had no legal title or interest in Emerson's separate property at the time 
of her death, and therefore there is no recovery under the first part of Ja.,~kman 1. 
The Department then takes a mighty leap of logic concluding that the following language 
allows the Department, under Jackman I, to get at Emerson's separate property. However, the 
second part of Jackman I deals only with the issue of Barbara Jackmarl, Hildor's niece, signing 
away Hildor's and Lionel's interest in their respective estates. The second part of Jackman I 
states: 
"Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income :md resources as well as 
Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not affect the status of assets that 
federal law considers to be part of the recipient's estate because the definition of assets 
includes "income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled 
to but does not receive because of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in 
----
~lace of or on behalf of the individual or such individual:;' spouse." 42 U.S.C. 
139(e)(1)(B). Jackman's signing of the agreement constitutell action by a person on 
behalf of Hildor and Lionel." 
The import of part two of the Jackman I case is federal law prohibits someone other than 
the individuals themselves from being able to transmute the property and put it beyond 
Medicaid's reach. When Barbara Jackman, instead of Lionel or Hildor, executed the agreement 
to transmute the character of the property, that property was brought ba(;k into Medicaid's grasp 
by the terms of federal law above quoted. It is this part of the federal le,w which the Department 
states "Medicaid law ... does not provide any protection for subsidy for the heirs." 
The instant case is entirely different from the second part of .;1ackman 1. Each of the 
spouses, Emerson and Vivian, signed the marital settlement agreementshemselves. Thus, there 
was no action by a third person "on their behalf' signing the document transmuting the property. 
To otherwise hold, no person in Idaho could ever transmute their property and avoid the reach of 
Medicaid. The Idaho legislature, to do so, would need to completely ;remove the authorization 
under Title 32, Section 9 of the Idaho code, and rewrite it. The right to deal with ones property as 
he or she sees fit, would be eliminated under the Department's position. 
Under the facts of the instant case, not only did both Emerson and Vivian signed an 
agreement transmuting their property to separate property, but afterward, in furtherance of their 
intent, Vivian spent down her separate property to a point where :;he became eligible for 
Medicaid. She had no further interest in Emerson's separate property, under Idaho or federal law, 
at that time. The Department seeks to resurrect title to property she faikd to have in 2003. Even 
the Department of Health and Welfare does not have that power. 
Once again, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Hudelson, supra, that the State of Idaho 
cannot receive more power over a person's property than the language of the federal statute 
allows: 
"The Court considered 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the anti-lien provision of the federal Medicaid 
statute, and found that it limited a state's ability to recover medical expenses it paid on a 
Medicaid recipient's behalf. Id. at 284, 126 S. Ct. at 1763, 164 L.Ed.2d at 473-74. A 
state Medicaid plan must comply with section 1396p, which generally prohibits states 
from placing liens against a Medicaid recipient's property. 7 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18)." 
(emphasis added). 
In the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 42 u.~'.C J396p(b)(J), and (4), 
the federal statute allowed recovery only against the "individual's estate". The import of that 
language has not changed, and the Idaho legislature has no authority to exceed that mandate. We 
all understand that the Idaho legislature may give it a try, because the worst that can happen is 
the Court declaring the infringing portion ineffective, but the Court's of this State are here to 
stop such a blatant attempt to exceed the grant given by the federal statme. 
In Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho :; 13 (1998) (Jackman II), 
the Idaho Supreme Court specifically prohibited Medicaid from collecting beyond the 
community property the spouses accumulated after a marriage settlement agreement transmuted 
their property, i.e.: 
"'We conclude, however, that federal law applicable to t:,tis case prohibited this 
recovery, except from any community property the spouses mayhave accumulated after a 
marriage settlement agreement transmuting their communitY..-Qroperty into separate 
property of each." 
Contrary to the claim of the Department that Jackman II only dealt with the modified 
federal statute in 1993, the Court was clearly speaking of the case where individuals themselves 
transmute their property by way of a marriage settlement agreement. The Jackman II Court 
used the word "a" when referring to a marriage settlement agreerr ent, not "the" marriage 
settlement agreement signed by Barbara Jackman, on behalf of her aunt and uncle, in the 
Jackman I case. The Court cannot not assume the Idaho Supreme Court did not know the 
difference between the word "the" which would have referenced the agreement in the Jackman I 
decision and the word "a" they used in the Jackman II decision. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
Jackman II was clearly referring to any marriage settlement agreement and used the word "a" to 
so signify. 
Furthermore, it is the State of Idaho, Department of Health and "\1 elfare who has prepared 
and provides to the persons seeking to transmute their property to qualify for Medicaid. A eopy 
of the same is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This marriage settlemen: agreement, provided by 
the Department, uses all the wording necessary for each party to effectively transmute their 
community property into separate property. To induce the people looking to plan for Medicaid 
into signing an agreement the Department has prepared, which pur ports to transmute their 
community property to separate property is unconscionable, because at the time the Department 
is advising them how to comply with Medicaid law and protect treir separate estates, the 
Department knows (according to the allegations made by the Depa rtment in this case) the 
agreement will not be effective to do so. The Department does not tave the right to dupe the 
citizens in Idaho into believing they are executing an agreement which will put the non-recipient 
spouse's separate estate out of harms-way, and then having the Department assert that the 
agreement is not effective to do so. Further, if the separate property of a spouse is part of the 
recipient spouse's estate, as claimed by the Department, there wou.d be no reason for the 
maniage settlement agreement the Department provides. The Department cannot have it both 
ways, i.e. permitting the spouse's to transmute their community propelty into separate property 
by the Department's own agreement in order to become eligible for Medicaid, but only thereafter 
take the position the agreement is not effective to do so. 
The mamage settlement agreement also advises that the incom~ from spouse's separate 
property is community property. The agreement then states such community property will be 
used to determine eligibility, implying that the separate property itself w ill not be an impediment. 
That position is again inconsistent with the position presently taken by the Department. 
If the mamage settlement agreement provided by the Department was not intended to 
shelter the separate property of the non-recipient spouse, the Departnent has the duty to so 
inform the persons signing the same. 
Finally, even if the Minnesota legislature changed its law to ge:1 around Barg (which is 
not shown by the Department's allegation of the same), if Minnewta has not had a case 
challenging the new statute, it is of no precedential or other value to the Court in Idaho. 
Barg correctly analyzed the federal law as prohibiting any recovery by the States except 
for the three limited exceptions. Those exceptions are to be strictly construed. None of them 
allows the States to collect from anyone other than the "individual's estate", other than the 
situation in which someone" other than the individual's themselves" attempted the transmutation. 
The Department has presented no legal authority which prohibits the individual, 
themselves from transmuting the character of their property and thus leaving it beyond the 
authority of recovery given by federal law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that the Court make its decision WhiC~l upholds both Idaho and 
Federal law on the subject. Both Idaho and Federal law prohibit the State from exceeding the 
authority given by the Federal statute. 
Dated this~~day of February, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the ~'hay of February, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Responsive Memorandum was mailed by regular Ur ited States mail, postage 
prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wifgins 
1520 W. 28 Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
&]~.n-giH-
State of Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare 
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMEN'r 
THIS AGREEMENT, is made and executed on this_ 
by and beUNeen 
hereinafter referred to as the "Husband" and 
hereinafter referred to as the 'Wife". 
WITNESSETH: 
HW0970 
Revised 04/01 
day cf 
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife are married and are resi! ~ents of the State of 
Idaho; and 
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife desire that certain propert:! owned by them bl:~ 
owned as separate property of each spouse and not as community property; and 
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife own certain property as community property as set 
forth in Schedule A, and desire to transmute and divide such property inte the separate property 
of each spouse as set forth in Schedules Band C; and 
r-.IOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed by and beUNeen the Husband anj Wife as follows: 
1. TRANSMUTATION AND/ORTRANSFER: Certain property which is owned as separate 
and/or community property is hereby transmuted and divided, or trar sfarred into separate 
property of each of the Husband and Wife. The property set forth on Schedule "8", attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, shall hereafter be the sElparate property of th4? 
husband and the property set forth on Schedule "C", attached hereto andncorporated herein by 
this reference, shall hereafter be the separate property of the Wife. 
2. CONVEYANCES: The Husband does hereby transfer, convey ami a:3sign to the Wife all 
of his interest in the property set forth on Schedule "C". The Wife does hereby transfer, convey 
and assign all of here interest in the property set forth on Schedule "8". The Husband and Wife 
each agree to execute such additional documents of conveyance, including deeds, bills of sale, 
and assignments as may be necessary to transmute or transfer the property set forth on 
Schedule "8", to the Husband and the property on Schedule nc" to the Wij'e. 
3. Separate Income: Pursuant to 16 IDAPA §03.05620, all the future income from the 
Husband's separate property and all the income from the Wife's sepal"atl7 property shall bl9 
considered the community property of Husband and Wife for purposes o·f determining eligibility 
for Medical Assistance under Federal Spousal Impoverishment. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this document the day and 
year first above written. 
"Husband" 
''WIfe'' 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of _________ -J) 
On this day of , 20_, before IT Ie, the undersigned, a 
Notary Public in and for said state, personally appeared ___ ~~ ______ --:_ 
and I Husband and WifH, known or identifiecl 
to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the v lithin instrument and 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affi}ed by official seal th,; 
day and year first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
(Seal) 
Commission expires: ____ _ 
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SCHEDULE A 
Community Property of Husband and Wife 
Description Value 
------~----------------------------------------~-
Date Husband's Signature 
Date Wife's Signature 
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Date 
Date 
SCHEDULE B 
separate Property of Husband 
Husband's Signature 
Wife's Signature 
4 
Value 
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-
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Date 
r. 
Date 
SCHEDULEC 
Separate Property of Wife 
Husband's Signature 
Wife's Signature 
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R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
Email-bmasingiU@hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL llISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) Case No.: 2009-1')26 
) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL POST-HEARING 
) MEMORANDUI'i1 RE: LEGISLATIVE 
) IDSTORY OF IDAHO CODE 56-218 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entiH~d estates, and files his 
Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum in support of disallowance of the Department of 
Health and Welfare's claim against the Estate of Emerson D. Wiggins. 
LEGISLATIVE IDSTORY 
The Department of Health and Welfare claims the statute, Idaho Code 56-218, is intended 
to allow a Medicaid lien to attach to the separate property of a non -institutionalized spouse. 
However, a review of the legislative history of the statute belays that pt)sition. The following is 
the language from the Senate bill, thereafter becoming Idaho Code 56-218, which specifically 
states that its purpose is to be limited to attaching the communitLoroperty of the non-
institutionalized spouse, not the separate property of the non-institutionalized spouse: 
"MEDICAL ASSISTANCE - Amends existing law to clarify when medical assistance 
may be recovered; and to specify when the cause of action aecrues to void a transfer 
which was made without adequate consideration. 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 13525 
Under federal and state law, the state is authorized to set aside "ransfers of assets owned 
by recipients of Medicaid where the transfer is made without adequate consideration and 
those assets could have been used to pay for the medical assi stance provided through 
Medicaid. In a recent decision, a state district cOUli ruled that the state's action was barred 
by a four year statute of limitations which ran from the date of th~ transfer even though 
the circumstances of the transfer were not reasonably discovered by the state until after 
the four years had elapsed. The proposed legislation adds language to Idaho Code Section 
56-218 that would prevent the statute of limitations from running until such time as the 
state discovers, or reasonably could have discovered, that the a ~set transfer was without 
adequate consideration. "Discovers" or "reasonably could have discovered" as used in 
proposed subsection 56-218(8) is intended to have the same mearing as "discovery", as 
interpreted by the courts, in subsection 5 -218( 4), Idaho Code. The proposed legislation 
also makes a technical correction to Idaho Code 56-218 to clarify that the non-Medicaid 
spouse of a Medicaid recipient need not survive the Medicaid recipient in order for the 
department to file a claim against the community pl'Ql"Jerty of the non-
Medicaid spouse's estate. (emphasis added). 
The foregoing legislative history shows that the legislature never intended the statute to 
permit such an outrageous result as taking someone's separate property to pay for the debt of the 
spouse who has the misfortune of needing Medicaid. 
The Department's position encompasses, within its ambit, such situations as occur when 
two older folks become married, both having substantial separate property from their former 
relationships. The Department's position is such that the subject cl)uple can do nothing to 
protect their separate property from the Medicaid lien. It is unconscionable to think: that people 
who get married the second or third time around, presumably in their later years, would lose their 
separate property to Medicaid when that separate property was not produced by the recipient 
spouse. The statute as applied in the manner demanded by the Department, is overbroad and 
unconstitutional. 
However, the statute need not be so interpreted, as it is clear the legislature did not intend 
anything but the community property of the non-institutionalized spouse from being subject to 
the Medicaid lien. The Department's claim that it applies to the non-;nstitutionalized spouse's 
separate property is not supported by either federal law or the Idaho statute. 
In addition, then, to the previously provided memorandums, the Wiggins estate avers 
that the Court, upon a review of the legislative history of Idaho Code St.-21S, will determine that 
neither the terms of the statute, nor the public policy of this State, snpports the Department's 
proposition that the separate property of the non-institutionalized is subjeet to the Medicaid lien 
incurred by the institutionalized spouse. 
CONCLUSION 
The claims of the Department violate both the intent of the statute and the public policy 
of this State, and it should be denied. 
Dated this \ 5t' day of March, 2010. 
~~»' 
R. Brad Masingill 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the ,5t day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum was mailed by regular United States 
mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wilgins 
1520 W. 2° Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
Email-bmasingill@hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) Case No.: 2009-1')2,) 
) 
) FIRST SUPPLElv'CENTAL POST-HEARING 
) MEMORANDU]\;[ RE: 
) 
) Estate of George D. Perry, Ada County case: 
) Case No. CVIE0905214 
) 
) 
Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled I~states, and files his First 
Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum in support of disallowance of the Department of 
Health and Welfare's claim against the Estate of Emerson D. Wiggins. 
Estate of George D. Perry, Ada County Case No. CVIE0905214 
The Department of Health and Welfare was denied its claim of lien in the Estaitc of 
Perry, supra, a copy of which is attached hereto. The Perry case wa;; handed down on March 
10, 2010. The case just came to counsel's knowledge and after reading the same it is clear it 
has significant effect on the case at bar. In fact, although it is not controlling precedent for the 
case at bar because it is from a Court of equal jurisdiction, it is respectfully submitted it has 
decided the case in a manner which is identical in many respects to the case at bar. The Perry 
case cites both Idaho Dept. of IIealth and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) and In re 
the Estate of Barg, 752 N. W. 2nd (May 30,2008 and rehearing deniled on July 21,2008), as 
being controlling and discusses the federal and state statutes involved in the case at bar. 
After review of the same, it is submitted the Department's claim in the case at bar is not 
well founded. The Perry case clearly provides that if the Medicaid recipient spouse does not 
own an interest in the non-recipient spouse's property, such as community property, at the time 
of death, the claim does not attach. In the case at bar, Mr. Wiggin's separate property is not 
subject to the Department's claim oflien under Perry. 
The Department did not send a copy of the Perry decision to counsel, nor did it alert 
counsel of the decision, despite its clear impact on the case at bar. It is great to be a member of 
the Idaho Trial Lawyer's Association! 
~ 
Dated this £day of March, 2010. 
/J/~JJi~ ~Singill 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the I~Y of March, 2010, a true and correct eopy 
of the foregoing First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum was [nailed by regular United 
States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
R. Brad Masingill 
AECElVED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of: 
Case No. CVIE0905214 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM 
Deceased. 
On February 26, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the chltm of the State of 
Idaho. Department of Health and Welfare (Department) against George Perry's estate. 
The Department seeks to recover Medicaid benefits paid to Mr. Perry':; wife, Martha 
Perry. The personal representative ofMr. Perry's estate, Barbara McCormick, is 
represented by Peter Sisson and the Department by Corey Cartwright. The parties have 
agreed to the relevant facts and have presented written memoranda and made oral 
argument. 
L Background. 
During George and Martha Perry's marriage, Martha owned a home at 2104 
Tendoy Drive in Boise. On November 18,2002, by quitclaim deed, Martha transferred 
this property to herself and George. On July31, 2006; agai& by quitclaim deed, the 
property was transferred to George a1one. I 
Over the years, Martha's health has failed and, since October j, 2006, she has 
received assistance from the Medicaid program to pay for her nursing home care. At the 
time of George's death, February 25, 2009, Medicaid had provided over $100,000.00 in 
benefits to Martha. In March 2009. Ms McCormick, in her capacity a 5 personal 
t The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from ?vurtha and that he had 
the authority to transfer the property to himself. 
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representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net 
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only significant asset of 
George's estate. 
On April 15,2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on 
June 4,2009, Ms. McCormick filed a notice of disallowance of the clai m. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15,2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance 
of Claim \vhich is now before the court. 
II. Issues Presented. 
The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid benefits that it has 
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeds of the sale of the 
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the 
Tendoy horne during the marriage (and after federal statutory changes in 1993), it may 
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership intere:it from the 
proceeds of the sale of the horne. The personal representative (PR) argues that the 
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal 10 Martha's 
interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and 
neither this horne nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the 
Department may recover any amount. 
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-56-218(1) which 
provides: 
Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(l) Except where eKempted or waived 
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter 
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when 
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to ~~lther or both: 
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(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be authorized 
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section 
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse. 
(emphasis added) 
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefit: from the estate of 
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department of Health alld Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho 
213 (1998).2 Jackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limited to the 
estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may reeo\' er appropriate 
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate 
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an 
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of which, the court 
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate. 
Jaclanan does not directly address the critical question for our :;ase: To what 
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid rcecipient's interest 
in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the cime of the 
recipient's death.:> 
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of 
"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(l) 
provides: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
2 In re ESfate of Kaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to recover Medicaid b<~nefits from the 
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's claim was urtimely. 
3 Jackman certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinativt: time: "The record 
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property,!!! the time of Hildor's 
death~ Jfthey did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefore be part of Hildor's 
"estate" that 42 U.s.c. 1396p(b)(l )(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover End apply against the 
balance of the Medicaid payments." [d. at 216. (emphasis added) 
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or oldt~r when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shaH sed; adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate, 
This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4): 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased 
individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets induded within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and~rsonaI property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or injerest at the time 
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets cQnveved to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through join]: tenancy, tenancy 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arran!?~ent. 
(emphasis added) 
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p(h) contains general definition provisions: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income 
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but 
does not receive because of action--
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's 
spouse. 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because 
Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse; 42 U.S.c. 
1396p(b)( 4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" and 42 U.S.c. 
1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The 
court cannot accept this interpretation. 
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The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid 
benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the estate of Verna Witz, 
Clarence's wife. The Winz court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and 
"asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to 
Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the departmeilt's recovery 
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpretation of the 
tem "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dckota court in Wirtz 
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the n:st of the section. 
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an alltomatic fashion 
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfen and life estates. 
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of 
this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context ,()f the surrounding 
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a :;,imilar, automatic 
nature not any possible transfer. 
The case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more 
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which t) interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not 
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale 
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates 
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the 
Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would n;)t be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Winz, to the 
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the definition of "estate" for 
Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits that 
expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the Time of her death. 
ld at 71.J emphasis added) 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certif\l that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Order Disallowing Claim, pursuant to 
Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
PETER SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
DEPUTY ATIORNEY GENERAL 
MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERY 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0036 
Date: 10 March, 2010 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District C 
Ada County, Idaho 
DEBR By ____ ---.::. 
III. Conclusion. 
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include tran:;fers of property 
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of 
a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover agaim;t property in 
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry 
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint 
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any 
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not 
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for Allowance of claim is 
denied. 
DATED This 10th day of March, 2010. 
CHRISTOPHER M. BfETER 
Hon. Christopher M. Bieter 
Magistrate Judge 
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 6 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
fcartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
Case No. CV-2009-1926 
RESPONSE TO MARCH 15,2010 
MEMORANDlJM 
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Department") and responds to the personal representative's third post hearing memorandum, 
denominated "First Supplemental Post-Hearing Memorandum etc." by the personal 
representative. 
The Department has attached a copy of it's Notice of Appeal in the George D. Perry case, 
cited by the personal representative. The Department believes the Magi;3trate decision in the 
IJm:y case was incorrectly decided and did not address the dispositive authorities presented in 
RESPONSE TO MARCH 15,2010 
MEMORANDUM - 1 Z:\MRCaseslEsta':e\Wigginsv\Response to Supp Memo,wpd 
this case. The ~ decision also lacks any analysis of the reasoning gi ven by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman. 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 
6 (1998),1 and fails to acknowledge that the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re 
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008), is not contrary to Jackman, but that each court was 
interpreting its own state's law. (See Section IV of the Department's Reply Brief, herein, 
beginning at page 10). 
Moreover, the facts of this matter are substantially different from those in the £gry 
matter. In this case, the Medicaid recipient pre-deceased her spouse and this matter was filed as 
a joint probate which anticipates that the assets are unified for administration. Idaho Code § 15-
3-111. In the ~ estate, the Medicaid recipient is still alive, and probate was opened for the 
deceased spouse who had a will disinheriting his spouse. In the ~ case, there are formal 
documents purporting to transfer the couple's real property to the non-"tdedicaid spouse. In this 
case, the personal representative has never produced a formal document, such as a deed (as in 
~) or a marriage settlement agreement which effects any transfer of Vivian's interests to 
Emerson. 
DATED this 18 day of March, 2010, 
N6~_->Z1 
"W:COJkEY CARTWRIGI:IT 
Deputy Attorney General 
lIn response to the statutory framework discussed by the Supreme Court in JackI::lan at 132 Idaho 216, the court 
in ~ merely states that it "cannot accept this interpretation" without further analysis. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, and sent via facsimile, to the following: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
C/O R. BRAD MASINGILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER ID 83672 
facsimile (208) 414-0490 
DATED this 1K day of March, 2010. 
RESPONSE TO MARCH 15,2010 
MEMORANDUM - 3 
March lle Premo, Legal Allsistant 
Division of Human Servic~:s 
Z:IMRCases\Estak\WigginsV\Response to Supp Memo.wpd 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov) 
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"It OAVI9 NAVARRO, Cltltk 
By r. BOURNE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
EXEMPT: I.e. § 31-1212 
TO: BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HER 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PETER SISSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the Department"), appeals purlUsnt Idaho Code § 17-
201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
1. The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of 
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in md for the County of 
Ada, Magistrate Judge Christopher M. Bieter, presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 Y:\MRCases\Esta .e\PenyMID CourtlNotice of Appea1.wpd 
2. The title of the cOUli to which the appeal is taken is the District Court ofthe 
Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada. 
3. The Depaliment appeals from the ORDER DISALLOWE-JG CLAIM filed 
March 10,2010. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw. 
5. This matter was heard by oral argument on February 26, ~;Ol 0, at Boise, Idaho; 
however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence vIas taken. The hearing 
was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession .of the clerk 0>: the court. 
6. The issues on appeal are: 
1. Did the Magistrate err in detennining that the gen'~ral power of attorney 
held by George Peny gave him authority to make a gift tc himself of Martha 
Perry's real property? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code 
§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim agdnst the estate of George 
Perry? 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-2 L8? 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding 
in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, J 32 Idaho 213 (1998) to 
the facts of this case? 
5. Is the Depruiment entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 Y:\MRCases\Esl! le\PenyM\D Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2010, 
Q~ /----.--~ 
W. Cp Y CARTWRIGBT 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a hue and con'ect copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
p~stage pre~paid) to the following: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
c/o PETER C SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
DATED this.tl- day of March, 2010. 
~~r2amO 
Marchel e Premo, Legal A~;sistant . 
Division of Human Servic€s 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 Y:\MRCases\Esllte\FmyM\D Court\Nolice of Appell.lvpd 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THRID JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
) 
) 
) 
Vivian M. Wiggins and ) 
Emerson Wiggins ) 
Deceased. ) 
Case No. CV 2009-1926 
MEMORAND'Jl'vf DECISION 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE 
Hearing on the Department of Health & Welfare's petition for allowance of a 
claim against the estate of Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins was heard on the 
3rd day of February 2010. Corey Cortwright appeared on behalf of the: claimant, the 
Department of Health & Welfare. The personal representative Lynl ·Wiggins appeared 
and was represented by R. Brad Masingill. 
Background 
A joint estate was opened May 21,2009, pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-111. On 
November 23,2009 the Department of Health & Welfare filed a claim (pursuant to Idaho 
Code 15-3-804) against the estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent 
Vivian M. Wiggins in the amount of $264,674.45 made pursuant to Idaho Code 56-218. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 1 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE 
The personal representative filed a Notice of Disallowance c,[the claim pursuant 
to Idaho Code 15-3-806 on November 30, 2009. The claimant filed a Petition for 
Allowance of Claim pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-806 on December 1, 2009. 
The parties stipulated to the following facts: 
1. The Department of Health & Welfare treated Vivian Wiggins and 
Emerson Wiggins as though they had a Marriage Settlement Agreement 
(hereinafter MSA) which divided their assets. 
2. The MSA transmutted Vivian Wiggins and Emerson Wiggin's community 
property to separate property. 
3. Although no executed copy or original MSA was presented to the court, 
the parties agreed that one was executed in 2002. 
4. The first application for Medicaid Assistance took place in 2002 and the 
second occurred August 27,2003. 
5. Unless the MSA had been executed, Vivian WigginE would not have been 
eligible for Medicaid Benefits. 
6. Plaintiff s Exhibits A through G were admitted; they support the amount 
claimed by the Department $264,674.45 that was pa d on behalf of Vivian 
Wiggins and has not been recovered; and, that a Notice of a Statutory 
Claim regarding the Estate of Vivian Wiggins was s!~nt to the Personal 
Representative on March 5, 2009 (Plaintiffs Exhibi: B). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 2 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE 
The court further finds based on the pleadings that Vivian and Emerson Wiggins 
were married at the time of Vivian's death. Vivian M Wiggins died on the 30th day of 
January 2009. Emerson Dale Wiggins died on February 9, 2009. 
The personal representative did not contest the amount of the claim or that the 
Medicaid funds were expended for the care of Vivian Wiggins. 
The assets in the joint estate were the separate property of Emerson Wiggins. 
The Department did not challenge the validity of the MSA, even though no 
original or copy of the original was delivered to the court and no proof was made that the 
MSA complied with Idaho Code sections 32-916 et. Seq. The Department has not 
brought any action in the district court to challenge the MSA. 
Issue 
May the Department recover Medicaid benefits paid for Vivian's care from the 
separate property of her husband, Emerson? 
Idaho Code 56-218 provides for the recovery of Medicaid b(mefits from the 
estates of deceased Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code 56-218 provides; 
(1) Recovery of Certain Medicaid Assistance - (1) Excepl where exempted or 
waived in accordance with federal law, medical assistance pursuant to this chapter 
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year:; of age or older when 
the individual received such assistance, may be recovered from the individuals 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
The Department argues that the legal basis for its claim aga;nst Emerson's 
separate property is Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jadanan 132 Idaho 213 
(1998). That case parallels this case factually. Jackman's holding is that the Department 
is not limited to the estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 3 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE EST ATE 
recover amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that: (1) "if the estate of the individual who received Medicaid assiE:tance is inadequate 
to repay the full amount of the assistance received, the Department can recover the 
balance from the estate of the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when 
recipient and her husband entered into marital settlement agreement transmitting most of 
recipient's and husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited 
the Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may have 
accumulated after the agreement. 
In this matter the personal representative for the estate denied the claim because 
the claim to recover for benefits paid on behalf of Vivian Wiggins 'V/aS made against 
property which pursuant to the MSA would be the separate propert;/ of Emerson 
Wiggins. 
The Department argues that recovery against the separate property of Emerson 
should be allowed because the MSA between Emerson and Vivian ,)ccurred in 2002 after 
the law applicable in Jackman was amended to include a more expansive definition of 
"estate" and "asset". In Jackman the parties entered into a MSA in April of 1993 and the 
Federal Law was amended in October of 1993 (OBRA 93). 
The Department's claim relies on an interpretation of the dEfinition of "estate" 
and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes amended in Octobm of 1993. 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)( 4) provides: 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased 
individual-
MEMORANDUM DECISION 4 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living, or other arrangement. 
The term "asset" is defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396(h): 
(1) The term "asset", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any 
income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, ... 
The Department argues that it doesn't matter whether the property is Emerson's 
separate property or not because the Department may under these definitions recover 
against any property which had been the couple's community propet1y at any time after 
October 1, 1993; 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. - Limits on the Department's claim against the assets 
of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections 56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho 
Code. A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after Octoberl, 1993, community property, 
or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly owned property . 
.. .IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. 
The Department points to the language in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) as the basis 
for its position that property transferred to the spouse after the look back period is 
recoverable. This proposition is based on the Department's interprr;;tation that "other 
arrangement" contained in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) includes property transferred by 
way of a Marriage Settlement Agreement. That section contains a laundry list of assets 
which may be recovered at the option of the State, "assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 5 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living tmst, or other arrangement." 
All of the specific transfers of property listed in that section occur in an automatie 
fashion upon the death of the o-wner. Under the Department's interpretation all 
arrangements or transfers of any type occurring after the look-back date would be "other 
arrangements". There is no specific mention of Marriage Settlement Agreements in that 
section. 
Marriage Settlement Agreements are recognized under Idaho law and require 
specific statutory compliance 32-916 et. Seq. An MSA allows one spouse to transmute 
community property to the other. Furthermore, the Idaho legislatur,;~ contemplated that 
transfers could be made by recipients of Medicaid andlor their spow;es without 
compensation in order to avoid repayment. A remedy is provided in Idaho Code 56-218 
(2) which addresses these transfers. That section provides that transfers of real or 
personal property, on or after the look-back dates defined in 42 U.S,C. 1396p, by 
recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and 
may be set aside by an action in the district court. 
A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is not an 
automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(bl(4)(B). Another 
remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The Departments expansive 
interpretation to include all transactions is not reasonable. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 6 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE 
Conclusion 
The Marriage Settlement Agreement in this case has not been voided. The assets 
in the estate are the separate property of Emerson; there is no evidence to the contrary. 
The Department may only recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an 
interest at the time of her death. Since Vivian predeceased Emerson she has no legal 
interest in the Separate Property of Emerson under Idaho Law. The Department's Claim 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 7 
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R. BRAD MASINGILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
Email-bmasingill@hotmail.com 
Filed VV~:~ 23 C ftJ ( () 
BETIV J. THOMAS. ~ 1 g n-M. 
Cle C District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL, DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) Case No.: 2009-1'\J26 
) 
) REPLY TO DEP ARTMENT'S MARCH 18 
) MEMORANDUM: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled estates, and files his 
Response to the Department's Response to March 15, 2010 Memorandu m. 
Joint Probate: First, the Department claims that the filhg of a joint probate has 
something to do with the issue before the Court. It does not. The prohate was filed jointly, but 
the documents clearly show that the money over which this issue is discussed was designated as 
Emerson's separate property, and the documents further show that Vivian had no interest therein. 
Emerson's Separate Property: Second, the Department c1airJs that the fact that there 
was no Marriage Settlement Agreement or the like somehow has an impact on the Court's 
decision. Again, it does not. In fact, in open Court, as well as by written stipulation, the 
Department stipulated that the property in question was Emerson's separate property. 
Perry: Finally, the Department claims the Perry decision did not address the 
dispositive authorities. That is also false. The Perry decision, one the Department failed to let 
the Court or Wiggins counsel know about, discussed the appropriate :,tatutes, the federal and 
state, and the dispositive case, In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W. 2nd (J\1ay 30, 2008). 
Conclusion and the Law: The legal position of the Department is not supported by 
either fact or law. 
case: 
The following are the uncontradicted facts and the uncontradicted legal authority in this 
1. The property in question is Emerson's separate property. See stipulation in open 
Court and subsequent written stipulation; and 
2. Idaho Code 56-218 is subject to the constraints of the federal statute. State Dept. of 
Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905 (Idaho, 2008); Emd 
3. The Federal statute, 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4), specifically provides no right to get to the 
separate property of a non-recipient spouse, and speaks only of the "individual's" 
obligation to repay Medicaid funds; and 
4. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 132 Idaho 213 (1998), known and cited 
as Jackman, clearly provides that community property is the only property subject to 
Idaho Code 56-218; and 
5. Idaho Code 32-903 provides that separate property cannot be subject to the 
community or separate debt of a spouse. Simplot v. Simp/ol, 96 Idaho 239 (Idaho, 
1974); and 
6. In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W 2nd (May 30, 2008) is directly on point with the 
Personal Representative's position; and 
7. Subsequent Minnesota statutory law does not affect Idaho statutory law, Idaho ease 
law, or F ederallaw; and 
8. The legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218 reveals the legislature'S intent to 
include only community property of the non-recipient spouse as subject to 
recoupment; and 
9. Judge Beiter has entered the Perry decision, which is directly on point and belies the 
Department's position. The Department's appeal will fail. 
. sr Dated thls3L'day of March, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
sf-
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the 31 day of March, 201 0, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Response to the Department's Response to March 15, 2010 Memorandum was 
mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
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R. BRAD MASINGILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone #1(208)414-0665 
Fax #1(208)414-0490 
Email: bmasingilI(al.hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF II)AHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS ) 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM lIN SUPPORT OF 
THE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEI:£S AND COSTS 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and throu~;h its attorney, of record, 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and 
Law in support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fee and CO!:ts. 
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A. 
I. 
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-121 
Frivolous Claims: 
Idaho Code 12-121 confers the broad power of the court to "award 
reasonable attorney fees to "a prevailing party or parties" in any civil action. An avvard 
under this code section requires an analysis of IRCP 54( e), which generally provides that 
attorney fees can be awarded when the Court finds, from the facts presented, that the case 
was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Idaho Code 12-121 is applicable to estates. See KoJ'ouch v. First Sec. Bank 
of Idaho, 911 P.2d 779, 128 Idaho 186 (Idaho App., 1996). The Idaho Supreme Court, 
in Kolouch, supra, sustained an attorney fee award of $50,000 in an estate case, stating as 
follows: 
"Helen asserts that the magistrate erred in awarding attorney fees to the 
respondents in their action to remove her from the position of personal 
representative. She argues that because her defense of the petition to remove was 
not frivolous, the fees were wrongfully granted. Further, she claims that the 
amount of attorney fees granted was inappropriate and urges this Court to review 
the amount awarded. She also disputes the magistrate's order granting attorney 
fees without first conducting a hearing on the issue. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(1) provides that an award under Idaho 
Code Section 12-121 may not be made unless the court finds, from facts presented 
to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivDlously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. In re Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho J50, 354, 707 P.2d 461, 
465 (Ct.App.1985). Applying these criteria to the facts of a particular case is a 
task invoking the judge's discretionary function. The judge's determination as to 
whether the criteria for an award of attorney's fees have been satisfied will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless such discretion has been abused. Id. Like the award 
itself, the reasonableness of the amount is a discretion2ry determination by the 
trial court. DesFosses v. DesFosses, 122 Idaho 634, 635, 836 P.2d 1095, 1099 
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B. 
(CLApp.1992). When reviewing an exercise of discretion" an appellate court must 
determine whether the lower court properly applied the legal standard. Estate of 
Kunzler, 109 Idaho at 354, 707 P.2d at 465. 
The magistrate found that the respondents were the prevailing parties in the 
removal action and met the criteria for an award of atlomey fees under Idaho 
Code Section 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B). The 
magistrate further found, pursuant to Rules 54(d)(I)(B) a:nd 54(e)(I) and (2), that 
Helen's defense against the petition for removal was unreasonable and frivolous. 
The magistrate then used the criteria set forth in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) to determine the 
amount of the attorney fee award. Finally, the magistrate fmmd that equity would 
not be served by requiring Peggy's children to pay for r,epresentation to remove 
Helen as the personal representative when she was, in bad L'lith, misappropriating 
funds and property from the estate. 
The magistrate used the correct legal standard in determining whether an 
award of attorney fees was appropriate and in what amount. The magistrate's 
factual findings of Helen's bad faith misuse of estate funds support the conclusion 
that her defense of the removal action was unreasonable and frivolous. The 
magistrate found that the time, skill, and labor required, novelty and difficulty of 
the issues and the financial impact upon the estate jmtified an award in the 
amount of $50,000. It was not an abuse of discretion in this situation for the 
magistrate to award attorney fees in that amount to the estate for the removal 
proceedings. 
Frivolous, Unreasonable, or Without Legal or Factual Basis. In the present case, 
the State came to the court arguing that Idaho Code 56-218 provided that the separate 
property of Emerson was liable for the Medicaid paid on behalf of his spouse. It was 
wrong and its actions were frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable. 
In fact, this Court found that its interpretation of the law and fact~; was "unreasonable". 
By way of synopsis, the following factors show the State's attempt to lien 
Emerson's separate property was frivolous, without a lega:i or factual basis, and 
unreasonable under Idaho Code 12-121: 
1. Joint Probate: First, the Department claimed that the filing of a joint probate 
rendered its lien valid against Emerson. The filing of a joint probate, when the 
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schedules of property show that all the money in the estate was the separate property 
of Emerson, is completely valid. In fact, joint probates a re filed all the time, but 
which decedent owns property is set forth in the schedule~:. The claim that a joint 
filing makes the State's lien effective is frivolous and wibout any legal or factual 
basis. Filing a joint probate did not transmute Emerson's separate property into 
community property, or into any other property to which the State's lien would 
attach. 
2. Emerson's Separate Property: The Department claimed that the fact there was no 
Marriage Settlement Agreement had an impact on the Court's decision. That claim is 
frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable. In open Court, as well 
as by written stipulation, the Department stipulated that the property at issue in this 
case was Emerson's separate property. 
3. Perry: The Department claimed the Perry decision did fil)t address the dispositive 
authorities. That claim is frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and 
unreasonable. The Perry decision discussed the appropriate;tatutes, both federal and 
state and the dispositive cases, Barg and Jackman. The fact that neither case 
supported the Department's position does not make it wrong. 
4. Failure to Alert. The State of Idaho, Department of Heal th and Welfare, lost the 
identical issue in the Perry case. The State failed to alert the Court or opposing 
counsel of the Perry decision, despite its obvious relevance [0 this case. The failure 
to disclose dispositive, relevant case law would be the subject of a bar reprimand if 
done by private counsel. The State of Idaho's counsel should be held to a higher 
standard. The State's blatant failure to disclose is unreasonal:le. 
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C. Conclusion: the Facts and the Law: The legal position taker by the Depmiment was 
frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable. Se(~ as follows: 
1. It was frivolous and unreasonable to claim Emerson's separate property was subject 
to the Medicaid lien, when the State assisted the Wiggi:r;s in making Emerson's 
property separate so his wife could qualify. It is simply uncon~cionable not to advise 
the decedents that the spend down and division of property the State sanctioned 
would be subsequently ignored by the State when the estate was administered; and 
2. Idaho Code 56-218 is subject to the constraints of the fed~ral statute, as per State 
Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905 (Idaho, 2008). To claim the 
State's statute could alter the federal statute when the ~,tate participated in the 
Hudelson case, and knew that position was not support~d by a case the State 
participated in is frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, ard unreasonable; and 
3. The State frivolously failed to properly analyze the Fecleral statute, 42 U.S.e. 
1396p(b)(4), which specifically provides there is no righ to get to the separate 
property of a non-recipient spouse. The federal statute speaks only of the 
"individual's" obligation to repay Medicaid funds; and 
4. The State presented the Court with an unsigned, unverified, imd wholly inappropriate 
section of some document, claiming it was what the Idaho Supreme Court would have 
decided in Jackman. To quote and submit to the Court som~thing so preposterous is 
frivolous and unreasonable; and 
5. In Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998), 
known and cited as Jackman, the law clearly provides that cl)mmunity property is the 
only property subject to Idaho Code 56-218. The State's pm:ition that Jackman does 
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not stand for that proposition was, and still is, frivolous, ~ itl:out a legal or factual 
basis, and unreasonable; and 
6. Existing law, codified in Idaho Code 32-903, provides that ~eparate property cannot 
be subject to the community or separate debt of a spouse. Simp/ot v. Simp/ot, 96 
Idaho 239 (Idaho, 1974). To claim otherwise is frivolous, \rithout a legal or factual 
basis, and unreasonable; and 
7. The case of In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N W rd (May 30, 2008) is directly on 
point with the Personal Representative's position. The Department's position that it 
was not controlling law in the present case was frivolous, vrithout a legal or factual 
basis, and unreasonable; and 
8. Contending subsequent Minnesota statutory law affects Id::ho statutory law, Idaho 
case law, or Federal law was frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and 
lmreasonable; and 
9. The legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218 revealed the h:gislature's intent was to 
include only community property of the non-recipient spcuse as being subject to 
recoupment under the State's Medicaid lien. To assert to the contrary is frivolous, 
without a legal or factual basis, and unreasonable; and 
10. The Department frivolously and unreasonably contended that Judge Beiter entered the 
Perry decision without properly addressing the issues, and that Perry was not directly 
on point, was frivolous, without a legal or factual basis, and 1: nreasonable. 
The issue of the State's right to lien the non-recipient srouse's separate property 
was discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in In re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177 
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A. 
(2005). In Elliott, attorney's fees and costs were awarded against the State and affirmed 
on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. The same award should be made herein. 
H. 
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 12-117 
The Statute. Idaho Code 12-117 was enacted to pJOvide mandatory relief 
to persons (including estates) which have incurred attorney's fees and costs because a 
governmental agency acted without any basis in law or fact. 
Idaho Code 12-117 reads as follows: 
"In any administrative or civil judicial proceediag involving as adverse 
parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing (listrict and a person, the 
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorne/s fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court [mds that the party aga inst whom the judgment 
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
Case Law. 
Idaho Code 12-117 has been applied against the State of Idaho regarding its 
improper attempt to impose its lien under the very same code ;ection, Idaho Code 56-
218, which has been amended since the Elliott case, but is neveltheless instructive to the 
case at bar. See Matter of Estate of Elliott which stated as follows: 
[I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the 
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorne:y's fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party ag::tinst whom the judgment 
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
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I.C. § 12-117(1)(2004). This Court has held that the purpose of this statute is 
"two-fold: '(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and 
(2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct 
mistakes agencies never should ha(ve] made." Rincove'( Vo State, Dep't of Fin., 
Sees. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) (quoting Bogner v. 
State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 
(1984)). If the Court determines that a party acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law, an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 is mandatory. Id. 
In ruling from the bench on the personal representaLve's request for attomey 
fees, the district court noted that, "[s]o although I ruled in the (personal 
representative's] favor and although I found that the State action was without 
basis in law, as did Judge Dutcher, I do not find that the action was so 
unreasonable or crossed that broad canyon that I think is ~'equired in 12-117." The 
district court found that the Department's actions were without a basis in law but 
were not unreasonable. This determination is inconsistent considering the 
circumstances of this case. The Department presented a flawed interpretation of 
I.C. § 56-218, an unambiguous statute, that both the magistrate and the district 
court judges rejected, as does this Court. 
In Rincover, this Court determined that the prevailing party was not entitled 
to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 against the Department of Finance. Id. at 550, 
976 P.2d at 476. This Court noted that the Department of Finance, in wrongly 
denying the party's application for registration to sell securities, relied upon 
statutory provisions that had not been previously constmed by the court. Id. The 
Court explained that, "[ w ]hile the district court bebw disagreed with the 
Department's interpretation and application of [the statut~s] to the facts presented 
by [the applicant's] case, it does not appear that the Department's action was 
unreasonable under the circumstances." Id. This determination was based on the 
Court's finding that the Department did not act "withou or contrary to statutory 
authority." Id. 
This case is distinguishable from Rincover, where t le Court determined that 
the Department of Finance's actions were not "without or contrary to statutory 
authority." The Department presented an erroneous interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute, I.C. § 56-218. The Department acted without statutory 
authority in presenting its appeals to the district court and this Court. 
Additionally, the Department submitted issues beyond th~ scope of the order from 
which this appeal arose. The Department's actions in thi~; case were unreasonable 
and without a basis in law. I.C. § 12-117 required the district court to mvard 
attorney fees where the Department's actions were brought without a basis in law. 
The district court correctly perceived the law but failed to properly apply I.C. § 
12-117. The personal representative is entitled to her fees incurred in the appeal to 
the district court and in the appeal to this Court pursuant to I.C. § 12-
117.Although the statute has been changed since this c;].se, the attorney fee and 
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cost issue remains good law and applicable law to the present case. persons who 
file frivolous cases against the government, and in favor cf governmental agencies 
which have done exactly what the County of Washington has done in this case. 
Less than a month ago, the Idaho Supreme Court staced in Waller v. State, 
Docket No. 33831 (Idaho 812612008) (Idaho, 2008) as fonows: 
"The State requests attorney fees on appeal pmsuant to LC. § 12-117. 
Under that statute, this Court must award attorney fees where a person did not act 
with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a state agency 
which prevails in the action. Id.; Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 
Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). On cippeal, Waller has not 
acknowledged, much less addressed, the decisions of this Court relating to 
application of the doctrine of res judicata in cases invo'_ving default judgments. 
He has identified no legal authority to support his claim of entitlement to pursue 
an independent action to set aside the default judgment. He has not addressed the 
district court's factual or legal findings regarding his cJ aim for equitable relief. 
Under these circumstances, we find that Waller has purslled this appeal without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law and award attorney fees to the State pursuant to 
LC. § 12-117. 
No Law or Facts. Idaho Code 12-117 is applicable to the Jresent case. The State 
had no law upon which it could make a cogent argument. Furtlelmore, the facts of the 
case clearly showed, as the State so stipulated, that the property the State was seeking to 
lien was not community property of Mr. and Mrs. Wiggins, not the separate property of 
Mrs. Wiggins, but the separate property of Emerson D. Wiggins. There are no facts upon 
which the State could have been justified in bring this lien claim. 
III. 
COSTS 
Costs Generally: 
In Idaho, "costs" incurred in an action are to be paid as set £orth in the rules of the 
court. Idaho Code 12-101 states as follows: 
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"12-101. Costs. Costs shall be awarded by the ;ourt in a civil trial or 
proceeding to the parties in the manner and in the amc,unt provided for by the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Costs as a Matter of Right. Costs as a matter of right f re set forth in IRCP 
54( d)(l)( C). The cost of subpoenaing witnesses is such a cost. TIle Estate is entitled to 
recover the $20.00 it spent for the subpoena service on Robin Wo,)d. 
It is respectfully submitted that the costs for the foregoing, inch Ided in Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of R. Brad Masingill in Support of Motion for Attorrey Fees and Costs filed 
concurrently herewith, is properly awarded to the Estate pursuan: to Idaho Code 12-101, 
and IRCP 54(d)(I)(C). 
C. Discretionary Costs. Discretionary costs are also allowe, i pursuant to IRCP 
54(d)(1)(D). It is respectfully submitted that the consultation 'vith an elder law expert, 
such as Dennis Voorhees, at a cost of $700.00 is an appropriate discretionary cost. It was 
Dennis Voorhees knowledge of the Perry case, and its timely mbmission to the Court, 
which aided this Court in arriving at the proper decision. 
19 D. Attorney's Fees as Costs. IRCP 54(e)(5) provides for attorney's fees as costs. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
"Rule 54(e)(5). Attorney fees as costs. Attorney fees, when allowable by statute 
or contract, shall be deemed as costs in an action and processed in the same 
manner as costs and included in the memorandum of costs; provided, however, 
the claim for attorney fees as costs shall be supported by an affidavit of the 
attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney fees 
claimed. " 
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The fees incurred to Dennis Voorhees are covered by this not to well known 
provision of IRCP 54, but it is applicable to the present case by virtue of IRCP 54(e)(8) 
which provides: 
"The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable to 
all claims for attorney's fees made pursuant to section 12··121, Idaho Code, and to 
any claim for attorney fees made pursuant to any other s';atute, or pursuant to any 
contract, to the extent that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for 
attorney fees would not be inconsistent with such other statute or contract." 
CONCLUSION 
A relatively small estate has been required to incur over $10,000 in attorney's fees 
(which have been reduced by counsel because of the size of tbe estate Le. should have 
been $20,000 or more) because of the over extension of power by the Department of 
Health and Welfare. The Department has not cited one case to tle Court in support of its 
position. It supported its position with a portion of some docum~nt without a name, date, 
or author. It contends the statute permits it to enforce its I ien against the separate 
property of the non-recipient spouse, when the legislative history states otherwise. The 
Department was not willing to discuss settlement of the maHer, making it an all or 
nothing case. The Department also failed to disclose an adv<:~rse magistrate case, the 
Perry decision, which was clearly relevant to the case at bar. 
The only way to get the Department's attention that its position relative to the 
non-recipient spouse's separate property is (a) not subject to its Medicaid lien, (b) is not 
supported by law, (c) is not supported by facts, and (d) is c1mtrary to good common 
sense, is to award attorney's fees against the Department. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS' 
1 The award is the only way to make the Estate whole again" Attorney's fees and 
2 costs awarded against the State are proper in this case. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Dated: April&-r;201O. 
/~d 
------
LL, 
Attorney for Estate 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs was mailed by regular United States mail, 
postage prepaid thereon on this t.,1iIayof fl ~J ,2010, to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.o. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
)11}:)"21 ~ 
R. Brad Masingill 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS' 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
Email-bmasingiII@hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) Case No.: 2009-1926 
) 
) 
) MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEF$ AND 
) COSTS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Comes now, the Personal Representative of the above-entitled estates and hereby files its 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs against the State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare (hereinafter State). 
This Motion is made and based on the file in this matter, the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, filed concurrently herewith. 
This motion is additionally based on Idaho Code 12-120, Idah() Code 12-121, IRCP 54, 
and Idaho Code 12-117, and the fact that Estate was the prevailing party in the State's request 
for a lien pursuant to Idaho Code 56-208. 
It is respectfully submitted that the State had no legitimate is:me of fact and/or no 
legitimate issue of law, upon which to base its request for a lien against the separate property of 
Emerson M. Wiggins. 
Dated this U'day of April, 2010. 
L16~~-» 
R. Brad MasingiH 
Attorney f{r the Estate 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the (Omday of April, 2010, :1 true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs was mailed by regular United States mail, 
postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiigins 
1520 W. 2" Street 
Weiser,ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
Email-bmasingill@hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAJL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 01F 'VASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
) Case No.: 2009-1926 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR )JTTORNEY'S FEES AND 
) COSTS, INCLUDING THE FACTORS IN 
) IRCP 54 
) 
) 
COUNTY OF W ASIDNGTON ) 
R. Brad Masingill, being fIrst duly sworn on oath, deposes and ~;ays: 
1. That your Affiant is the attorney of record for tr e above-entitled Estate 
(hereinafter Estate). 
2. That the following itemization of attorney's fees and costs is submitted pursuant 
to IRCP 54(d)(5). 
3. Attorney's Fees: That to the best of your Affiant's lmowledge and belief the 
following itemization is a true and accurate recital of your AffIant's actual time and services 
rendered to the Estate regarding the Estate's defense of the State of Idaho, Department ofH,:ealth 
and Welfare's (hereinafter State) claim of lien against the separate property of Emerson D. 
Wiggins, deceased. 
3. Attorney's Fees and Costs from Attorney, R. Brad MasingiU. See 
attached Exhibit A (7-27-09 through 4-02-10 re attorney's fees of $12,880.00) 
Amount requested is $12,880.00. 
b. Attorney's Fees from Attorney, Dennis Voorhees. See attached 
Exhibit B (12-2-09 through 2-26-10). Total attorney's fees from attorney, 
Voorhees, is $700.00. 
4. Total Costs (As a Matter of Right and Discretionary). That the total costs 
shown on Exhibit A include (a) service fee on witness Robin Wood (manager of the nursing 
home who took care of the books for the decedent); and (b) professional expert fees for Dennis 
Voorhees, an expert on elder law. The fees for Mr. Voorhees are both attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to IRCP 54. Attached Exhibit C is the total costs associated with the lien issue and is 
due pursuant to IRCP 54 in the amount of $720.00, which is the total of all the costs to date. 
5. Statutory and IRCP Authority: That this Affida'vit is being submitted 
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120, Idaho Code 12-121, and Idaho Code 12-117, for attorney 
fees and for costs pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(1), IRCP 54(d)(5). This Affidavit is submitted for 
attorney fees pursuant to IRCP 54(e)(1), IRCP 54(e)(5), and as an item of costs under I]RCP 
54(e)(1) and mcp 54(e)(5). 
6. }RCP 54 FACTORS: This Affidavit IS submitt,~d against the State of 
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare. 
A. Your Affiant was retained to represent the Estate at the agreed hourly rate of $200.00. 
B. That such rate is reasonable based upon the experience and e '{pertise of your Affiant. 
C. The time set forth herein was actually spent on this case and the amount is reasonable 
based on the issues involved, the experience and expertise of your Affiant, and for the 
issues involved in the claim of lien filed by the State. 
D. That the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare presented no facts nor did 
it submit any law to support its position. 
E. The State lost on the sole issue it presented. The savings to ':he estate is significant as 
the lien would have taken the entire separate property of the decedent, Emerson D. 
Wiggins. The Estate was the clearly the prevailing party. 
F. The costs are reasonable and necessary for the defense of 1he State's claim of lien. 
The Estate had no way of resolving this issue other than defend it vigorously. The 
costs and fees were incurred and were directly and proximately caused by the claim 
of lien filed by the State, not against the recipient spouse, but against the separate 
property of Emerson D. Wiggins, property the State itself a~sisted to be turned into 
Emerson's separate property for getting the recipient spouse eligible for Medicaid. 
The State stipulated that the recipient spouse had no interest whatsoever in the 
separate property of Emerson, but went after it anyway. J daho Code 12-117 was 
passed to remedy the exact situation in this case. 
G. The present case was not the type of case widely desirable by the Plaintiff's bar 
because of the specific and not well understood issues involved, i.e. Medicaid at both 
the federal and state levels. 
Dated this ~day of-!..h-4-P-!..\('-:"\...L\ ____ , 2010. 
dfi-~,,,,,-~ 
R. Brad M~ISingill 
Attorney fOIl" the Estate 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss: 
County of Washington ) 
On this ljti1 day of April, 2010, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public for Idaho, 
personally appeared R. Brad Masingill, known to me to be the person vJhose name is subscribed 
to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the SE me. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year first above written. 
KALLEE EISENBARTH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO Notary Public for Idaho Residing at: Weiser, Idaho 
My Commi:lsi<on Expires: ~. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the JiVlday of #\pill , 2010, a tme and 
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Cost:; was mailed by regular 
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
~?--ng-iI-I----------
R. Brad T. ..... ...,J., .. ,~ ..... ' P .A. 
27 \V. Commercial Street 
P. O. Box 467 
Weiser 
ID 83672 
Lynn Wiggins 
Weiser ID 83672 
Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Attention: 
Date: ')4/02/2010 
[446/001 
Invoice Number: [470 
DATE INIT DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE HOUR~; AMOUNT 
07/2712009 RBM Conference with client and email with client; 0.9; 190.00 
Review of bank statements and docs from 
07/27/2009 RBM Legal Research re Jackman case tobacco 1.55 310.00 
llitigation and email to client 
07/27/2009 RBM Preparation ofDocument(s)- Draft 1.1,) 220.00 
Inventory 
08/03/2009 RBM Preparation ofletter to client 0.1') 20.00 
08/3112009 RBM Preparation of letter to client with 1.5) 300.00 
preliminary research on statutes 
11106/2009 RBM Preparation ofDocument(s)- 1st Draft of 0.65 130.00 
Schedule of Final Distribution 
11/09/2009 RBM Preparation of Document( s)- Order for 1.1) 220.00 
Distribution 
11109/2009 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- Notice of 0.25 50.00 
Hearing 
11/13/2009 RBM Preparation ofDocument(s)- Petition for 1.1 ) 220.00 
Final Approval and Distribution, letter to 
client, letter to clerk, and letter to AG's 
11113/2009 RBM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn 0.05 10.00 
11113/2009 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- Final Schedule 0.25 50.00 
of Distribution 
1111812009 RBM Preparation of letter to client and 0.15 30.00 
Continued ... 
m 
EXHIBIT 
04/0212010 Page: 2 
DATE INIT OF SERVICE AMOUNT 
telephone conference with Cory 
1111812009 REM Review of Document(s) Fax from Corey 0.3') 60.00 
11118/2009 REM E-mail Communication with client 0.05 10.00 
11118/2009 REM Preparation ofDocument(s)- Inventory 1.2 5 250.00 
Schedules of Property 
11118/2009 REM Preparation ofletter to Corey 0.1') 20.00 
11120/2009 RBM Review ofDocument(s) Letter from Corey, 05) 100.00 
Claim against Estate, Demand for Notice 
11/2412009 REM Preparation of Document(s)- Notice of 0.35 70.00 
Disallowance of Claim and review of 
11130/2009 RBM Review ofDocument(s) Fax from Corey re 055 110.00 
Petition for Allowance of Claim 
12/0112009 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- 1st Draft 4.31) 860.00 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Deny 
12/0112009 REM Conference with client 0.51) 100.00 
12/0112009 REM E-mail correspondence with Cartwright, 0.05 10.00 
Cory 
12/01/2009 REM E-mail Communication with client 0.0; 10.00 
12/0112009 REM Review of Document(s) Fax from Corey 0.35 70.00 
12/02/2009 RBM Revision ofMemorandmn and legal research 3.51) 700.00 
regarding community and separate property 
12/02/2009 REM Email communication with/from Vorhees 0.11) 20.00 
12/03/2009 REM Review ofDocument(s) Memorandum in 0.61) 120.00 
Support of Petition for Allowance, Notice of 
12/0312009 REM E-mail correspondence with Cartwright, 0.15 30.00 
Cory and telephone conference with Corey 
12/03/2009 REM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn 0.21) 40.00 
(4x) 
12/08/2009 REM Preparation ofDocument(s)- Revision of 1.21) 240.00 
Memorandum 
12/22/2009 RBM Review of Document(s) Fax from Corey; 0.25 50.00 
Preparation of Letter to Client 
01105/2010 RBM Preparation ofletter to client, Court, and 0.55 110.00 
Corey; Preparation of Amended Notice of 
01/05/2010 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- Revision of 1.6) 320.00 
Memorandum in Support of Denial of Claim 
01/05/2010 REM Email communication with/from Cory (3x) 0.15 30.00 
01/06/2010 REM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
0110812010 REM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn 0.05 10.00 
0110812010 REM E-mail correspondence with Cartwright, 0.05 10.00 
Cory 
0110812010 RBM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
Voorhees 
01/08/2010 REM Review ofDocument(s) Stack of documents 3.5) 700.00 
for MSA all out of chronological order 
0111212010 REM Email communication withlfrom Corey 0.05 10.00 
Continued ... 
04/02/2010 Wiggins Page: 3 
DATE mIT OF SERVICE Al\10UNT 
o 1114120 10 RBM Preparation ofDocument(s)- Final Revision 2.0/) 400.00 
of Memorandum, meeting with clients, 
conference with Zions Bank officials 
01114/2010 RBM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
01114/2010 RBM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn O.O'i 10.00 
0111412010 RBM Conference with client 1.00 200.00 
0112612010 RBM Conference with client LOf) 200.00 
01126/2010 RBM Review ofDocument(s) Information from 0.3') 60.00 
e-mail with client 
01128/2010 RBM Conference with Robin Wood at Weiser 0.7i 150.00 
Care Center re MSA 
01/29/2010 RBM Preparation ofDocument(s)- Fax documents O.2i 50.00 
to Corey and email to client (2x) 
01129/2010 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- Flow Sheet for 1.91) 380.00 
42 USC 
02/0112010 RBM Preparation of letter to Client, Kathy, and 004,) 80.00 
Corey 
02/01/2010 RBM Review ofDocument(s) Fax from Corey and 004,) 80.00 
review of Reply Brief 
02/0l/201O RBM Review ofDocument(s) File and 2.5) 500.00 
Documents, preparation of Trial Exhibits 
02/0112010 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- Subpoena and 0.25 50.00 
telephone conference with Robin 
02/02/2010 RBM Preparation ofletter to client, Court, Kathy, 004) 80.00 
and Corey 
02/02/2010 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- Responsive 2.3) 460.00 
Memorandum and email to Corey (2x) 
02/03/2010 RBM Conference with client and review testimony 2.0) 400.00 
02/03/2010 RBM Court Hearing 1.0) 200.00 
02/03/2010 RBM Preparation of Document(s)- 1st Draft of 3.3) 660.00 
Post Hearing Memorandum 
02/03/2010 RBM Review ofDocument(s) Reply Brief from 0.9) 180.00 
Corey 
02/04/2010 RBM Preparation ofDocument(s)- work on Post 1.00 200.00 
Hearing brief and review entire federal 
statute for inclusion into the brief and email 
02/08/2010 RBM Revision of Post-Hearing Memorandum and 1.10 220.00 
email to Dennis 
02/08/2010 RBM Preparation of letter to client, Court, and 0.30 60.00 
Corey 
02/08/2010 RBM Email communication with/from Dennis 0045 90.00 
Voorhees and review of e-mail from Corey 
and attached Memorandum re Attorney Fees 
02112/2010 RBM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
02/24/2010 RBM Preparation ofletter to client and review of 0.25 50.00 
fax from Corey 
03/0112010 RBM Preparation ofletter to Corey, Court, and 0.30 60.00 
Client and email to Dennis 
03/0112010 RBM Preparation ofDocument(s)- Affidavit of 0.20 40.00 
Service 
Continued ... 
04/02/2010 ')fOOl Lynn Wiggins Page: 4 
DATE INIT OF SERVICE S AMOUNT 
03/0112010 REM Preparation of Document(s)- Supplemental 2.30 460.00 
Post hearing memorandum 
03/0412010 RBM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
Vorhees 
03/05/2010 REM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
Voorhees 
03/08/2010 RBM Email communication with/from Voorhees 0.05 10.00 
re statutes of liens, regulations, and 
03/09/2010 REM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
Voorhees 
0311312010 REM Review of Document(s) -Peny case, and 1.1J 220.00 
preparation of First SuppJ. Memorandum, 
03/1312010 REM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn 0.05 10.00 
03115/2010 REM Preparation of letter to Corey and letter to 0.20 40.00 
Client 
03118/2010 REM Review ofDocument(s) Response to March 0.65 130.00 
15,2010 Memorandum 
0312612010 REM Review ofDocument(s) IDAPA and 0.8·) 160.00 
defenses from Dennis 
03/31/2010 REM Preparation of Document(s)- Responsive 1.60 320.00 
Memorandum to Department's March 15, 
03/31/2010 REM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn 0.05 10.00 
03/31/2010 REM Preparation of letter to Corey 0.1,) 20.00 
03/3112010 REM Conference with clients, e-mail decision to 0.75 150.00 
Voorhees 
04/0112010 REM Email communication with/from Dennis 0.05 10.00 
Voorhees 
04/0212010 REM Preparation ofDocument(s)- 1st Amended 0.60 120.00 
Petition for Distribution 
04/02/2010 REM Preparation of Document(s)- Preparation of 0.40 80.00 
letter to Corey, Court, and clients 
04/02/2010 RBM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn 0.10 20.00 
04/02/2010 REM E-mail correspondence with Wiggins, Lynn 0.1 0 20.00 
04/0212010 REM Preparation ofDocument(s)- 1st Amended 0.30 60.00 
Inventory Schedules of Property 
04/0212010 REM Preparation ofDocument(s)- 2nd Amended 0.30 60.00 
Notice ofHeariong 
04/02/2010 REM Preparation of Document( s)- 1 st Amended 0.80 160.00 
Schedule of Distribution 
04/0212010 REM Preparation of Document(s)- revision of 0040 80.00 
Order Approving 1st Amended Petition for 
Final Settlement of Estate and Closing Order 
OUR FEE: 64.4 $12,880.00 
Continued ... 
R Bradley Masingill 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 467 
Weiser ID 83672 
RE: Wiggins Medicaid Claim 
THE VOORHEES LAW FIRM 
Attorney at Law 
112 Shoshone St E PO Box Z 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0090 
Tel: (208)736-6000 
Description 
12/2/2009 Received and preliminarily reviewed Brad's request for 
consultation and opinion on certain legal positions in 
defense of Medicaid estate recovery claims. Locate and 
transmit text of applicable IDAP A rules for Brad on the 
topic of limits to state's Medicaid recovery rights. 
12/3/2009 Analyze memorandum for facts and law. Email inquiry to 
Brad re separate property claim. 
1/6/2010 Preliminary additional questions re facts of case to Brad. 
Analyze memorandum in detail 
2/26/2010 Research and write defenses available for transmuted 
property based on IDHW regulations and statutory 
limitations on court action to set aside transfers. Discuss 
defenses with Brad 
Total Fees and Costs: 
Balance Due: 
2/22/2010 
Inv #: 2067 
Time Attorney/Professional 
(1.8 Dennis S. Voorhees 
0.5 Dennis S. Voorhees 
1.2 Dennis S. Voorhees 
1.0 Dennis S. Voorhees 
$700.00 
$700.00 
EXHIBIT 
Ih CL iu 
------~-------.. --.. -,-------.~------------------------------------NON-TAXABLE EXPENSES: 
FF Sum advanced for filing fees 
Sum advanced for filing fees 
Postage for January 2010 
Postage for February 2010 
Sum advanced for service fee Service of Robin Wood·· 
Other professionals Expert Dennis Voorhees Bill 
Total Non-Taxable Expenses 
Total Expenses 
90.00 
34.00 
1.22 
8.49 
20.00, 
700.00 
853.71 
853.71 
EXHIBIT 
R. BRAD MASINGILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
email bmasim!ill(a.)hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES 
OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV 2009-1926 
ORDER APPROVING PETITION 
FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT OF 
ESTATE ANn CLOSING ESTATE 
f 
Upon consideration of the Petition for Approval of Final Settlement of Estate, the 
Inventory, and the Schedule of Final Distribution filed by the Personallepresentative, and good 
cause appearing therefore, the Court finds that the allegations and statements in the Petition are 
true, all required notices have been given or waived, and that the esta:e has been administered 
according to the laws of the State of Idaho and the orders of this Court aJd should be closed. 
Order Approving Final Settlement and Closing Estate - 1 
THEREFORE, and in accordance therewith, the Court Orders as f()llows: 
(1) The Court approves the Petition for Final Settlement together with the Schedule 
of Final Distribution annexed thereto as filed by the Petitioner; and 
(2) The Court authorizes and directs the Petitioner to pay any outstanding 
encumbrances, pay any remaining costs or fees for administration, any attorney fees and costs 
remaining unpaid, any taxes due, any interest which may have accrue'd during administration, 
and any accounting fees necessary to close the estate, transfer title in the assets of the estate as 
deemed necessary by the Personal Representative, and distribute the remainder of the assets of 
the estate to the distributees in the amount (together with any interest earned thereon and less any 
fees or costs as aforementioned) in the manner set forth in the Schedule of Distribution; and 
(3) That after Petitioner has made such final settlement and distribution, he is 
discharged and released from his obligation. 
()oIO 
-----'11-------, '2~ 
Order Approving Final Settlement and Closing Estate -:: 
Apr. 7. 2010 3:39PM 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder. Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
No.8169 P. 18 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAl, DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASIDNGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS l 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
Case No. CV-2C09-1926 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
~ 
EXE'MPT: I.C. § 313212 
TO: LYNN WIGGINS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HfS ATTORNEY OF 
RECORD, BRAD MASINGILL, ATIORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO} DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the DepartmentH ), appeals pu meant Idaho Code 
§ 17-201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules ofCivll Procedurej as follows: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 Y;\MRCases\Estal j\WlgglnsVID Coul1\Nolice of Appeal.wpd 
Apr. 7, 2010 3:39PM No. ~lb~ r I~ 
1. The title of the court from which the appeal IS taken is th.le M:agistrate Division of 
the District Court of the Third Judicial District ofllie State ofIdaho in 2tUd for the County of 
Washington, Magistrate Judge Gregory F. Frates, presiding. 
2. The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Washington, 
3. The Department appeals from the MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING 
PETITIONER'S CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE filed March 30, 20 O. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters offact and law. 
5. This matter was heard by oral argument on February 3, 2010, at Weiser, Idaho~ 
however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence ",vas taken. The hearing 
was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the clerk dthe court. 
6. The issues on appeal are: 
ll. Did the Magistrate err in determining that a Mardage Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) existed and that such MSA trans mutt d Vivian Wiggins and 
Emerson Wiggints community property to separate prop ,crY' (of Emerson 
Wiggins), and that such MSA was executed in 2002J anc. that such MSA met all 
of the fonnalities required by Idaho law, and that the Department was not in error 
in granting Medicaid benefits to Vivian Wiggins? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofIdaho Code 
§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim ag:ainst the estate of 
Emerson Wiggins? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
Apr. 7. 2010 3:40PM IVa. d lOY r. LV 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofIdaho Code § 56-2187 
4, Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding 
in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman) 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to 
the facts ofthis case? 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
DATED this 7th day of Aprit 2010. 
t.V~~1-~-1-----
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of tho foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, and sent via facsimile, to the following: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
c/o R. BRAD MASINGILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER ID 83672 
Facsimile: (208) 414-0490 
DATED this L day of April, 2010. 
~c1lc.LJh ~t)l.qo 
MRI'C};lle Premo, Legal A;;'istant 
Division of Human Servic~ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 Y;\MRCase:s\Eslat :\wrgglnsV\D COlll1\Norlce of AP::x:al.Wpd 
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R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone #1(208)414-0665 
Fax #1(208)414-0490 
Email: pmasingill({i1hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF W ASHING10N 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS ) 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO THE DEPARTMENT'S 
MOTION TO STAY 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and through its attorney, of record, 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Department's Motion to Stay. 
First, the Department provides the Court with no legal futhority for its motkm to 
stay distribution. The lack of authority in the Department's Motion and in its 
Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Department's Motion to Stay 
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Memorandum is due to the fact none exists. There is no law which would allow the 
Court to deprive the Wiggins' heirs and/or its creditors to be held hostage to the appeal 
by the Department of another case. 
Second, the effect of the proposed stay is to remove the heirs and creditor's use 
of the funds in the estate without any legal justification and 'Nould be a taldng the 
estate's property without compensation. 
Third, there is no chance whatsoever that the Perry case" or the Wiggins case will 
be altered on appeal. The legal reasoning of two separate magistrates is not a 
coincidence, it is the combined intellect of two jurists to see through the great Idaho 
money grab. 
Fourth, as the Department points out, the Personal Representative is responsible 
to return the assets to the estate should the case be reversed or remanded. There has been 
no effort to show that the personal representative, an upstanding citizen of the COlmty of 
Washington, and former Assessor of Washington County, would not be good for it. 
Fifth, the Department is unable, or unwilling, to post a bond or other type of 
security required by all litigants should the losing party wish tl) appeal and preserve the 
assets during the appeal. Normally, the appellate rules provide for the posting of a bond 
in approximately one and one-half times the value of the asset~ being held, with interest 
and other requirements. Some of the other requirements are picking the appropriate 
surety. Due to the recession, it would be difficult for the Estate to submit its assets to the 
possibility that the surety will navigate its way through the banking problems, and not 
default if required to come up with the funds. 
Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Department's Motion to Stay 2 
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Finally, there are pending motions which need to be resolved, and any appeal 
would not be allowed until those issues have been resolved. The Department seeks to get 
around that problem by avoiding an appeal, and just seeking the Court's assistance in 
depriving the heirs and creditors of the estate from their respedive rights to have those 
issue resolved. 
Dated:~ of April, 2010. 
Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Department's Motion to Stay 
Attorney for Estate 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to 
Department's Motion to Stay was mailed by regular United States maiL, postage prepaid thereon 
on this'l~"Jay of ,2010, to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
Memorandum in Opposition to tne 
Departmentls Motion to Stay 
Lz/qllR~ 
R. Brad M asingIlI 
R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 West Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone # 1 (208) 414-0665 
Fax # 1 (208) 414-0490 
E-mail: bmasingiH@hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ,\VASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV-2009-1926 
1 ST AMENDI::D PETITION FOR 
APPROVAL OF FINAL SETTLEMENT, 
AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Category L 7 $ 9.00 
Category L8 $25.00 
PETITIONER, LYNN WIGGINS, of Weiser, Idaho, repres~nt~ to the Court thrat: 
1. Petitioner is the Personal Representative of the estate of the above named 
decedents, has collected and managed the assets of the estate, has filed Petitioner's final 
inventory and schedules, paid all lawful claims against the estate, including all federal and state 
estate, inheritance and other death taxes now due, and performed nIl other acts required of 
Petitioner by the laws of this State pertaining to estates of the decedent5; and 
2. The time for presenting valid claims which arose prior to the death of the 
decedents has expired, or it is not expected that any valid claims will be presented, all known 
1 st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 1 
valid claims have been paid, or have been provided for in the final dis tribution and there are no 
known contingent, unliquidated, or future valid claims against the estate; and 
3. That there are no valid Medicaid claims; and 
4. Petitioner has filed concurrently herewith the following: 
3. 1 st Amended Inventory Schedules of Property 0 f Vivian M. 'Wiggins and 
the 15t Amended Inventory Schedules of Emerson D. Wiggins; and 
b. 1 st Amended Schedule of Final Distribution; and 
5. Testacy Status: 
3. The decedents died intestate; and 
b. Petitioner has been appointed Personal Representative of the estate of the 
decedents; and 
c. Petitioner affirms that the statements set forth h Petitioner's Application 
for Informal Probate heretofore filed; and 
6. Based on the foregoing, and on the documents referenc(~d above, it appears that a 
final distribution of the assets at this time is proper, subject to the ri.sht to recover against the 
distributees for proportionate payment of any claim or debt found by law to be due by the estate. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that: 
1. The Court fix a time and place for hearing on this Petition; and 
2. Notice be given as required by law. 
3. After notice and hearing, the Court enter an Order: 
a. Approving the 1 st Amended Petition for Final Settlement and Distribution 
together with the amended schedules as filed by the Peti tioner; and 
1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 2 
b. Authorizing and directing Petitioner to pay any outstanding 
encumbrances, pay any remaining costs or fees for am ninistration, any attorney 
fees and costs remaining unpaid, any taxes due, any accounting fees necessary to 
close the estate, transfer title in the assets of the estate a~ deemed necessary by the 
Personal Representative, and distribute the remainder of the assets of the estate to 
the distributees in the amount (together with any intere::t earned thereon and less 
any fees or costs as aforementioned) in the manner set forth in the 1 st Amended 
Schedule of Distribution; and 
c. After Petitioner has made such final settlement and distribution, 
discharging and releasing Petitioner, and closing the administration of this estate. 
Dated this 'way of April, 2010. 
1 sl Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 3 
M~fi1' 
R. Brad Ivilsingill 
Attorney for the Personal 
RepresentmiveiEstate 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss: 
County of Washington ) 
The Petitioner, LYNN WIGGINS, being sworn, having read tbe foregoing, state that the 
facts set forth therein are accurate and complete to the best of the Pt:titioner's knowledge and 
belief. 
In o~ 
WIGGINS!? ~ '-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the I3f~ay of April, 2010 . 
KALLEE EISENBARTH 
NOTARY PUBUC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 4 
. 
~E~~f\. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing in: Weiser 
My Comm. E:xpires: 8-26-2015 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the ay of April, 2010, it true and correct copy of 
the foregoing 1 ST AMENDED PETITION FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 
was mailed by regular United States mail, postage prepaid thereon to th:~ following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. Second 
Weiser, Idaho 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Corey Cartwright 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste B 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
1 st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement - 5 
asingiH 
Attorney f.)r the Personal 
Representative 
Apr 20. 2010 2:15PM 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
No.8512 P. 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
t 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
Case No. CV -2009-1926 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO IHSALLOW 
ATTORNEY Fl!3ES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW the State ofIdaho, Department of Health and Wdfare (hereinafter the 
'"Depaltment") and submits the following memorandum of points and allthorities in support of its 
Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW ATIORNEYFEES AND COSTS-1 
Y;\MRCases\E.slale\WlgginsV"l"i~giSir.lie\Memorandum in Supper. ofUoUon 10 D!$;lllol'l' Altorlley f<ws.wpd 
Ap r 20. 2010 2: 15PM No,8512 p, 3 
I. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Vivian Wiggins applied for Medicaid benefits on November 18,2002) and was 
detennined eligible for Medicaid benefits effective September 1, 2003. Between that time and 
the time of her death, the Department paid Medicaid benefits on her behalf in the sum of 
$272,134.68. Prior to applying for Medicaid, the assets of Vivian Wiggins and her husband 
Emerson were held as community property. While no marriage settlem;mt agreement has been 
discovered, as part of the process of detennining Vivian's eligibility for benefits, the Department 
treated the assets as if they had been transmuted to the separate property of Emerson. Vivian 
died January 30,2009. Emerson died less than two weeks later on February 9,2009. 
Lynn Wiggins was appointed personal representative of the join
'
[ estate of Vivian and 
Emerson on May 22,2009. The Department was not given notice until the personal 
I representative filed a Petition for Approval of Final Settlement about November 16, 2009,1 The 
Department then filed its Claim Against Estate in the sum ofS264.674A5 for medical assistance 
benefits paid on behalf of Vivian. The personal representative disallow ~d the claim and the 
Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
The Petition for Allowance of Claim was heard by the court on February 3t 2010, and the 
court thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's ·:;Iaim Against the Estate. 
Ipersonal representatives of estates subject to Medicaid claims are required to g ve the DepaIimenl notice 
within 30 days of their appointment. Idaho Code §§ 56.218(5), 15.3-g01(d). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ~ 2 
Y;\MRCases\Esi~t,\WigginsV'.Masislrnle\M;mol'llndum in SUppal! oCMolion (0 Disallow Altom6y I'eos.wpd 
Ap r, LO, '2010 L: lJPM No, ~JlL r, 4 
The personal representative now claims attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-1 17, 12-1202, 
12-121, and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. 
PREVAILING PARTY 
As a threshold issue, attorney fees may only be awarded to a pre?ailing party. Rule 
54(e)(l); Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Department filed its Notke of Appeal on April 7, 
2010. and therefore which party may ultimately be the prevailing party has not been detennined. 
However, the Department aclmowledges that the question of attorney fe;~ and costs is correctly 
before the court pursuant to Rule 83(i)(2), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedu:r'e, and Rule 13(b )(9), 
Idaho Appellate Rules. Therefore. for purposes of this memorandum, tbe Department will treat 
the personal representative as the prevailing party. 
In. 
I 
THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT BRING OR PURSUE ITS 
CLAIM FRIVOLOUSLY, UNREASONABLY, OR 
WITHOUT FOUNDATION. 
Idaho Code § 12-121, together with Rule 54(e)(1), Idaho Rules e:fCivil Procedure, 
pennits an award of attorney fees where the non-prevailing party's case was '1Jrought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Most of the personal 
representative's suggestions of what might be frivolous or unreasonable arc~ merely 
disagreements with the Department's theory of the case. That the court disagreed with the 
lrhe personal representative provides no argument to explain how (his section could apply. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW ATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS ~ 3 
Y:\MRCsse.s®iiaie\WigginsVIMagi,(ralc\}\,kmorandum in SupPOI1 ofUollon 10 Di:5illlow AHomey f~.wpd 
Apr.LV. LVIV L:I:;nVi No. U:; IL r.:J 
Department's arguments is a ugivenH in this context and does not suggegt the Department's case 
was pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." 
A. Black.letter Idaho Law Clearly Supports tho Department's Clairrl in this Matter. and Pre-
emption by Federal Law Was Certainly Not Obvious. 
It is undisputed that the Department provided medical assistance benefits to Vivian 
Wiggins in the sum of$272)134.68. Idaho Code § 56-218(1) provides a~ follows: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance 
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of tl:le spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both; 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added), Clearly! the black-letter law in the State ofIdaho 
pennits this claim. There is no restriction in this clear statutory grant of authorily which would 
prevent the Department's claim from extending to property that had been community property 
but was transferred to the spouse. Indeed. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 clearly anticipates that 
I I 
property transferred to the spouse will be subject to the Department's claim: 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets of the estate that had been, at anytime after October 1, 19:!1. community 
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly 
owned property. 
IDAP A 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). There is no question but thnt the Department's claim 
in this matter is firmly supported by Idaho law. 
The disallowance of the personal representative, and the holding of the court in this case 
is based on pre-emption. The court held, in essence, that Idaho's clear statutory and regulatory 
law cannot be enforced because it conflicts with a federa1 law. This is certainly not an obvious 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW A TIORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 4 
Y;\MRCascs\Esl~t(l\Wiggin3V\MBgisll1!le\Mem()r.lndum In S\lppon orMotion 10 Disallow Allomey rees.wJXI 
Ap r, 20. 2010 2: 16PM No.8512 P. 6 
defect in Idaho law. As shown by the Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright the Department has 
consistently sought recovery of the type of property identified in this cas e since at least prior to 
1996. Before the recent ~ case in Ada County, and this case, the only challenge this law has 
faced was in the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 
(1998) which the Department viewed as a victory, and fully supportive ofIdaho statutes and 
Departmental practice. After Jackman, the Department's recoveries of tilis type of property from 
spouse estates continued for more than another decade without a challenge, Indeed, during that 
time; the law was re-drafted to comply with the Supreme Court's decisions in In re Estate of 
Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436,111 P.3d 121 (2005) and In re Estate of Eltiott, 141 Idaho 177.108 
P.3d 324 (2005). These cases challenged the timing of the Department";;: claim in spouse estates, 
but did not question the Department's right to recover property transfem:d to the spouse from the 
spouse's estate. The re-drafting was performed by some of the most expert attorneys in the field 
of estate planning and Medicaid taw and at no time was any issue raised about the Deparbnent's 
ability to recover property transferred to the spouse, such as the issue raised in this case. Indeed, 
the very purpose of the law was to recovery property of this type. Clearly, there was a solid 
foundation for the Department's filing and attempt to enforce its claim in this matter. 
B. The Department's Conduct in this Matter Has Been Reasonable ;;Ind in Good Faith. 
The personal representative also seems to take issue with the Department's conduct ill 
this matter, claiming the Department failed to alert the court to the ~: decision: 
The State faHed to alert the Court or opposing counsel of the Per:y decision, 
despite its obvious relevance to this case. The failure to disclose dispositive, 
relevant case law would be the subject of a bar reprimand if done by private 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW ATIORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 5 
Y:WRCases\E.slate\WlgglllsV\MaglslrateWemorandum In Support of Motion 10 DIsallow Auomey Fe-es.wpd 
Apr,20. 2010 2:16~M No.ti?lL Y. / 
counsel. The State ofIdaho's counsel should be held to a higher standard. The 
State's blatant failure to disclose is unreasonable. 
Memorandum in Support of the Estate}s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. p. 4. Perhaps the 
personal representative would not have been so quick to cast that stone ifhe had looked at the 
timing more closely. As shown by the Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwrigh!, the personal 
representative received the ~ decision and transmitted it to the court before the attorney for 
the Department had even seen it. The attorney for the Department saw the ~ decision for the 
first time on March 16, 2010, and discussed the matter with his client and superiors the following 
day, by which time, the personal representative's memorandum transmitdng that document to the 
court had also been received. There was nothing to disclose that was not a1ready fully disclosed 
to the court. 
The personal representative also refers to "an unsigned, unverified, and wholly 
inappropriate section of some document." Memorandum in Support of1lhe Estate's Motion for 
l 
Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 5. The Department cannot determine what document the personal 
representative is referring to. If the personal representative is referring to the original Jaclanan 
decision, that document was provided, not as authority, but as explanation for the court's later 
revised decision, and is certified by the clerk of the Supreme Court. 
Also. the personal representative refers to the Elliott case, supra: contending that in 
Elliott "attorney's fees and costs were awarded against the State and affirmed on appeal by the 
Idaho Supreme Court. The same award should be made herein." Memcrandum in Support of the 
Estate's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 7. This is the "attorney fees by association" 
argument, and is factually incorrect. The Elliott case involved the timing of the Department}::; 
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claim where there was a living spouse, not the validity of a claim againslt fonnerly community 
property, and resulted in the re-drafting of the statute enacted by the 2006 legislature. In Ellio.ll, 
there were no attorneys fees awarded by the magistrate, attorney fees were denied by the District 
COUlt on appeal, but were granted by the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, not 
12-121. Neither the facts nor the legal issues in this case are in any way related to the Elliott 
case. 
Finally, the Department's actions in pursuing its claim have been continually reasonable 
and above-board. While dealing with cont.inually shifting legal theories by the personal 
representative, t.he Department provided advance legal briefing to the personal representative to 
explain the Department's position, provided the Department's entire Medicaid file to the 
personal representative upon a simple email request and without formality, attempted to stipulate 
to facts to assist the personal representative to present his case, and did not object to the personal 
t representative's attorney twice postponing the hearing on the Department's Petition for 
Allowance of Claim. 
IV. 
THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT ACT WITHOUT A 
REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW. 
The personal representative also claims attorney fees under Idah:) Code § 12-117, which 
pennits attorney fees where the non-prevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law." As noted in section IlLA., above, Idaho law unambiguously penn its the Department to 
recover "from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to 
either or both." Idaho Code § 56~218(1) (underline added), Further, DtlPartment rule. which was 
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approved by the legislature and has the effect oflaw, pennits recovery f'om ((assets of the estate 
that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community property." IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. 
While the court may conclude that federal law precludes the application ofIdaho law as written, 
it is indisputable that the Department's claim is supported by U a reasona.ble basis in law," As 
shown by the Affidavit ofW. Corey Cartwright, it was certainly not ob'\'ious that the statute and 
rule were pre-empted by federal law. The law has been in effect for mOle than fourteen years 
without being challenged on the basis raised here. When the law was ft:-drafted in 2005, none of 
the experts in Idaho Medicaid law raised the issue presented here as a challenge or defect. 
Something so obvious as to make the Department's reliance on clear Idaho law unreasonable 
would not have been overlooked by Idaho practitioners for more than fcurteen years. 
The persona] representative also challenges the factual basis for the Department's claim. 
It is undisputed, however. that the property of this estate had been comnunity property after 
Octob~r 1, 1993, as provided in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. That fact, alene, is sufficient to 
support the Department's claim. Even under the doctrine advanced by 1he personal 
representative from the case ann re Estate ofBarg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008), there was a genuine 
issue as to the community property status of the property in this eState. The personal 
representative argues that "the State ... stipulated, that the properly the State was seeking to lien3 
was not community property." This is incorrect. The Department stipulated that, for eligibility 
purposes, the Department treated the couple as if they had a maniage settlement agreement. The 
)The personal representative frequently refers to the Department's claim as a "I ien," While a lien was filed in 
the Secretary of State's office in this matter, the Department has pursued (his matter as an estate claim, not a lien 
foreclosure. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 56.218(6)(a), whether a lien is filed or not, the estate claim is unaffected. 
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Department believes that was the extent of Us stipulation regarding community property. The 
undersigned realizes the court found that the Department stipulated to much more, and if this is 
so, the Department's attorney erred in doing so, because no stipulation n~garding the status of the 
property beyond that indicated above was intended. No marriage settlement agreement was ever 
produced, the terms of such an agreement, ifit existed) were never provf;ld. That the statutory 
requirements for such an agreement, if it existed, were met was also never proved. Certainly the 
facts of this matter provided a "reasonable basis in fact" for the Department's pursuit of its claim. 
v. 
FEES FOR ATTORNEY DENNIS VOORHEES SHOULD BE 
EVALUATED AS A TTORNE¥ FEES, NOT COSTS 
The personal representative has requested, as discretionary costs. attorney fees for Dennis 
Voorhees. Mr. Voorhees is an Idaho attorney and the work performed v'as in giving legal advice 
and services. As such, these fees should be evaluated as attorney fees, and subject to the same 
i ~ 
limitations as attorney fees, not be awarded as discretionary costs. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Being the prevailing party, alone, is not sufficient to support an award of attorney fees. 
The personal representative must show that the Department's claim was "hrought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Under Idaho Code § 12-117, the 
personal representative must show the Department Hacted without a rea~lonable basis in fact or 
law." The Department's claim was well supported by both fact and law. 
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DATED this 20th day of AprilJ 2010, 
N~~ ____ S:;'::1-
W. C Y CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent via 
facsimile, to the following: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
C/O R. BRAD MASINGILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 467 
WEISER ID 83672 
WASHINGTON COUNTY CLERK 
WASHINGTON COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
485 E 3RD STREET 
WEISER ID 83672 
DATED this ~ day of April, 2010. 
facsimile (208) 414-0490 
facsimile (20B) 414-2335 
_--=---:-:-\~.a.......t~~ 61 fb Zl 
remo, Legal A:lsistant 
Division of Human Services 
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R. BRAD MASIN GILL 
Attorney at Law 
27 W. Commercial Street 
P.O. Box 467 
Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone #1(208)414-0665 
Fax #1(208)414-0490 
Email: bmasingiU@hotmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF JDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VIVIAN M. WIGGINS 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~) 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR 
STAY re: ATTOFINEY'S FEES 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and through its attorney, of record, 
R. BRAD MASINGILL, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and 
Law in opposition to the Department's Motion for Stay as it relates to the attorney's fees 
and costs incurred by the Estate to its attorneys, R. Brad Masingi n and Dennis Voorhees. 
Facts: On 10th day of March, 2010, the Court issued its order denying the 
Department's Claim for reimbursement for Medicaid from the separate property of 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Emerson Wiggins. The Personal Representative paid the Estate~ attorneys fees by check 
on the 5th day of April, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The 
Department filed its Motion to Stay on April 7, 2010. The Motion was not received by 
the Estate until the 10th day of April, 2010. The Department also filed its Notice of 
Appeal in the present case on April 7, 2010. 
(1) 
(2) 
ISSUES: 
Is the motion for a stay applicable to the payment of the attorney's fees, which 
were paid before the Department filed its motion for stay 
Is a subsequently entered Order Staying the payment of actomey's fees applicable 
retroactively. 
I 
THE DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR STAY 
IS NOT EFFECTIVE RETROACTIVELY 
A. Motion is not a Stay: 
21 
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23 
24 
25 
The Motion filed by the Department on April 7, 2010, is not the equivalent of a 
stay. It is a request for the same. The stay cannot be effective against any action by the 
personal representative taken prior to an order being issued. 
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II. 
THE DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR STAY 
IS NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL AN ORDER IS ENTERED 
Even if the Court felt inclined to grant a stay in this natter, the attorney's fees 
have already been paid by the personal representative and the Court does not have the 
authority to make a ruling which is retroactive in effect. Thus, the failure of the 
Department to file and have its motion for stay heard prior to the payment by the personal 
representative is fatal to its proposed stay. 
III. 
Idaho Code 15-3-720 
Idaho Code § 15-3-720 provides that a personal represertative who: 
"defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not ... 
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary exp~nses and disbursements 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred." The services rendered must benefit 
the estate and cannot be incurred to protect personal interests. In Re Estate of 
Sauter, 615 P.2d 875 (Mont.1980); Matter of Estate of :,tephens, 117 Ariz. 579, 
574 P.2d 67 (Ariz.App.1978)." In re the Matter of Eli,lsen's Estate, 105 Idaho 
234 (1983). 
In the present case, there is no doubt the personal r,~presentative "defended" 
the proceeding (the claim of lien) in good faith. There is no doubt that the services 
rendered benefited the estate. Despite the fact Lynn is the only heir, the defense of the 
Department's unreasonable claim of lien was the type authorized by the legislature. 
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The Department's reliance on In the Matter of the ESTATE of BERRIOCHOA. 
108 Idaho 474 (1985) is erroneous. In Berriochoa, the trial court's determination of the 
issues was found by the Idaho Court of Appeals to have been erroneous as a matter of 
law. The issue dealt with the construction of the Will. It was in response to those 
erroneous conclusions that the Court made the statement attributed to it by the 
Department about Idaho Code 15-3-720. The erroneous detemdnation was described in 
Berriochoa as follows: 
'The trial court erred by failing to make any determination of what the testator 
intended by the phrase "manager of Adrian's Club." Further, the trial court's 
findings were infected by erroneous conclusions that appellant could not be the 
manager of Adrian's Club--and thus receive the liquor, beer and wine licenses--
because it might interfere with the subsequent management or disposition of the 
real property which the 'will provided would be held in trust; it might give 
appellant an undue advantage over the administration of the trust; or it might give 
appellant the power to "bulldoze" the other devisees. TIlese conclusions were 
erroneous, and they indicated that the magistrate's inquiry was misdirected, 
confusing appellant's authority to continue to operate ':he business as personal 
representative with his status as devisee under the fifth p[ragraph of the will. " 
The Court of Appeals stated what the rule is when interpreting Idaho Code 
15-3-720 as follows: 
"Appellant has claimed attorney fees under I.C. § 15-3-720. We have held 
that a personal representative who litigates his own pers(mal interests or bequests 
is not entitled to attorney fees for such litigation from the estate under I.C. § ] 5-3-
720. See Eliasen v. Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (1983); In the Matter 
of the Estate of William Peterson, 38 Idaho 195, 220 P. 1086 (1923); Matter of 
Stephen's Estate, 117 Ariz. 579, 574 P.2d 67 (App.1978)." 
The Appellant in Berriochoa was seeking a determination that he, as personal 
representative, was entitled to be the manager of the bar which was a specific bequest, as 
he alleged, in the Will. See the following: 
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"Testator died after owning and operating a small bar in Mountain Horne for 
some 40 years. Approximately two years prior, the appellant, a grandson, moved 
from Boise to Mountain Horne to assist testator in the operation of the bar. After 
appellant's move, testator and appellant executed documents defining their 
business relationships and thereafter testator executed the will in question. The 
will states in part: 
"FIFTH: In the event my grandson, Alan A. Marriage, is manager of Adrian's 
Club, Mountain Horne, Idaho, at the time of my death, then I give, devise and 
bequeath to him all liquor, beer and wine licenses used in connection with the 
operation of said Adrian's Club." 
The bequest was challenged by respondents who alleged that the condition 
precedent was not satisfied, i.e., that appellant Alan .A. Marriage was not the 
manager at the time of death. After a trial, the magistrate court determined that "at 
the time of death of Adrian Berriochoa, Alan Marriage was not the manager of 
Adrian's Club .... " The decision was appealed to and affirmed by the district court. 
Berriochoa dealt with a specific bequest to the App<~llant. The present case 
has no such issue, and is not seeking the affirmation or refection of any specific bequest, 
or anything personal to Lynn Wiggins. The present case deals with a claim against the 
estate, not against Lynn Wiggins. Lyim is the sole heir, but the claim of the Department 
is against the estate, and thus is not the type of situation found in any of the cases cited by 
the Department. 
The Department is also erroneously relying on the C2 se of In re the Mattd?7 of 
Eliasen's Estate, supra. In Eliasen, the magistrate allowed all attorney's fees incurred by 
the personal representative. On appeal to the District Court, the attorney's fee award was 
approved, except for the personal representative's effort tel (1) defeat the family 
allowance, the homestead allowance, or the exempt property, ani (2) those attributable to 
the resistance of the first Personal Representative to his removal. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court in Eliasen, reversed the District Court, reinstating 
the entire attorney fee and cost award to the personal representat:i ve as follows: 
"The only basis for the district court's denial or apportioning of the attomey's 
fees sought by the personal representative was evidt;;ntly its belief that the 
contesting of the widow's rights to family allowance, homestead and exempt 
property was not brought in good faith. See I.e. § 15-3-720. The district court 
also refused to affirm the magistrate's allowance of attomey's fees incurred by the 
personal representative in his efforts to remain the per::onal representative. We 
find no abuse of discretion in the rulings of the magistrat'~: court and hence reverse 
the decision of the district court overturning the magistrate's allowance of those 
attorney's fees. 
As in the present case, and as is the case in mos"t probates, the personal 
representative was also one of the devisees of the Eliasen estate. Thus, his actions in 
defending the claims of the widow (who killed the decedent) were in the same nature as 
those actions of the personal representative in the case at bar, i.e. the estate was benefited, 
the claims of the widow were defended in good faith. Further, the attorneys fees and 
costs associated with the defense of the motion by the widow to remove the personal 
representative, was deemed to have occurred within the protection of Idaho Code 15-3-
720. 
The Departments memorandum aside, it is clear the law ;ll Idaho does not support 
the denial of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code l5-3-720 despite the fact 
the personal representative has an interest in the outcome as the sole heir to the estate. In 
fact, the Department once again cites the Court to case which, after careful review, do not 
support its position. 
The Department next cited In re the Estate of Zonas, 536 N.E. 2d 642(1989). 
This is a case out of Ohio, so its applicability to the case at barls suspect as it pertains to 
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Idaho law, which is based on an Idaho statute. Nevertheless, the Department's position is 
similarly flawed. Zonas, dealt with the issue of whether the statute providing for 
attorney's fees in favor of the personal representative is also applicable to attorney's fees 
recoverable by someone other than the attorneys for the fiduciary. Zonas states as 
follows: 
Appellants contend that R.C. 2107.75 mandates the recovery of their 
expenses incurred during the will contest. They claim that as attorneys for 
beneficiaries under the contested will, they fall within the statute's scope and 
purpose. The statutory language which provides that costs of defending an invalid 
will shall be allowed II * * * to the fiduciary and to the attorneys defending such 
purported last will * * * II is imprecise. 
Only a few Ohio cases have dealt specifically with whether statum 
attorney fees are recoverable by someone other than attol'~s for the fiduciary. In 
Lindsey v. Markley (1950),87 Ohio App. 529, 533,430.0.317,319,96 N.E.2d 
311, 313, the court found that G.C. 12082 did not limit authorization of fees only 
to attorneys for the estate's legal representative, but that fees "shall be allowed 'to 
the attorney or attorneys defending such purported last will,' etc." However, in 
Doty v. Peters (1958), 106 Ohio App. 435, 442, 7 O.0.2d 181, 185, 155 N.E.2d 
239, 245, R.C. 2741.04 (the immediate predecessor to the current R.c. 2107.75) 
was construed to mean that It * * * the executor and his attorneys may 
nevertheless be paid reasonable compensation out of the estate." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Although appellants would construe R.C. 2107.75 to include attorneys for 
both executors and beneficiaries, we decline to apply SUCil a broad reading. 
Upon review, we find that other states which have statutes concerning 
attorney fees in a will contest generally limit recovery of such fees to the personal 
representative, executor, or administrator. Several states model their statutes after 
the Uniform Probate Code provision on attorney fees which states: 
"If any personal representative or person nominated as a personal 
representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding. in good faith, whether 
successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses 
and disbursements including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. II Uniform 
Probate Code (1987), Section 3-720. " 
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As the Zonas case states, the fiduciary tor the estate is entitled to be granted 
attorney's fees and expenses so long as it was done in good laith. The Department's 
reliance on Zonas for any position it might take in this case, is flawed at best, and more 
importantly helpful to Lynn Wiggins' position. In fact, it gives the court a look into the 
intent behind the Uniform Probate Code's attorney fee and costs provision, i.e. 3-720. 
Idaho Code 15-3-720 came from the Uniform Probate Code. 
Finally, the Department cites Matter of Estate of Rog;rentien, 445 N. W. 288 
(Iowa 1989) for the proposition that attorney's fees in the case at bar should be denied. 
However, Roggentien, supra, does not have any application to the case at bar. In 
Roggentien, the Iowa Supreme Court was determining the appEcation of its own statute, 
which dealt with the issue of "extraordinary" fees and costs. That statute being addressed 
is inapplicable to the mandatory attorneys fees and costs under Idaho Code 15-3-720. 
Furthermore, Roggentien did not conclude that the "extraordinary" attorney's fees should 
be disallowed. In fact, just after the portion quoted by the Department, the Iowa Court 
concluded as follows: 
"We determine in this instance the executor in the'llterest of the estate was 
correct in seeking legal assistance to assess the nature of the proceeding and the 
course of action to take on the claim. However, when it became apparent the issue 
was who would take the balance of the estate the claimants or the heirs, there was 
no equity in accruing attorney fees to defend the heirs' position to the detriment of 
the claimant should she be successful. We therefore determine the order for fees 
and costs should be modified .... 
We find the attorneys have met the statutory aI td rule requirements for 
claiming extraordinary fees. We allow McMeen extrai )rdinary fees for sale of 
realty of 1 hour; for a nonprobate procedure to clear title of 1 A hours; and 
litigation time of20.6 hours, for a total of23 hours at $75 per hour; we detennine 
5 hours should be allowable for attorney Hobart at $75 per hour. We modify the 
order to allow extraordinary fees of $1,725 to McMeen and $377 for Hobart." 
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The case at bar is entirely different in the most significam ways, the first being the 
personal representative in the case at bar was successful and saved the estate the entire 
amount it had, and second, the estate in Roggentien would have been gutted by the 
attorney's fees and costs and the claimant would have received nothing, while the case at 
bar is just the opposite, i.e. had the personal representative not contested the 
Department's claim, the estate would have been gutted. In equity, the case at bar is 
contrary to the considerations in Roggentien. In fact, the decision in RoggeI1tien 
affirms the right of the case at bar to be paid its attorney's fees and costs. Equity is not a 
consideration under Idaho Code 15-3-702. 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code 15-3-720 is mandatory, despite success, that the personal 
representative is entitled to recover the attorney's fees and cost!: incurred in a good faith 
defense of the Department's claim: 
"a personal representative who defends or prosecute:; any proceeding in good 
faith, whether successful or not ... is entitled to receive from the estate his 
necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred." 
The defense was in good faith, was successful, and vrithout it the estate would 
not exist. It matters not if the Department thinks fees and costs are not in good faith jf the 
defense is against it. The statute is not subject to equitable principles, is not subject to a 
serious contention that the defense was not successful. The e:;taTe is entitled to pay its 
attorney. The payment was made before the Department to(,k action, and before the 
1 automatic stay on appeal was filed. The Department failed to perfect any stay outside the 
2 automatic stay on appeal, but even had it done so, its request for a stay is not sustainable. 
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Dated: ApriQU 2010. 
R.BRADMAS , 
Attorney for Estate 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Support of Objection to Department's Motion to Stay was mailed by regular United States mail, 
postage prepaid thereon on thisdUA'ay of ~i \ ,2010, to the following: 
Lynn Wiggins 
1520 W. 2nd Street 
Weiser, ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Kathy Garrett 
Estate Recovery Officer 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 836720-0036 
f!Ij~j ~: 
R. Brad M:lsingill 
I KENNETH LYNN WIGGINS 
I 1520 W 2ND ST 
WEISER, IDAHO 83672-1208 
Account Number: 422330274 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
31-511240 
DATE-dis J J tl 
EXHIBIT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV -2009-1926 
ORDER RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS 
The Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs ofthe Personal Representative and the Motion 
to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs of the State ofIdaho, Department I)fHealth and Welfare, 
having come before the court on the 21 sl day of April, 2010, and the COl.rt having received the 
arguments and submissions of counsel, and being fully advised herein; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Personal Representative shall 
be allowed costs as a matter of right in the sum of $20 for witness fees, and discretionary costs in 
the sum of$700 for services provided by Dennis Voorhees, for a total ([$720 in costs. Attorney 
fees requested pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 121 are DISALLOWED. The court defers 
the request for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, and it wi n issue its decision on 
that question by further order of the court. 
J 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
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Weiser, Idaho 83672 
Telephone #1(208)414-0665 
Fax #1(208)414-0490 
Email: bmasingill(a)botmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF llDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATES OF: 
VlVlAN M. WIGGINS 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
THE ESTATE'S l\IOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled estate, by and through its attorney, of record, 
R. BRAD MASINGILL, and hereby submits the following Plaintiff's First Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of the Estate's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. This 
memorandum is submitted pursuant to the Court's request for ,:dditional support for the 
Estate's request for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-Lf7. 
Plaintiffs First Supplemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 1:~-117 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 A. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 B. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Plaintiff re-asserts the legal and factual positions ir submitted in its motion 
and memorandum in support of attorney's fees and costs, under both Idaho Code 12-121 
and Idaho Code 12-117 without reasserting them herein. 
I. 
THE ESTATE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES Al\TJ) COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE l2-117 
The Statute. Idaho Code 12-117 was enacted to provide mandatory relief 
to estates which have incurred attorney's fees and costs because i governmental agency 
acted without any basis in law or fact. 
Idaho Code 12-117 reads as follows: 
"In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the 
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party ag~dnst whom the judgment 
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
Case Law. 
(1) Elliott. This statute has been applied against the State of Idaho 
regarding its improper attempt to impose it's lien tmder the very same code section, 
Idaho Code 56-218. See Matter of Estate of Elliott, 141 Ilaho 177 (2005), which 
stated as follows: 
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[I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceedilg involving as adverse 
parties a state agency, a city, a cOlmty or other taxing district and a person, the 
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorne y's fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party agdnst whom the judgment 
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12-
117(1)(2004). 
This Court has held that the purpose of this sta:ute is "two-fold: '(1) to 
serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency aCTion; and (2) to provide a 
remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjuitified financial burdens 
defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies 
never should harvel made." Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Secs. Bureau, 132 
Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) (quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of 
Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984». If the 
Court determines that a party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, an 
award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 is mandatory. rd. 
In ruling from the bench on the personal representative's request for attorney 
fees, the district court noted that, "[s]o although I ruled in the [personal 
representative's] favor and although I found that the ~:tate action was without 
basis in law, as did Judge Dutcher, I do not find that the action was so 
unreasonable or crossed that broad canyon that I think is required in 12-117." The 
district court found that the Department's actions were vdthout a basis in law but 
were not unreasonable. This determination is incolisistent considering the 
circumstances of this case. The Department presented .a flawed interpretation 
of I.C. § 56-218, an unambiguous statute, that botb the magistrate and the 
district court judges rejected, as does this Court. 
In Rincover, this Court determined that the prevaililg party was not entitled 
to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 against the Departmmt of Finance. rd. at 550, 
976 P.2d at 476. This Court noted that the Departmen1 of Finance, in wrongly 
denying the party's application for registration to sell securities, relied upon 
statutory provisions that had not been previously construed by the court. Id. 
The Court explained that, "[w]hile the district court b~low disagreed with the 
Department's interpretation and application of [the statutes] to the facts presented 
by [the applicant's] case, it does not appear that the Department's action was 
unreasonable under the circumstances." Id. This determJ nation was based on the 
Court's finding that the Department did not act "withou: or contrary to statutory 
authority." Id. 
This case is distinguishable from Rincover, where tile Court determined that 
the Department of Finance's actions were not "without or contrary to stahltory 
authority." The Department presented an erroneous interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute, I.e. § 56-218. The Departmen1 a,eted without stahltory 
authority in presenting its appeals to the district court and this Court. 
Additionally, the Department submitted issues beyond th~ scope ofthe order :C'rom 
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which this appeal arose. The Department's actions in thi; case were unreasonable 
and without a basis in law. I. C. § 12-117 required th ~ district court to award 
attorney fees where the Department's actions were brought without a basis in law. 
The district court correctly perceived the law but failed to properly apply I.C. § 
12-117. The personal representative is entitled to her fee~ incurred in the appeal to 
the district court and in the appeal to this Court pursuant 10 I.C. § 12-117." 
The issue in Elliott, supra, is the identical issue present~d in the case at bar, i.e. 
did the State pursue a lien based on its misinterpretation of the Medicaid statute, Ida/tO 
Code 56-218. The newer cases dealing with the same issue 1:'re discussed hereinafter. 
However, Elliott should have been a wake-up call to the Department that it's 
interpretation of the Medicaid statute (which the Department ha 3 been misconstruing for 
ten years) was improper and a closer look should have been g~ ven to make sure it was 
being correctly interpreted. 
(2) Perry Case. Additionally, as the Affidavit of Peter Sisson reveals, the 
Department knew of the potential misinterpretation of Idaho Code 56-218 regarding the 
issue of taking the non-Medicaid spouse's separate property, 110 Jess later than June 4, 
2009, when Peter Sisson challenged its interpretation in the Peny ease. See Affidavit of 
Peter Sisson filed concurrently herewith. Yet, the Department :tiled its lien request with 
this Court on the 18th day of November, 2009 and filed its pethion for allowance of the 
claim on November 30,2009. By then (5-6 months after the issue was brought up in the 
Perry case), there was no excuse for the Department not reass,~ssing its position in the 
case at bar. The Departments claim it had no notice of this issue for 10 years is not true. 
No Facts. Idaho Code 12-117 is applicable to the present ca3e. The State had no law 
upon which it could make a cogent argument. Furthermore, the facts of this case clearly 
showed, as the State so stipulated, that the property upon whicl the State was seeking a 
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lien was not the community property of Mr. and Mrs. Wiggins, not the separate property 
of Mrs. Wiggins, but the separate property of Emerson D. Wiggins. There are no facts 
upon which the State could have been justified in bring this lien claim. 
At the time of filing its lien and petition for allowance, the Department was well 
aware of the issue, contended that the filing of a joint probate was tantamount to 
admitting Mrs. Wiggins had an interest in Mr. Wiggin's separate property, and had 
assisted the Wiggins in dividing the assets and making Mr. Wiggin's property separate. 
Despite the Department's contention it had a factual basis for its claim, it had no 
such thing. In fact, the facts show just the opposite. 
No Law. In addition to the law cited to the Court in the previous memorandums, the 
following recent cases support the Estate's position. 
(1) Taylor. In Taylor v Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 147 
Idaho 424 (2009), Justice Horton, concurring in part and dissentmg in part, held that it is 
insufficient to avoid attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code 12-117 to contend it is 
relying on a statute. Justice Horton stated in Taylor as follows: 
"I concur in the result, save as to the denial of the Board':; request for an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. " 
and 
"Furthermore, because there is no statute authorizing, review of the Vickers' 
petition, I would conclude that not only are they not the prevailing party, but that they 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in bringing theii: petition. Giltner Dairy, 
LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633-34, 181 P.3d 1238, 1241-42 (2008). I would 
thus award the Board attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. Id." (emphasis added). 
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In Taylor, Justice Horton found that Salva's contention there was statutory 
authority under Idaho Code 67-6512 for the Court to judicially review the issues was 
improper. In Taylor, the Court determined that a condition 11 rezone based upon a 
development agreement was the functional equivalent of an i::suance of a special use 
permit, citing Idaho Code § 67-6512. The Court majority incorrectly, according to 
Justice Horton, that the Court was authorized to review the Bnard's action pursuant to 
Idaho Code 67-6512. 
However, Justice Horton correctly pointed out that they (conditional rezone and 
permit) are not the same, nor are they a functional equivalent. He would have awarded 
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 against Savala for misreading the statute, 
i.e. contending Idaho Code 67-6521 gave them the right of judicial review. See Justice 
Horton's dissent as follows: 
"In sum, I find that there is no statutory basis for any portion of the 
Vickers petition for review and thus that they acted with;mt a reasonable basis in 
fact or law in bringing it. I would accordingly remand. with instructions to the 
district court to dismiss the petition and would award attorney fees to the Board 
but not Savala." (emphasis added). 
The point being, Justice Horton acknowledged that when dealing with a statute, 
the misreading or misapplication thereof will not relieve a party of liability for costs and 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code 12-117. The State, in the case at bar, contends that 
because it relied on the federal and state statutes, as well as en the Jackman decision 
(which only discussed community property), it is sheltered from liability under Idaho 
Code 12-117. 
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As mentioned in the prior memorandums, the State had the obligation to know the 
law prior to filing its claim for lien. A simple review of the wording of the Idaho statute, 
the legislative intent of the Idaho statute, or the wording of the federal statute would have 
led a prudent attorney to question the applicability of the same t(l the separate property of 
the non-Medicaid spouse. Furthermore, the State assisted the Wiggins' by dividing lheir 
estates and paying down the estate of Vivian Wiggins (the Medicaid recipient spouse) 
until she was eligible for Medicaid. Eligibility is established pursuant to Medicaid law 
when the recipient has "no interest in any other assets". As a result, Vivian had no 
interest in Emerson's separate property due to the acts ofthe De:)aJtment. Finally, the 
foregoing was insufficient to put the Department on notice, surely the identical 
contention in the Perry case, some 5-6 months before would have put the Department on 
notice that its interpretation of the law deserved a closer look. There is no indication in 
the record of any such review, but instead the Department simply claims it had been 
doing the same thing for a decade. Doing something incorrectly for a decade does not 
make a continued reliance thereon reasonable. It is, however, the definition of 
"tmreasonable" as the Court so found. 
The State, in the case at bar, went far beyond the failure to properly interpret the 
effect of a statute as Justice Horton opined was grounds for awarding attorney's fees 
pursuant to Ida/to Code 11-117. 
The State actually participated III the removal of all of Vivian's interest in 
Emerson's property. It further attempted to use an unsigned, undated, and inadmissible 
portion of a purported decision as support for its position. That action is tmreasonable as 
per Idaho Supreme Court rule lS(fU which states that an unpubli:;hed opinion of the Idaho 
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Supreme Court may not be cited to any court. The Departm=nt violated the rule by 
submitting its copy of an unpublished, portion, unsigned, and lmproper opinion of the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Jackman. 
TIle State cannot now validly claim it acted with a reasonable basis in law or fact 
by claiming a lien against Emerson's separate property. There is no law supporting the 
State's position to claim an interest, through Vivian, in Emerson's separate property, nor 
are there any facts which could justify that position. The :filcts and law are totally 
opposite to the claim of the State in the case at bar. 
If Idaho Code 12-117 applies at all, it applies in the cm:e at bar. It applies as a 
matter of law and as a matter of fact. 
(2.) Court's Decision. Furthermore, the Court made a finding that the State 
acted "unreasonably". Discussing the obvious difference between automatic and non-
automatic transfers pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 1396(b)(4)(B), this Court stated in its decision: 
"A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is 
not an automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)( 4)(B). 
Another remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The 
Department's expansive interpretation to include lill transactions is not 
reasonable." (emphasis added). 
(3). Sunnyside. The foregoing finding alone supplies the elements 
necessary for the mandatory award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 
12-117. Idaho Code 12-117 mandates attorney's fees. See Slimnyside Industrial And 
Professional Park, LLC v Eastern Idaho Public Health Distrid, --- Idaho -----, (2009) 
which states: 
"Idaho Code Section 12-117 is not a discretionary statute. Rincover v. 
State, Dept. of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999)" 
(emphasis added). 
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(4) RammeH. In a recent case, Rammell v Idaho State Department Of 
Agriculture, 147 Idaho 415 (2009), Rammell asserted the foDowing issues on appeal 
from a determination that he violated the department's regulation:) and a statute: 
"The Rammells appeal to this Court, and present five arguments: that (1) the 
hearing officer violated their due process rights by excluding some of their 
proffered evidence regarding the reasonableness of the Department's rules; (2) 
I.C. § 25-3708 is unconstitutional; (3) the hearing ofii(:er erred by refusing to 
disqualify herself; (4) the Department regulations at issue were umeasonable and 
beyond the scope ofthe Department's authority; and (5) the award of attorney fees 
and costs imposed against them was improper. The Department, in turn, claims 
that it is entitled to costs and fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117." 
Rammell involved the misinterpretation of a statute and regulations an 
individual against a State agency. The Court found that despite Rammell's contentions 
that the action of the department violated its own statute and regulations, and that 
Rammell's actions did not, an award of attorney's fees and costs against them was he1d to 
be proper pursuant to Ida/to Code 12-117. 
Rammell, supra, stands for the proposition that if dther party to an action 
involving a state agency fails to correctly interpret the intentio;l of a statute, the losing 
party will be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idah(} Code 12-117. 
It is submitted that the case at bar involves a claim 1: y the State that it simply 
misread the statutes, and therefore should not have attorney's fees and costs awarded 
against it. Rammell instructs otherwise. 
(5) Truman. In The Matter Of The Driver's License 
Suspension Of: Hal R. Truman v Department Of Transportation (hereinafter Truman), 
Docket No. 36082 Court of Appeals of Idaho (filed Januar:r 27, 2010) was a case 
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involving the failure of the Department of Transportation to grant a hearing to the driver 
who was cited for DUI. The Idaho Supreme Court found: 
"The district court found that the de[!artment's narrow reading of IDAPA 
39.02.72.100.02 was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion because it 
failed to articulate reasons for denying the hearing other than the timeliness of the 
request and failed to articulate the guidelines upon which it reviews untimely 
hearing requests. " (emphasis added). 
Based on the foregoing finding, the district court awarded attorney's fees and 
costs to the appellant pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117. Although the district court was 
reversed on appeal, in Truman, supra, the reversal was not on the attorney's fees issue 
pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117. 
The import of the Truman decision at the district court level was the 
imposition of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho' Code 12-117 for the 
Department's failure to accurately read and apply its own regulations. The same 
application is required in the case at bar. 
(6) Gardiner. Finally, the very recerlt eases of Gardin,er v 
Boundary County (hereinafter Gardiner), Docket No. 35007, Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, (filed March 18,2010) and In The Matter Of David T. K{)otenai Hospital District 
v Bonner County (hereinafter David T.), Docket No. 36217, Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Moscow, (Filed April 23, 2010) end any doubt regarding the iSSlle before this Court. 
Gardiner, supra, holds that the agency's misinterpretation of an ordinance (the 
same construction is used for interpretation of a statute) is suffi~ient to award attorney's 
fees and costs pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Idaho Code 12-117. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Gardiner stated: 
"This Court affirms the district court's award of atto:ney fees and costs and 
awards attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
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The district court required the Board to pay attorney fees to the Gardiners under 
I.C. § 12-117(1). Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, o. city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
The Board claims that the award of attorney fees was unwarranted. The Board 
cites Ralph Naylor Farms v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 (2007), 
Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999), and 
Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Russet Valley Produce, 127 Idaho 654, 904 P.2d 566 
(1995), to demonstrate that even if it was improper for the Board to grant a special 
use permit, the ruling of the Board was reasonable. 
The Gardiners argue that Chapter 7, Section 1 (E) conflicts with the 
unambiguous meaning of I.e. § 67-6512(a), and in light of its clear meaning, the 
Board's interpretation was unreasonable. 
This Court exercises free review over a district court's application of I. C. § 
12-117. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 109 P.3d 1091, 094 
(2005). "The prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117 if 
they show that the state agency 'acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.''' 
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, 140 Idaho 11 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 
(2004). 
This Court affirms the award of attorney fees by the district court. This case 
is similar to Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 88-91,175 
P.3d 776, 778-80 (2007), and Fischer, 141 Idaho at 356, 109 P.3d at 1098, 
because in both cases an agency ignored the plain and unlll1biguous language of a 
statute or ordinance, which led to the award of attorney f~es. Likewise, the grant 
of attorney fees to the Gardiners is affirmed because the Board acted contratyjQ 
an unambiguous state statute and a local ordinance. 
(7) David T. In David T, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court again held 
that attorney's fees under Idaho Code 12-117 were proper: 
"On the other hand, we find the Hospital's position to be without reasonable 
basis in fact or law and, therefore, award the County its attorney fees pnrsuant to 
Idaho Code section 12-117." 
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David T. involved the Hospital's misinterpretation of Idaho Code 31-3505(4)(a). 
With the same reasoning as this Court used in finding the State's interpretation 42 
U.S.c. 1396(b)(4)(B) failed to consider the automatic enumerated situations in which the 
federal statute was applicable, the David T., supra case held as follows: 
"A first-party insurance claim is not one of th~: enumerated resources 
contained within the exhaustive list in Idaho Code section 31-3505(4)(a), and 
consequently, the Hospital cannot show that David T. filed a bona fide 
application. Because David T. did not file a timely claim and because his 
application cannot be construed as a valid delayed appl:ication, it is unnecessary 
for this Court to consider the other arguments made by the parties. Accordingly, 
we affirm the district court's decision denying David T.':; delayed application for 
indigencyassistance." 
David T., supra, is applicable on all fours to the C8se at bar. This Court 
determined that the list of enumerated automatic transfers in 42 U.S.c. 1396(b)(4)(B) 
made the State's attempted application of the facts of the case at bar unreasonable. David 
T., supra, found the same thing. There is no distinction between David T., supra, and the 
case at bar. 
(8) List of Issues. David T., supra, is applicable to the case at bar 
because of the most compelling lack of facts and law summarized as follows: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Idaho Code 56-218 is subject to the corstraints of 42 U.S.c. 
1396(b)(4)(B); and 
The list of automatic transfers in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(4)(BJ are not 
applicable to the non-automatic transfer to Mr. Wiggins; and 
Jackman clearly applies only to community property; and 
Citing to this Court an unpublished, unsigned, portion of a draft of a 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court violates Internal Rules of the Idaho 
Supreme Court (lRISC) 15(/) which states: 
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e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
i. 
j. 
"(f) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. At or after the oral conference 
following the presentation of oral argument or the submission of the case 
to the Court on the briefs, the Court, by the unanimous consent of all 
justices, may determine not to publish the final opinion of the Court. If an 
opinion is not published, it may not be cited as. authority or precedent 
in any court"; and 
Idaho Code 32-903 is existing law which makes a pmiy's separate property 
non-assailable; and 
In re the Estate of Barg, 752 N. W. 2nd (May 30, 2008) is directly on point; 
and 
The legislative history of Idaho Code 56-218 c1~arly shows it was only 
applicable to community property, not separate property of the non-
Medicaid spouse; and 
The State assisted Emerson and Vivian in making Emerson's property 
separate from Vivian's so Medicaid could be affo··ded to Vivian; and 
The State's assistance in making Emerson's property separate is a 
judicially binding act of the Department which co ntradicted its filing a lien 
against the separate property of Emerson; and 
This Court found the State's position to be unreascnable. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
For the State to claim it is free from the application of Idaho Code 12'-117 
because no one had opposed the State's similar actions for ten years does not allow the 
Department to escape the liability for attorney's fees and costs. The Department was also 
made aware of this issue in the Perry case, some 5-6 months prior to filing its claim of 
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lien in the case at bar, contradicting the Department's claim it ilad never had this issue 
come up. 
In fact, most of the Department's claims in this case are very troubling. If 
Wiggins' attorney, and Peter Sisson in the Perry case, could ~!ee the problem with the 
State's contradictory actions, research the law and find thatlhe State's position was 
flawed, it is respectfully submitted that the State, with its enOrm[lUS supply of legal talent 
and money should certainly have been able to ascertain the intent of the State statute and 
the Federal statute. Thus, the actions of the State have no basis in law or in fact. 
Furthermore, the State assisted Vivian Emerson to spend down her estate and thus 
become Medicaid eligible. To become Medicaid eligible, Vivian had to devoid herself of 
any interest in Emerson's separate property. See admission of llhe State on the record at 
the first hearing. To come after Emerson's estate through Vivian is simply devoid of 
reasoning. The State is estopped from doing so both judicially and factually. The State 
took a position in Vivian and Emerson's probate which is dinctly the opposite of the 
position it now takes before this Court. 
If a private attorney filed a case without knowing the sta tutory and case law basis 
for the same, while also taking a factual position in Court whicJ l is contrary to a position 
taken in another part of the same case, that attorney would ne,t only sUQ,ject his or her 
client to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 12-121, he or she 
would be sanctioned urtder IRCP 11. 
The State should be held to a standard in excess of that of a private attorney. as a 
matter of law. The State's actions have grave consequences for parties in a probate. 
They are not likely to oppose the awesome power of the State, and they should be able to 
Plaintiff s First Suppiemental Memorandum re Idaho Code 12-117 
14 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
rely upon the State's attorneys to be diligent in protecting all parties rights in a probate 
where Medicaid is involved. It is clear the Department has not done so in the in:,tant 
case, and Emerson's estate will never be made whole until attorney's fees are awarded 
pursuant to the code section which mandates the recovery, i.e. Idaho Code 12-117. 
The State had no basis in fact upon which to assert its 1 len. The lack of either 
law or fact, mandates attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117. 
As to the Court opining that Mr. Cartwright has been V(:ry pleasant to deal with, 
the Court does not know the other side and the estate is concerned that issue will affect 
the Court's decision before it. During the case, the Estate's atto:ney sent an email to Mr. 
Cartwright asking him to be a bit more pleasant to deal with, a~ he had not been such to 
that date. In fact, Mr. Cartwright was curt and rude prior to the hearing in all 
discussions. In addition, although the State did stipulate to the existence (or its 
equivalence of) a Marriage Settlement Agreement, it did so OI~ in front of the Court, 
despite being asked to do so on numerous occasions. It had steadfastly denied one 
existed until a witness was going to be called by the Estate shewing the Wiggins had to 
have executed a Marriage Settlement Agreement, because if they did not Vivian would 
never have become eligible. The witness would have also tesffied that over 70% of the 
documents she sends to the Department are lost and the Deprutment calls to have them 
resent. It was because of the foregoing Mr. Cartwright stipulated in Court to the obvious 
existence of a Marriage Settlement Agreement. 
.-Dated: May.l, 2010. 
Attorney for Estate 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fc regoing Plaintiff s First 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attcmey's Fees and Costs 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117 was mailed by United States mail on this '5~ay of 
I-'l &oW ' 201 0, to thefollowing person( s): 
Lynn Wifgins 
1520 W. 2" Street 
Weiser,ID 83672 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
c/o Corey Cartwright 
State of Idaho 
Office of Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste B 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
/lA,l c 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNET.GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
POBox 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
VIVIAN WIGGINS and 
EMERSON D. WIGGINS, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2C09-1926 
SECOND AFF!DA VIT OF '''. 
COREY CARTWRIGHT 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am the Deputy Attorney General for the Department of Health and Welfare, in 
the above~captioned matter, and have personal knowledge of the matter:; stated herein. 
2. Attached are true and correct copies of the email corresp<mdence between myself 
and the attorney for the personal representative. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT - 1 Z;\MRCases\Estate\Wigginsv\Magistrate\Second Affidavit ofVICC.wpd 
3. Other than simple transmittals, I believe this is all of the correspondence between 
myself and Mr. Masingill. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2010, 
A~£ /~ W. ~ CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this Jt day of May, 2010. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT - 2 Z;\MRCases\Estate\WigginsV lMal,>istrate\Second Affidavit ofWCC.wpd 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing 
SECOND AFFIDA VIT OF W. COREY CARTWRIGHT were trl.ailed first class, postage 
prepaid, on the 11 day of May, 2010, to: 
LYNN WIGGINS 
CIO R BRAD MASINGILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
POBOX467 
WEISER ID 83672 
WASHINGTON COUNTY MAGISTRATE CLERK 
WASHINGTON COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT 
485 E 3 RD STREET 
WEISER ID 83672 
~Qjtra.d 0; ~'-YKL 
Marchell Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT - 3 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
R. Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Tuesday, December 01,20094:13:01 PM 
Cory: as per our discussion, please be advised that I have vacated the 
hearing on the above entitled estate set for tomorrow at 11 am. I will be 
in touch for determination of our further proceedings. Thank:,; for your 
kindness in dealing with me. It is quite uncommon for me to be involved in 
this type of matter. Bear with me, as I am learning. Despite going to the 
seminars about this Medicaid and medicare stuff, it is a little complicated 
when first approaching it. 
Brad 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Thanks. Brad 
R. Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Thursday, December 03,20094:27:30 PM 
-----Original Message-----
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov] 
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 3:45 PM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Here you go. 
-----Original Message-----
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2009 2:54 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Cory: I have received a copy of your most recent Memorandum. I am 
collaborating with other attorneys in this case, and will have to scan the 
document into my computer in order to get a copy to them. Could you be so 
kind as to email me a copy? Thanks. 
Brad 
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply 
to the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, 
please delete this email after replying to the sender. 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
R. Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Tuesday, January 05, 2010 3:39:36 PM 
Thanks. I don't really know what I am looking for other than the look back 
paperwork. I have the brief done and will file it when I have finished 
reviewing the documents. Brad 
-----Orig i na I Message-----
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idjlho.qov] 
Sent: Tuesday, January OS, 2010 3: 18 PM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Sorry. I thought you were going to ask for what you wanted. I'll have 
my paralegal gather the Department documents together and we'll email 
them to you. Is there something in particular that you're interested in? 
Corey 
-----Original Message-----
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, January OS, 2010 2:28 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Cory: do I have to send discovery requests to you before I Ci:!n see the 
file? I thought you had mentioned you would be willing to make that 
available. Is there a way I can get it in sufficient time to use the 
documents for our hearing? I would be willing to come over 1:0 Boise to 
pick it up, but would rather you just copy and send it to me. Thanks. 
Brad 
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply 
to the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, 
please delete this email after replying to the sender. 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
tlR. Brad Masingill"; 
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Monday, January 111 2010 5:37:00 PM 
Brad: I asked my staff about this. The order of the documents doesn't mean 
anything. I'm told the regional files come to us in no particular order and the 
order your received the documents was just the order in which they were pulled 
and scanned. 
-----Original Message-----
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 08, 20102:13 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Corey: the documents I received were in no particular order by date. I re-
sorted them, but now that I think about it, was there some reason for them 
being out of chronological order? Thanks. 
Brad 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Attachments: 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
fiR. Brad Masingill"; 
RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Monday, February 01, 20104:21:00 PM 
20100120 Caseworker Notes.pdf 
Brad, I've been digging through this file looking for anything having to do with 
the MSA, and I found these caseworker notes. They weren't part of the regional 
file (they come off the computer only), so I don't think you got them. 
Page 3 refers to a redetermination done in 2004 where the wl)rker assumes 
there was a marriage settlement agreement when eligibility was first 
determined. Note the "HOPE SO ANYWAY" language. 
I'm not sure this helps except to support the belief that DHW assumed one 
existed, but I thought you should have it. 
Corey 
-----Original Message-----
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net] 
Sent: Saturday! January 09, 2010 1:38 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Ok. Thanks. Brad 
-----Original Message-----
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov] 
Sent: Friday, January 08, 2010 3:09 PM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: RE: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Brad, we've looked and we don't have the marriage settlement agreement. 
Not sure it was ever provided to the Department. 
-----Original Message-----
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 08, 2010 1:16 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: Re: Wiggins, Lynn re Wiggins estates 
Corey: I could not find a Marriage Settlement Agreement in the file you sent. 
Could you make sure it has not been overlooked? Thanks. 
Brad 
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may face 
penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to the 
sender that you have received this information in error. Alsol please delete this 
email after replying to the sender. 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
Wiggins Estate 
Monday, February 01, 2010 5:00:45 PM 
Corey: thanks for the copy of the previous Jackman decision. I will read 
it tonight and get back to you tomorrow. 
Brad 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
Wiggins Estate 
Monday, February 01, 2010 4:34:45 PM 
Cprey: I wanted you to know that we have not been able to find the 
MSA. We are still looking. If you wish to talk about settling this case 
please give me a call. I would talk to my clients about t if you are 
interested. 
Brad 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
Wiggins Estate 
Tuesday, February 02, 2010 9:41:30 AM 
Corey: I am afraid I don't read the first Jackman decision the way you 
do. I will be filing a response to your brief. 
Brad 
from: 
To: 
cc: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Attachments: 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
HR. Brad Masingill"; 
Genta, Stacey - Medicaid; 
RE: Wiggins Estate 
Monday, February 08, 2010 9:46:00 AM 
Generic Brief.Ddf 
Brad, I think a personal representative can be reimbursed for attorney fees 
reasonably necessary for administering an estate. IC 15-3-715(21). However, a 
personal representative is a fiduciary who has at least as much of a duty toward 
creditors of the estate, such as the Department, as he does toward the heirs of 
the estate, including himself. A personal representative is not permitted to take 
sides. In our case, I believe you are representing the family in a personal 
capacity in seeking to overturn Idaho law, rather than the personal representative 
administering the estate in accordance with existing law. I think the family has to 
be responsible for those portions of your attorney fees relatinrJ to challenging 
Idaho law governing spousal estate recovery. I've attached a generic brief that 
I've used in the past that deals with the duty of the personal mpresentative in not 
taking sides. 
Corey 
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingill@hotmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2010 5:09 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: Wiggins Estate 
Corey: I will likely be filing my Post Hearing Brief tomorrow. em I get my 
attorney's fees paid from the estate? Brad 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
R. Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:21:45 PM 
Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed in the mail. I had 
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the 
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The 
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary elemert to have 
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrate. I think you 
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessmerlt, and it will only 
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't 
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you 
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from 
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the !'ules, so I will 
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appea 
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you 
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we starteci this case, but 
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other 
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the 
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was 
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction. 
But, if it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold 
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aV\dare of any other 
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It Vvould be helpful to 
see those court's reasoning. Brad 
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and 
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed 
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehousH). Since our Notic,3 
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailecl on the 5th (and 
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have crossed in the mail. 
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under JAR 13(b), I woul:1 think the 
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you clgree? If so, will 
you vacate the hearing now set for April 21? 
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are stm trying to set for 
hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think 
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal. 
Please let me know what your intentions are. 
Corey Cartwrig ht 
The infonnation contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are adviE~ed that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this bfonnation with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to 
the sender that you have received this infonnation in error., Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlemert 
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:36:08 PM 
Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed iT, the mail. I had 
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the 
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The 
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have 
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrate. I think you 
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessment, and it will only 
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't 
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you 
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from 
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will 
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appeal 
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you 
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we starteei this case, but 
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other 
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the 
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was 
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction. 
But, if it is something you want to try, I will be happy to do so. 
Brad 
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2010 10:52:05 -0600 
From: CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov 
To: bmasingill@hotmail.com 
Dear Brad: I have your 1 st Amended Petition for Approval of I=inal Settlement 
and other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were 
mailed Monday, AprilS, so the mail is slow coming from the statehouse). Since 
our Notice of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documentn were mailed on 
the 5th (and filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these rllay have crossed in 
the mail. Since this isn't one of the matters listed under tAR 13(b), I would think 
the magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so, 
will you vacate the hearing now set for April 21? 
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and you;, I'vtemorandum in 
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were al'e still trying to set 
for hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I 
think the petition for final settlement will have to wait until aftel' the appeal. 
Please let me know what your intentions are. 
Corey Cartwright 
The information contained in this email may be privilegE:ld, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they 
may face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this 
information with unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in 
error, please reply to the sender that you have received this information 
in error. Also, please delete this email after replying to the sender. 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
R. Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:05:57 PM 
Thanks for the reply Corey. I also want to be friends. I seldom have 
a case where the opposing attorney and I are at odds. Hal Ryan, my 
former partner, told me to be that way and I have tried. As you know, 
I hope you don't succeed in your appeals. Good legell issues, don't 
you think? It is not often we get such juicy ones. Brc\d 
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 2:02 PM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Brad: The attorney fees and costs are listed under IAR 13(b)(9), so the appeal 
doesn't deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction to hear that. I don't think the appeal is 
premature. The magistrate's decision on attorney fees can become an issue on 
appeal if needed. I'll do my motion to disallow the attorney fees and set that for 
hearing before the magistrate as contemplated by the rules. I don't think that will 
affect the appeal going forward since it will take time to get the transcript prepared 
and the transcript and record settled. The attorney fee question will be decided 
long before we get to the briefing stage on the appeal. 
I'm trying to set the Motion to Stay before the district court (appnllate) judge 
because I've asked to stay the appeal itself which I don't think tile magistrate has 
authority to do. I did the motion to stay the appeal itself simply :0 save everyone 
(myself included) time and expense. I'm not trying to stay the attorney fee issue, 
just distribution of the estate and the appeal itself. While I can't guarantee it, I think 
the Perry case will go to the Supreme Court. I think Pete Sisson will appeal if we 
prevail before the district court. That would certainly decide at least the important 
legal issues in this case. 
I'm sorry if I seemed "cold" to you. I was under the impression I had been overly 
helpful and cooperative, to the point of perhaps harming my cliHnt since the 
magistrate certainly got the facts different than I had thought I rad stipulated to. I 
would hope that we could keep this matter on a professional and collegial basis 
rather than have it become personal (I get paid the same (not much) whether I win 
or lose). 
If you are asking if there are other Idaho court decisions relatinq to the Barg case, I 
don't know of any. I'm sure we'll get some more objections based on Barg before 
this is all decided and I'll simply try to stay them pending the outcome in Perry and 
this case. 
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:22 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed in the mail. I had 
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the 
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The 
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have 
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrclte. I think you 
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessment, and it will only 
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't 
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you 
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from 
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will 
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appeal 
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you 
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we started this case, but 
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other 
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the 
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs: issue was 
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction. 
But, if it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold 
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aVlare of any other 
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It would be helpful to 
see those court's reasoning. Brad 
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Filla! Settlement and 
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed 
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehouso). Since our Notice 
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailed on the 5th (and 
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have crosHed in the mail. 
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under tAR 13(b), I would think the 
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so, will 
you vacate the hearing now set for April 21? 
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are :Btill trying to set for 
hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think 
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal. 
Please let me know what your intentions are. 
Corey Cartwright 
The information contained in this email may be privileged; confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to 
the sender that you have received this information in error., Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
The information contained in this email may be privileged,: confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in err!)r, please reply to 
the sender that you have received this information in error Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
"R. Brad Masingill"; 
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:49:00 PM 
As far as good legal issues, for me Yogi Berra's famous quotE) comes to mind: 
"This is like deja vu all over again." I thought we had put this issue to rest in 
1998 in Jackman. When the Barg case was decided the estate recovery folks 
from many states talked about it and asked what states would be affected. I 
remember thinking it wouldn't affect Idaho because the issue had already been 
litigated and decided in Jackman. I wasn't surprised when someone brought up 
the issue, but I am surprised it has gotten traction. I really have not seen this as 
a difficult question, but then I've been doing this a long time and you get pretty 
close to the law and issues. It's a reminder to me to step back and show the 
court the whole picture. If this issue goes to the Supreme Court, which seems 
likely to me, I hope the Supreme Court will state their holding clearly one way or 
the other. My guess is, if the Department loses, it will go to trle legislature for a 
change like Minnesota did. At any rate, I agree it's more fun 10 have juicy legal 
issues to spice things up. 
Do I need to file anything for the hearing set for next Wednesday the 21 st, or will 
you take that off the calendar until the appeal is concluded? 
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:06 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Thanks for the reply Corey. I also want to be friends, I seldom have 
a case where the opposing attorney and I are at odd::;. Hal Ryan, my 
former partner, told me to be that way and I have tried. As you know, 
I hope you don't succeed in your appeals. Good legal issues, don't 
you think? It is not often we get such juicy ones. Brad 
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idclho.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 2:02 PM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Brad: The attorney fees and costs are listed under lAR 13(b)(9'!, so the appeal 
doesn't deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction to hear that. I dor;'t think the appeal is 
premature. The magistrate's decision on attorney fees can become an issue on 
appeal if needed. I'll do my motion to disallow the attorney fees and set that for 
hearing before the magistrate as contemplated by the rules. I don't think that will 
affect the appeal going forward since it will take time to get the transcript prepared 
and the transcript and record settled. The attorney fee question will be decided 
long before we get to the briefing stage on the appeal. 
I'm trying to set the Motion to Stay before the district court (appHllate) judge 
because I've asked to stay the appeal itself which I don't think the magistrate has 
authority to do. I did the motion to stay the appeal itself simply to save everyone 
(myself included) time and expense. I'm not trying to stay the attorney fee issue, 
just distribution of the estate and the appeal itself. While I can't guarantee it, I think 
the Perry case will go to the Supreme Court. I think Pete Sisson will appeal if we 
prevail before the district court. That would certainly decide at I(,~ast the important 
legal issues in this case. 
I'm sorry if I seemed "cold" to you. I was under the impression I had been overly 
helpful and cooperative, to the point of perhaps harming my cli€'nt since the 
magistrate certainly got the facts different than I had thought I had stipulated to. I 
would hope that we could keep this matter on a professional and collegial basis 
rather than have it become personal (I get paid the same (not much) whether I win 
or lose). 
If you are asking if there are other Idaho court decisions relatin~l to the Barg case, 
don't know of any. I'm sure we'll get some more objections based on Barg before 
this is all decided and I'll simply try to stay them pending the ou':come in Perry and 
this case. 
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:22 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed in the mail. I had 
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the 
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The 
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have 
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistratt~. I think you 
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessme1t, and it will only 
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't 
know everything about appellate practice, but I would :;uggest you 
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from 
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will 
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hec;lring your appeal 
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you 
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we started this case, but 
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other 
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the 
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was 
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction. 
But, jf it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold 
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aware of any other 
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It would be helpful to 
see those court's reasoning. Brad 
from: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaf10ogoV] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and 
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed 
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehousEl). Since our Notice 
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailec on the 5th (and 
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have cros~ed in the mail. 
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under JAR 13(b), I woukl think the 
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so, will 
you vacate the hearing now set for April 21? 
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are still trying to set for 
hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think 
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal. 
Please let me know what your intentions are. 
Corey Cartwright 
The information contained in this email may be privilegec!, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advi sed that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this ],nformation with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in ennf, please reply to 
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to 
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
From: 
To: 
Subject: 
Date: 
R. Brad Masingill 
Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid; 
RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Wednesday, April 14, 2010 4:30:04 PM 
Corey: I will review your brief and objection. My inclination is to take 
the distribution off, but I need to be sure. The attornEV's fees issue 
needs to be resolved, and I thought you were thinkinn it is not subject 
to the stay. Anyway, I will let you know tomorrow. Brad 
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idano,gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:49 PM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
As far as good legal issues, for me Yogi Berra's famous quote comes to mind: "This 
is like deja vu all over again. II I thought we had put this issue to rest in 1998 in 
Jackman. When the Barg case was decided the estate recovery folks from many 
states talked about it and asked what states would be affected. I remember 
thinking it wouldn't affect Idaho because the issue had already been litigated and 
decided in Jackman. I wasn't surprised when someone brought up the issue, but I 
am surprised it has gotten traction. I really have not seen this as a difficult question, 
but then I've been doing this a long time and you get pretty closf3 to the law and 
issues. It's a reminder to me to step back and show the court the whole picture. If 
this issue goes to the Supreme Court, which seems likely to me·, I hope the 
Supreme Court will state their holding clearly one way or the otller. My guess is, if 
the Department loses, it will go to the legislature for a change like Minnesota did. At 
any rate, I agree it's more fun to have juicy legal issues to spice things up. 
Do I need to file anything for the hearing set for next Wednesday the 21 st, or will 
you take that off the calendar until the appeal is concluded? 
From: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 3:06 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Thanks for the reply Corey. I also want to be friends I seldom have 
a case where the opposing attorney and I are at odds. Hal Ryan, my 
former partner, told me to be that way and I have tried. As you know, 
I hope you don't succeed in your appeals. Good legal issues, don't 
you think? It is not often we get such juicy ones. Brc:d 
from: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 2:02 PM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Brad: The attorney fees and costs are listed under IAR 13(b)(9) so the appeal 
doesn't deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction to hear that. I don't think the appeal is 
premature. The magistrate's decision on attorney fees can become an issue on 
appeal if needed. I'll do my motion to disallow the attorney fees and set that for 
hearing before the magistrate as contemplated by the rules. I don't think that will 
affect the appeal going forward since it will take time to get the lranscript prepared 
and the transcript and record settled. The attorney fee questior will be decided 
long before we get to the briefing stage on the appeal. 
I'm trying to set the Motion to Stay before the district court (appellate) judge 
because I've asked to stay the appeal itself which I don't think tile magistrate has 
authority to do. I did the motion to stay the appeal itself simply:o save everyone 
(myself included) time and expense. I'm not trying to stay the attorney fee issue, 
just distribution of the estate and the appeal itself. While I can't guarantee it, I think 
the Perry case will go to the Supreme Court. I think Pete SiSSO.l will appeal if we 
prevail before the district court. That would certainly decide at least the important 
legal issues in this case. 
I'm sorry if I seemed "cold" to you. I was under the impression had been overly 
helpful and cooperative, to the point of perhaps harming my cliEnt since the 
magistrate certainly got the facts different than I had thought I had stipulated to. I 
would hope that we could keep this matter on a professional and collegial basis 
rather than have it become personal (I get paid the same (not much) whether I win 
or lose). 
If you are asking if there are other Idaho court decisions relatinu to the Barg case, I 
don't know of any. I'm sure we'll get some more objections based on Barg before 
this is all decided and I'll simply try to stay them pending the outcome in Perry and 
this case. 
from: R. Brad Masingill [mailto:bmasingi@ruralnetwork.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 12:22 PM 
To: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid 
Subject: RE: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Corey: I agree that our documents must have passed ill the mail. I had 
no more than objected to the motion for stay than I had an appeal in the 
mail. On the other scores, I think your appeal is quite premature. The 
issue of attorney's fees and costs is a necessary element to have 
resolved before removing jurisdiction from the magistrate, I think you 
will find the District Court agreeing with that assessment, and it will only 
take more time to go forward with whatever you intend to do. I don't 
know everything about appellate practice, but I would suggest you 
withdraw your appeal and wait until you have a final judgment from 
which to appeal. Maybe the State is exempt from the rules, so I will 
take a look, but I cannot imagine an appellate court hearing your appeal 
and then having the second part of it coming up. Let me know what you 
want to do. You were quite cold to me when we started this case, but 
you have improved, so I would be willing to stipulate to some other 
procedure if you think of one. I was thinking of stipulating that the 
appeal would be held until the attorney's fees and costs issue was 
resolved, but I don't know if he can stipulate away or to jurisdiction. 
But, if it is helpful to you I would be willing to do so. I don't hold 
grudges. One other thing, I need to know if you are aware of any other 
magistrate or district court decisions on this issue. It would be helpful to 
see those court's reasoning. Brad 
From: Cartwright, Corey - Medicaid [mailto:CartwriW@dhw.idaho,gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2010 10:52 AM 
To: R. Brad Masingill 
Subject: First Amended Petition for Final Settlement 
Dear Brad: I have your 1st Amended Petition for Approval of Fina! Settlement and 
other documents (We got them yesterday, April 12. They show they were mailed 
Monday, April 5, so the mail is slow coming from the statehouso). Since our NoticH 
of Appeal was filed on the 8th and your documents were mailed on the 5th (and 
filed with the court on the 9th), it appears these may have crossed in the mail. 
Since this isn't one of the matters listed under IAR 13(b), I would think the 
magistrate no longer has jurisdiction to hear this matter. Do you agree? If so, will 
you vacate the hearing now set for April 21? 
I also have your Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs and your Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Department's Motion to Stay (which were are still trying to set for 
hearing), so we'll still have a couple of upcoming hearings in this matter, but I think 
the petition for final settlement will have to wait until after the appeal. 
Please let me know what your intentions are. 
Corey Cartwright 
The information contained in this email may be privileged~, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to 
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
The information contained in this email may be privileged, confidential or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in err{)r~ please reply to 
the sender that you have received this information in error.. Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
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otherwise protected from disclosure. All persons are advised that they may 
face penalties under state and federal law for sharing this information with 
unauthorized individuals. If you received this email in error, please reply to 
the sender that you have received this information in error. Also, please 
delete this email after replying to the sender. 
